287.020. Definitions--intent to abrogate earlier case law.
Definitions--intent to abrogate earlier case law.
287.020. 1. The word "employee" as used in this chapter shall beconstrued to mean every person in the service of any employer, as defined inthis chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written,or under any appointment or election, including executive officers ofcorporations. Except as otherwise provided in section 287.200, any referenceto any employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, alsoinclude his dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may be payable. The word "employee" shall also include all minors who work for an employer,whether or not such minors are employed in violation of law, and all suchminors are hereby made of full age for all purposes under, in connection with,or arising out of this chapter. The word "employee" shall not include anindividual who is the owner, as defined in subsection 43 of section 301.010,RSMo, and operator of a motor vehicle which is leased or contracted with adriver to a for-hire motor carrier operating within a commercial zone asdefined in section 390.020 or 390.041, RSMo, or operating under a certificateissued by the Missouri department of transportation or by the United StatesDepartment of Transportation, or any of its subagencies.
2. The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpectedtraumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrenceand producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specificevent during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because workwas a triggering or precipitating factor.
3. (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be aninjury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury byaccident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor incausing both the resulting medical condition and disability. "The prevailingfactor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor,causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of theemployment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all thecircumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing theinjury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employmentto which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated tothe employment in normal nonemployment life.
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes isnot compensable.
(4) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, orcerebrovascular accident or myocardial infarction suffered by a worker is aninjury only if the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the resultingmedical condition.
(5) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence tothe physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is usedto make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures,artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which areplaced in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease orinfection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case exceptas specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupationaldisease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious orinfectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shallthey include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is atwork.
4. "Death" when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation meansonly death resulting from such violence and its resultant effects occurringwithin three hundred weeks after the accident; except that in cases ofoccupational disease, the limitation of three hundred weeks shall not beapplicable.
5. Injuries sustained in company-owned or subsidized automobiles inaccidents that occur while traveling from the employee's home to theemployer's principal place of business or from the employer's principal placeof business to the employee's home are not compensable. The extension ofpremises doctrine is abrogated to the extent it extends liability foraccidents that occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer evenif the accident occurs on customary, approved, permitted, usual or acceptedroutes used by the employee to get to and from their place of employment.
6. The term "total disability" as used in this chapter shall meaninability to return to any employment and not merely mean inability to returnto the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of theaccident.
7. As used in this chapter and all acts amendatory thereof, the term"commission" shall hereafter be construed as meaning and referring exclusivelyto the labor and industrial relations commission of Missouri, and the term"director" shall hereafter be construed as meaning the director of thedepartment of insurance, financial institutions and professional registrationof the state of Missouri or such agency of government as shall exercise thepowers and duties now conferred and imposed upon the department of insurance,financial institutions and professional registration of the state of Missouri.
8. The term "division" as used in this chapter means the division ofworkers' compensation of the department of labor and industrial relations ofthe state of Missouri.
9. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "minor" means a person whohas not attained the age of eighteen years; except that, for the purpose ofcomputing the compensation provided for in this chapter, the provisions ofsection 287.250 shall control.
10. In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of thelegislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on themeaning of or definition of "accident", "occupational disease", "arising outof", and "in the course of the employment" to include, but not be limited to,holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d524 (Mo.App.W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing,interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
(RSMo 1939 § 3695, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 438; RSMo 1939 § 3744; A.L. 1945 p. 1996, A.L. 1959 S.B. 167, A.L. 1963 p. 408, A.L. 1967 p. 384, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1977 S.B. 49, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 2005 S.B. 1 & 130, A.L. 2008 H.B. 1883)Prior revision: 1929 §§ 3305, 3354
Effective 6-26-08
CROSS REFERENCE:
Division of motor carrier and railroad safety abolished, duties and functions transferred to highways and transportation commission and department of transportation, RSMo 226.008