706.13 Slander of title.

706.13

706.13 Slander of title.

706.13(1)

(1) In addition to any criminal penalty or civil remedy provided by law, any person who submits for filing, entering in the judgment and lien docket or recording, any lien, claim of lien, lis pendens, writ of attachment, financing statement or any other instrument relating to a security interest in or the title to real or personal property, and who knows or should have known that the contents or any part of the contents of the instrument are false, a sham or frivolous, is liable in tort to any person interested in the property whose title is thereby impaired, for punitive damages of $1,000 plus any actual damages caused by the filing, entering or recording.

706.13(2)

(2) This section applies to any person who causes another person to act in the manner specified in sub. (1).

706.13(3)

(3) This section does not apply to a register of deeds or other government employee who acts in the course of his or her official duties and files, enters or records any instrument relating to title on behalf of another person.

706.13 - ANNOT.

History: 1979 c. 221; 1995 a. 224; 1997 a. 27.

706.13 - ANNOT.

Enactment of this section did not create a cause of action nor destroy the common-law right of recovery. Schlytter v. Lesperance, 62 Wis. 2d 661, 215 N.W.2d 552 (1974).

706.13 - ANNOT.

When a lawsuit is commenced under this section, conditional rather than absolute privilege applies to the filing of a lis pendens. Kensington Development v. Israel, 142 Wis. 2d 894, 419 N.W.2d 241 (1988).

706.13 - ANNOT.

The filing of a lis pendens is not privileged when there is no relationship between the filing and the underlying action. Larson v. Zilz, 151 Wis. 2d 637, 445 N.W.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1989).

706.13 - ANNOT.

To recover for slander of title, it is not necessary in all cases to prove the loss of an actual sale. The trial court must consider whether it is reasonable under the circumstances to require proof that the slander prevented a particular sale, and if not, the court must determine the degree of particularity required. Tym v. Ludwig, 196 Wis. 2d 375, 538 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-2859.