Estey v. Commissioner
Case Date: 05/03/1994
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 93-1453
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 93-1453 DEBRA ESTEY, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge] ___________________ ____________________ Before Torruella, Circuit Judge, _____________ Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________ and Cyr, Circuit Judge. _____________ ____________________ Patrick Francis Ende, with whom Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc. _____________________ ________________________________ was on brief for appellants. Peter D. Coffman, with whom Jay P. McCloskey, United States _________________ _________________ Attorney, Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Jay ________________ ___________ Singer and Deborah Ruth Kant, Department of Justice, were on brief for ______ _________________ appellee. ____________________ April 20, 1994 ____________________ BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs appeal BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge. _____________________ from a judgment on stipulated facts upholding a policy of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that reduces their food stamp benefits. The district court upheld the USDA policy of counting as income for food stamp purposes the utility reimbursements plaintiffs receive from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and from the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Estey v. Commissioner, Maine _____ ___________________ Dep't of Human Servs., 814 F. Supp. 152 (D. Me. 1993). _______________________ Because we conclude that the energy-related components of HUD and FmHA utility reimbursements are excluded by statute from income under the Food Stamp Act, we reverse. I. I. BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________ The defendant-appellees are the Secretary of USDA (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services, the state agency charged with applying USDA's uniform guidelines in administering the food stamp program in Maine. Plaintiffs are a class of tenants receiving food stamps, paying for household utilities, and living in HUD public housing, in privately-owned "Section 8" HUD-assisted apartments, and in privately-owned FmHA-assisted housing.1 ____________________ 1The class includes [a]ll the persons in the State of Maine who will receive or who have received FmHA and/or HUD utility [reimbursements] anytime since March 1, 1990 and whose food stamp benefits were or will be -2- Plaintiffs, as tenants in HUD and FmHA housing, receive monthly payments, called "utility reimbursements," because all of their utilities are not included in their rent, and because their monthly income is very low relative to average utility costs in their communities. The issue on appeal is whether USDA may count utility reimbursements as income under the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. 2011-2032, although section 2014(d)(11)(A) of the Act expressly excludes "energy assistance" payments from food stamp income. A. Food Stamp Act A. Food Stamp Act The Food Stamp Act establishes a federally-funded, state-administered program to alleviate malnutrition and hunger in low income households by providing needy persons with coupons to purchase food from retail stores. See id. ___ ___ 2011; Massachusetts v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424, 425 (1st Cir. _____________ ____ 1990); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1124 (3d Cir. 1989). ____ _____ USDA establishes uniform standards for food stamp eligibility. See 7 U.S.C. 2014(b). Eligibility depends on ___ income. "Income" is defined as money payable to a household, from whatever source, subject to the exclusions and deductions in the Act. See id. 2014(d)-(e). The exclusion ___ ___ ____________________ wrongfully terminated, reduced, or denied because of the defendant's policy of refusing to exclude FmHA and/or HUD utility [reimbursements] from "income" when determining food stamp eligibility and benefits. Estey, 814 F. Supp. at 154. _____ -3- at issue exempts from food stamp income "any payments or allowances made for the purpose of providing energy assistance under any Federal law." Id. 2014(d)(11)(A). ___ Plaintiffs, as recipients of FmHA and HUD utility reimbursements, are allotted fewer food stamps because USDA interprets the Act to include utility reimbursements as income. B. HUD and FmHA Utility Reimbursements B. HUD and FmHA Utility Reimbursements To frame an analysis of whether utility reimbursements are "energy assistance" under the Food Stamp Act, we outline the regulations on utility reimbursements under the FmHA rental assistance program and the HUD section 8 and public housing programs. In relevant respects, these regulations are identical. Tenants in HUD and FmHA housing pay no more than 30% of household income for rent plus an allowance for any utilities not supplied by the landlord. See 42 U.S.C. 1437a(a)(1); 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, ___ exhs. B.IV.A.2.c, E.II.E. Water, sewerage, trash collection, electricity, cooking fuel, heat, and hot water are utilities for which allowances may be established. See 24 C.F.R. ___ 813.102, 965.472, 965.476; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exhs. A-5, A-6. The FmHA utility allowance reflects the utility costs incurred by the majority of households in similar units in a housing complex. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exh. ___ A-6.I, -6.II. HUD utility allowances represent a "reasonable -4- consumption" of utilities "by an energy-conservative household of modest circumstances consistent with the requirements of a safe, sanitary and healthful living environment." 24 C.F.R. 813.102, 965.476(a). To prevent tenants who pay for their own utilities from generally incurring excessive utility costs, HUD and FmHA regulations permit rent (capped at 30% of income) to be offset by an allowance for utilities. See 24 C.F.R. ___ 813.102, 913.102; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exh. E.IX.A.1. This set off results in a payment called a "utility reimbursement" whenever monthly income is very low and utility costs are relatively high. A utility reimbursement is equal to the sum of all allowances for any utilities not supplied by the landlord minus 30% of monthly income. See 24 ___ C.F.R. 813.102, 913.102; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exh. E.IX.A.2. For example, if a tenant's monthly income is $100, $30 (30%) is the total amount the tenant must pay for housing costs, including any utility allowance. If the utility allowance is $5, the tenant will not receive a utility reimbursement, but will owe the landlord only $25 because the allowance is credited against the total amount due. A tenant with the same monthly income, but with a utility allowance of $50, will pay the landlord no rent and will receive a utility reimbursement of $20 (the utility allowance minus 30% of -5- $100). Every tenant entitled to a utility reimbursement receives a bill from at least one utility company. The reimbursement ensures that FmHA and HUD tenants, living in very poor households, will not generally pay