508.010. Venue for nontort and tort suits--principal place of residence, defined.

Venue for nontort and tort suits--principal place of residence,defined.

508.010. 1. As used in this section, "principal place of residence"shall mean the county which is the main place where an individual residesin the state of Missouri. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that thecounty of voter registration at the time of injury is the principal placeof residence. There shall be only one principal place of residence.

2. In all actions in which there is no count alleging a tort, venueshall be determined as follows:

(1) When the defendant is a resident of the state, either in thecounty within which the defendant resides, or in the county within whichthe plaintiff resides, and the defendant may be found;

(2) When there are several defendants, and they reside in differentcounties, the suit may be brought in any such county;

(3) When there are several defendants, some residents and othersnonresidents of the state, suit may be brought in any county in this statein which any defendant resides;

(4) When all the defendants are nonresidents of the state, suit maybe brought in any county in this state.

3. The term "tort" shall include claims based upon improper healthcare, under the provisions of chapter 538, RSMo.

4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions inwhich there is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff wasfirst injured in the state of Missouri, venue shall be in the county wherethe plaintiff was first injured by the wrongful acts or negligent conductalleged in the action.

5. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all actions inwhich there is any count alleging a tort and in which the plaintiff wasfirst injured outside the state of Missouri, venue shall be determined asfollows:

(1) If the defendant is a corporation, then venue shall be in anycounty where a defendant corporation's registered agent is located or, ifthe plaintiff's principal place of residence was in the state of Missourion the date the plaintiff was first injured, then venue may be in thecounty of the plaintiff's principal place of residence on the date theplaintiff was first injured;

(2) If the defendant is an individual, then venue shall be in anycounty of the individual defendant's principal place of residence in thestate of Missouri or, if the plaintiff's principal place of residence wasin the state of Missouri on the date the plaintiff was first injured, thenvenue may be in the county containing the plaintiff's principal place ofresidence on the date the plaintiff was first injured.

6. Any action, in which any county shall be a plaintiff, may becommenced and prosecuted to final judgment in the county in which thedefendant or defendants reside, or in the county suing and where thedefendants, or one of them, may be found.

7. In all actions, process shall be issued by the court in which theaction is filed and process may be served in any county within the state.

8. In any action for defamation or for invasion of privacy, theplaintiff shall be considered first injured in the county in which thedefamation or invasion was first published.

9. In all actions, venue shall be determined as of the date theplaintiff was first injured.

10. All motions to dismiss or to transfer based upon a claim ofimproper venue shall be deemed granted if not denied within ninety days offiling of the motion unless such time period is waived in writing by allparties.

11. In a wrongful death action, the plaintiff shall be consideredfirst injured where the decedent was first injured by the wrongful acts ornegligent conduct alleged in the action. In any spouse's claim for loss ofconsortium, the plaintiff claiming consortium shall be considered firstinjured where the other spouse was first injured by the wrongful acts ornegligent conduct alleged in the action.

12. The provisions of this section shall apply irrespective ofwhether the defendant is a for-profit or a not-for-profit entity.

13. In any civil action, if all parties agree in writing to a changeof venue, the court shall transfer venue to the county within the stateunanimously chosen by the parties. If any parties are added to the causeof action after the date of said transfer who do not consent to saidtransfer then the cause of action shall be transferred to such county inwhich venue is appropriate under this section, based upon the amendedpleadings.

14. A plaintiff is considered first injured where the trauma orexposure occurred rather than where symptoms are first manifested.

(RSMo 1939 § 871, A.L. 1965 p. 659, A.L. 2005 H.B. 393)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 720; 1919 § 1177; 1909 § 1751

CROSS REFERENCES:

Action against carrier for loss or damage to shipment, RSMo 537.250

Action against nonresident motorist, RSMo 506.290

Administrative decisions, proceedings to review, Chap. 536, RSMo

Administrative rules, action to test validity, Chap. 536, RSMo

Applicability of statute changes to cases filed after August 28, 2005, RSMo 538.305

Dissolution of marriage, divorce and maintenance actions, Chap. 452, RSMo

Injunction to stay suit or judgment, RSMo 526.090

Mortgage foreclosure action, RSMo 443.200

Venue in wrong circuit or division circuit court, may transfer case where it could have been brought, RSMo 476.410

(1952) Objection to venue can be waived and unless fact of improper venue is raised by party entitled to assert it before trial it is waived. Entry of general appearance constitutes waiver. Jones v. Church (A.), 252 S.W.2d 647.

