537.053. Sale of alcoholic beverage may be proximate cause of personal injuries or death--requirements--(dram shop law).
Sale of alcoholic beverage may be proximate cause of personalinjuries or death--requirements--(dram shop law).
537.053. 1. Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop Act in 1934(Laws of 1933-34, extra session, page 77), it has been and continues to bethe policy of this state to follow the common law of England, as declaredin section 1.010, RSMo, to prohibit dram shop liability and to follow thecommon law rule that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not the proximatecause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons.
2. Notwithstanding subsection 1 of this section, a cause of actionmay be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personalinjury or death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor bythe drink for consumption on the premises when it is proven by clear andconvincing evidence that the seller knew or should have known thatintoxicating liquor was served to a person under the age of twenty-oneyears or knowingly served intoxicating liquor to a visibly intoxicatedperson.
3. For purposes of this section, a person is "visibly intoxicated"when inebriated to such an extent that the impairment is shown bysignificantly uncoordinated physical action or significant physicaldysfunction. A person's blood alcohol content does not constitute primafacie evidence to establish that a person is visibly intoxicated within themeaning of this section, but may be admissible as relevant evidence of theperson's intoxication.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to provide a right ofrecovery to a person who suffers injury or death proximately caused by theperson's voluntary intoxication unless the person is under the age oftwenty-one years. No person over the age of twenty-one years or theirdependents, personal representative, and heirs may assert a claim fordamages for personal injury or death against a seller of intoxicatingliquor by the drink for consumption on the premises arising out of theperson's voluntary intoxication.
5. In an action brought pursuant to subsection 2 of this sectionalleging the sale of intoxicating liquor by the drink for consumption onthe premises to a person under the age of twenty-one years, proof that theseller or the seller's agent or employee demanded and was shown a driver'slicense or official state or federal personal identification card,appearing to be genuine and showing that the minor was at least twenty-oneyears of age, shall be relevant in determining the relative fault of theseller or seller's agent or employee in the action.
6. No employer may discharge his or her employee for refusing serviceto a visibly intoxicated person.
(L. 1985 S.B. 345 § 1, A.L. 2002 H.B. 1532)(1985) There is no common-law "dramshop" liability on the part of a social host who serves alcohol in his home to an intoxicated guest who later injures a third party. Harriman v. Smith (A.), 697 S.W.2d 219.
(1987) Licensed vendors of liquor not to be consumed on the premises are "dram shop keepers" and are protected from liability according to the terms of this section. Ernst v. Dowdy, 739 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.App.).
(1987) Three men who planned a party at the home of one of the men's parents were not liable for the injuries of a woman who was involved in a motor vehicle accident while a passenger in a vehicle driven by a man who was intoxicated and had become so at the party given by the three men. Childress v. Sams, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.banc).
(2000) Provisions of Missouri's dram shop law that impose liability only upon conviction of sale of liquor to a person under age or to an obviously intoxicated person are an unconstitutional violation of the state's open courts provision, Missouri Constitution Article I, Section 14, because access to the courts is conditioned upon a prosecutor's decision to bring the case. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545 (Mo.banc).
(2002) Kilmer v. Mun decision applies retrospectively. Piskorski v. Larice, 70 S.W.3d 573 (Mo.App.E.D.).
(2006) Dram shop act is constitutional under open courts clause and equal protection clause. Snodgrass v. Martin & Bayley, Inc., 204 S.W.3d 638 (Mo.banc).