287.430. Limitation as to action, exception.
Limitation as to action, exception.
287.430. Except for a claim for recovery filed against the secondinjury fund, no proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall bemaintained unless a claim therefor is filed with the division within twoyears after the date of injury or death, or the last payment made underthis chapter on account of the injury or death, except that if the reportof the injury or the death is not filed by the employer as required bysection 287.380, the claim for compensation may be filed within three yearsafter the date of injury, death, or last payment made under this chapter onaccount of the injury or death. The filing of any form, report, receipt,or agreement, other than a claim for compensation, shall not toll therunning of the periods of limitation provided in this section. The filingof the report of injury or death three years or more after the date ofinjury, death, or last payment made under this chapter on account of theinjury or death, shall not toll the running of the periods of limitationprovided in this section, nor shall such filing reactivate or revive theperiod of time in which a claim may be filed. A claim against the secondinjury fund shall be filed within two years after the date of the injury orwithin one year after a claim is filed against an employer or insurerpursuant to this chapter, whichever is later. In all other respects thelimitations shall be governed by the law of civil actions other than forthe recovery of real property, but the appointment of a conservator shallbe deemed the termination of the legal disability from minority ordisability as defined in chapter 475, RSMo. The statute of limitationscontained in this section is one of extinction and not of repose.
(RSMo 1939 § 3727, A.L. 1941 p. 718, A.L. 1947 V. II p. 448, A.L. 1965 pp. 397, 419, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1992 H.B. 975, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 1998 H.B. 1237, et al.)Prior revision: 1929 § 3337
(1965) There is no legislative intent expressed in this section to extinguish completely a workmen's compensation claim if not filed within the period provided by the statute. Welborn v. Southern Equipment Company (Mo.), 395 S.W.2d 119.
(1966) While the furnishing of an elastic bandage by the employer's nurse constituted medical aid to relieve from the effects of injury, the mere wearing of that elastic bandage did not toll the statute of limitations while wearing the bandage. Morgan v. Krey Packing Co. (A.), 403 S.W.2d 668.
(1967) The word "treatment" does not include mere physical examination or mere diagnosis. Bryant v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (A.), 416 S.W.2d 195.
(1968) The limitation period does not begin to run until it becomes reasonably discoverable and apparent that a compensable injury has been sustained. Williams v. S.N. Long Warehouse Co. (A.), 426 S.W.2d 725.
(1976) Held, advice to treat ankle with "warm soaks" constituted "medical treatment" and that such treatment constituted "payment" sufficient to toll statute of limitations. Faries v. ACF Industries, Inc. (A.), 531 S.W.2d 93.
(2002) Use of term "extinction" indicates legislative intent that the two-year limitation is substantive and jurisdictional rather than procedural and waivable. Marston v. Juvenile Justice Center, 88 S.W.3d 534 (Mo.App.W.D.).