(1953) Venue of action in county where one or more of several defendants reside does not require that a joint cause of action be asserted against all defendants. If causes which may be joined under § 507.040 are asserted against the defendants, subdivision (2) of this section fixes venue. State ex rel. Campbell v. James (Mo.), 263 S.W.2d 402.

(1954) A foreign corporation may be sued under § 508.040 in any county where it has an office if it is the sole defendant but if it is joined as a codefendant with others it must be sued in the county where its registered office is maintained or in a county where one of the defendants resides. State ex rel. Whiteman v. James, 364 Mo. 589, 265 S.W.2d 298.

(1956) Action for declaratory judgment and injunction against former partners of plaintiff and stakeholder based on contract for settlement of partnership, where there were both resident and nonresident defendants, held properly brought in county of stakeholder's residence although joint cause of action against stakeholder and other defendants was not stated. Durwood v. Dubinsky (Mo.), 291 S.W.2d 909.

(1956) Where all parties to action were residents of Kansas and defendant was served in Missouri, there apparently being collusion between defendant and plaintiff's counsel, court had discretion to dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens. Elliott v. Johnston, 365 Mo. 881, 292 S.W.2d 589.

(1958) Where summons in separate maintenance action was served on defendant who was nonresident of county while he was in the county defending a criminal nonsupport proceeding instigated by his wife, the evidence was insufficient to establish fraud so as to invalidate the service. Glaize v. Glaize (A.), 311 S.W.2d 575.

(1959) Where plaintiff resided in one county and two defendants in another, service on one defendant in his home county did not confer jurisdiction over him, even though the other defendant was served in the county in which plaintiff resided. State ex rel. McCarter v. Craig (Mo.), 328 S.W.2d 589.

(1959) In suit by Pulaski County residents against three defendants where one was nonresident of the state and other two were residents of Howell County, but the only defendant served was found in Pulaski County, Pulaski County was the proper venue for the action against the one defendant served. State ex rel. Kissinger v. Allison (A.), 328 S.W.2d 952.

(1960) Circuit court of Jasper County was without jurisdiction of appeal from action of attorney general in formulating ballot title for constitutional amendment since service of summons was ineffectual to confer jurisdiction over defendant's person and, if the action was in rem, the situs of ballot title was in Cole County. State ex rel. Dalton v. Oldham (Mo.), 336 S.W.2d 519.

(1960) Venue in a suit against a foreign insurance company and an individual is governed by § 508.010 which provides that when there are several defendants and they reside in different counties, suit may be brought in any such county. Section 351.375 has no application to foreign insurance companies. State ex rel. Stamm v. Mayfield (Mo.), 340 S.W.2d 631.

(1961) Where a corporation of one county was sued by a resident of another county the corporation could not bring in by a third party petition another defendant who resided in the same county in which the corporation resides since the court of the county of plaintiff's residence would not have jurisdiction over him under the venue statutes. State ex rel. Carney v. Higgins (Mo.) 352 S.W.2d 35.

(1962) The objection to venue is a personal privilege and it was waived where, after plaintiffs in two cases had dismissed as to the one defendant in each case who resided in the county where suit was filed, the defendant consented to a consolidation of the two actions, accepted an assignment to a trial division and requested a continuance. In such circumstances the objection that one defendant was made a defendant solely for the purpose of fixing the venue was waived. Hutchinson v. Steinke (A.), 353 S.W.2d 137.

(1962) Where individual and foreign business corporation were joined as co-defendants in action brought in Jackson County venue was improper only as to individual defendant, a resident of Franklin County, since the corporation maintained its registered office and registered agent in St. Louis City although it maintained a general business office in Kansas City and did not object to venue. State v. Jensen (Mo.), 359 S.W.2d 343.

(1987) For actions against the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission special venue is fixed in Cole County by 1927 judicial interpretation of section 226.100 since office is established in Jefferson City and thus venue in action against Commission pursuant to this section was improper. State ex. rel. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 731 S.W.2d 461 (Mo.App.).