Sec. 52-557n. Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents. Liability of members of local boards and commissions.

      Sec. 52-557n. Liability of political subdivision and its employees, officers and agents. Liability of members of local boards and commissions. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the political subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and (C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or participation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149. (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.

      (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for damages to person or property resulting from: (1) The condition of natural land or unimproved property; (2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain or similar structure when used by a person in a manner which is not reasonably foreseeable; (3) the temporary condition of a road or bridge which results from weather, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreational or scenic area, if the political subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condition safe; (5) the initiation of a judicial or administrative proceeding, provided that such action is not determined to have been commenced or prosecuted without probable cause or with a malicious intent to vex or trouble, as provided in section 52-568; (6) the act or omission of someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision; (7) the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization, when such authority is a discretionary function by law, unless such issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or such failure or refusal constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety; (8) failure to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such political subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circumstances; (9) failure to detect or prevent pollution of the environment, including groundwater, watercourses and wells, by individuals or entities other than the political subdivision; or (10) conditions on land sold or transferred to the political subdivision by the state when such conditions existed at the time the land was sold or transferred to the political subdivision.

      (c) Any person who serves as a member of any board, commission, committee or agency of a municipality and who is not compensated for such membership on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall not be personally liable for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1992, resulting from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy or decision-making responsibilities on such board, commission, committee or agency if such person was acting in good faith, and within the scope of such person's official functions and duties, and was not acting in violation of any state, municipal or professional code of ethics regulating the conduct of such person, or in violation of subsection (a) of section 9-369b or subsection (b) or (c) of section 1-206. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if such damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of such person.

      (P.A. 86-338, S. 13; P.A. 92-198; P.A. 93-290.)

      History: P.A. 92-198 added Subsec. (c) concerning immunity of members of local boards and commissions who are not compensated for their membership; P.A. 93-290 added Subsec. (b)(10) re preexisting conditions on land sold or transferred by the state.

      Cited. 208 C. 161. Cited. 214 C. 1. Court construed statute to provide action under Sec. 13a-149 is plaintiff's exclusive remedy against political subdivision for damages resulting from a defective road or bridge. 219 C. 179. Common law action for nuisance is barred by this section. Id., 641. Cited. 229 C. 829. Cited. 231 C. 370. Cited. 233 C. 524. Cited. 235 C. 408. Recreational land use act, Sec. 52-557f et seq. cited. 238 C. 653; Id., 687. Section allows plaintiffs to bring direct cause of action for negligence against municipality. 263 C. 22. In absence of reference to Sec. 7-308 or 7-465, statutes can coexist and a party may choose to rely on either statute. Id.

      Cited. 32 CA 373; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 829. Cited. 36 CA 601. Cited. 42 CA 624. Absent specific language in this section modifying common law rule of governmental immunity for claims of strict liability pursuant to Sec. 22-357, that section should not be so construed. 58 CA 702. Section does not bar recovery from a political subdivision where circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. 60 CA 178. Court provided jury with clear guidance on the issue of agency with respect to town's potential liability. 68 CA 284. Complaint alleging that city negligently failed to maintain a stairway in a reasonably safe condition constituted an allegation of negligent performance of a discretionary, rather than ministerial, act and therefore city was immune from liability pursuant to the statute that exempts political subdivisions from liability for negligent acts of its employees that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. 71 CA 844. Plaintiff's statutory negligence claims were barred by governmental immunity. 87 CA 353.

      Cited. 41 CS 420. Cited. 42 CS 22. Cited. 44 CS 45; Id., 527. Summary judgment granted for municipal defendants in matter where plaintiff alleged that defendant's failure to timely respond to 911 call and provide effective medical care resulted in her son's death. Plaintiff unable to invoke imminent harm/identifiable person exception to defendant's claimed governmental immunity because decedent was not identifiable nor was the harm imminent. 49 CS 200.

      Subsec. (a):

      Subdiv. (1)(C): Liability in nuisance can be imposed on a municipality only if condition constituting the nuisance was created by positive act of the municipality. 245 C. 385. Subdiv. (2)(A): Plaintiff's claim against city for intentional infliction of emotional distress by city employee is barred by governmental immunity. 267 C. 669. Subdiv. (1)(B) codifies common law rule that municipalities are liable for their negligent acts committed in their proprietary capacity. 279 C. 830. Appellate Court improperly concluded that plaintiff, the mother of a six-year-old child attending after school program located within a public school, fell within identifiable person imminent harm exception to governmental immunity. Only persons recognized for purposes of exception are school children attending public schools during school hours. 284 C. 91.

      Cited. 39 CA 289. Language of section is clear and unambiguous in abrogating governmental immunity that common law gives to municipalities with respect to vicarious liability. 66 CA 669. Parties need not comply with filing requirements of Sec. 7-465 in order to utilize this section, rather parties can bring a direct cause of action for negligence against a municipality under its provisions. Id. Although trial court improperly analyzed plaintiff's claims under subsection, which concerns claims brought directly against a municipality, rather than under applicable municipal indemnification statute (Sec. 7-465), which provides that qualified municipal immunity does not apply to claims for indemnification for acts by municipal employees unless the acts are willful or wanton, she could not prevail on claim that trial court improperly granted motion for a directed verdict because there is no recognized right to a claim for emotional distress resulting to a person from loss of a pet. 84 CA 395. Trial court properly struck plaintiffs' negligence claim where plaintiffs claimed that city's negligence in failing to ensure security of the building after city had taken the property by eminent domain resulted in plaintiffs property being stolen and destroyed. Pursuant to Subdiv. (2)(B) city cannot be held liable for the actions of its employees pertaining to security of the property. 88 CA 1. Because municipal status of city of New Haven was undisputed, the protection afforded under Subdiv. (2)(A) granted municipal immunity from liability for intentional tort committed by plaintiff's coemployee who was a city employee. 92 CA 558. Subdiv. (2)(A): A municipality may not be held liable for the intentional acts of its employees including the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 108 CA 710. When a law enforcement officer has been ordered by the court to vacate an arrest warrant, this is a mandatory duty; failure to do so may not be excused by governmental immunity. 110 CA 389.

      Subdiv. (2)(B) cited. 41 CS 402. Subdiv. (1)(A) cited. Id. Governmental immunity inapplicable in case in which plaintiff was involved in assisting police when she was bitten by police dog. 46 CS 197.

      Subsec. (b):

      Subdiv. (7) cited. 226 C. 314. Subdiv. (6): Provision does not establish a sole proximate causation standard or some other heightened causation standard; codifies common law that municipal defendants are not liable for acts of nonemployees or nonagents of the municipality. 245 C. 385.