more than 30% of household income for energy, water, sewerage, and trash collection costs. II. II. DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________ Plaintiffs argue that utility reimbursements are "energy assistance," and that section 2014(d)(11)(A) of the Food Stamp Act exempts such assistance from income calculations. USDA contends that this provision, excluding from food stamp income "any payments for the purpose of providing energy assistance," is inapplicable because "energy assistance" is limited to payments made to offset rapidly rising energy costs, whereas utility reimbursements cover routine utility costs.2 ____________________ 2Courts have split over whether USDA may count utility reimbursements as income. See, e.g., West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d ___ ____ ____ _____ 1122 (3d Cir. 1989) (striking down USDA's policy); accord ______ South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Madigan, 824 F. Supp. ___________________________________ _______ 1469, 1477 (D.S.D. 1993), appeal docketed, Nos. 93-2849, 93- _______________ 2869 (8th Cir. July 21 & 23, 1993); Carpenter v. North _________ _____ Carolina Dep't of Human Res., 419 S.E.2d 582 (N.C. Ct. App. _____________________________ 1992). Contra Gore v. Espy, Nos. 2:91-0139, 2:91-0826 ______ ____ ____ (S.D.W.V. March 31, 1993); Scott v. Grunow, No. 1:90-0188 _____ ______ (M.D. Tenn. May 22, 1992); Susan v. Scales, No. S-91-65M _____ ______ (N.D. Ind. May 19, 1992); Garcia v. Madigan, No. H-91-1992 ______ _______ (S.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 1991); Larry v. Yamauchi, 753 F. Supp. _____ ________ 784 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Mitchell v. Block, No. 82-3297-3 ________ _____ (D.S.C. June 22, 1983); Orr v. Arizona Dep't of Econ. Sec., ___ ____________________________ 761 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). Cf. Maryland Dep't of ___ __________________ -6- A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review A court reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers must first determine whether Congress has spoken to the "precise question at issue." Chevron _______ U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 ______ _____________________________ (1984). The precise question in this case is whether "energy assistance" under section 2014(d)(11)(A) encompasses only payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. Cf. id. at ___ ___ 840, 845 (noting that precise question at issue is whether EPA's plantwide definition of "stationary source" applies to a statute requiring permits for new or modified stationary sources of air pollution). If Congress's intent on this question is clear, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. ___ Our review of the district court's construction of the statute is de novo. See Lyng, 893 F.2d at 428. __ ____ ___ ____ In determining congressional intent, we employ the traditional tools of statutory construction, including a consideration of the language, structure, purpose, and history of the statute. See Dion v. Commissioner, Maine ___ ____ ____________________ Dep't of Human Servs., 933 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1991). Our _____________________ inquiry begins with an examination of the relevant statutory ____________________ Human Res. v. USDA, 976 F.2d 1462 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding ___________ ____ USDA's interpretation of exclusion for energy assistance provided under state or local laws). -7- language. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 ____________________ _________ (1982). To be excluded from income under section 2014(d)(11)(A), a payment must be "for the purpose of energy assistance." The Act provides no definition for "energy assistance," but its meaning is generally understood. A payment that provides "assistance" commonly refers to a public subsidy; for example: housing assistance, rental assistance, and medical assistance payments. We assume "`that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.'" American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. ____________________ at 68 (citation omitted). In the absence of a manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary, we conclude that "energy assistance" means what it says: a public subsidy for the purchase of energy. Under this plain reading of the provision, the plaintiffs have no colorable claim unless their utility reimbursements are subsidies for energy. FmHA and HUD utility allowances account for nonenergy utilities such as water, sewerage, and trash collection, as well as energy utilities including heat, electricity, natural gas, and hot water. A tenant directly liable for certain utilities receives a utility reimbursement only if the sum of the allowances for these utilities exceeds 30% of household income. Therefore, a utility reimbursement does not subsidize energy purchases unless the tenant pays at least -8- one energy company for the services provided. Otherwise, a utility reimbursement is not an energy subsidy at all because it assiststhe tenantonly inpaying nonenergyutility providers. In response to the Secretary's argument that utility reimbursements can never be energy assistance because they might offset nonenergy utility costs, plaintiffs contend that utility reimbursements are always energy assistance because they are intended "primarily" for the payment of energy bills. A committee report discussing the energy assistance exclusion states that benefits provided by the Home Energy Assistance Act, and the Energy Crisis Intervention and Energy Crisis Assistance Programs, are "energy assistance." See H.R. Rep. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d ___ Sess. 122-23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 843, 955- ____________ 56. Because these programs historically provided food, medicine, and rental assistance, as well as direct subsidies for fuel bills, plaintiffs contend that Congress did not intend "energy assistance" to include payments only for energy utilities. Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the difference between their utility reimbursements and the benefits provided under the programs discussed in the House Report. According to the report, these programs provided assistance to offset the impact of high energy costs. See id.; see also ___ ___ ________ 45 C.F.R. 1061.51-6(a), 1061.70-8. At issue in this case, -9- however, are utility reimbursements that are designed in part to offset nonenergy utility costs. The analogy suggested by plaintiffs is thus not apt; it does not clarify whether payments designed to account for a mixture of energy and nonenergy expenses are "energy assistance." Neither the energy assistance exclusion's plain language, nor its legislative history evince an intent to exclude payments provided primarily for the purpose of energy assistance. For _________ this reason, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to read the word "primarily" or its equivalent into the statute. The Secretary argues that a utility reimbursement can never be a subsidy for the purchase of energy because the _____ allowance may be based exclusively on nonenergy utility costs. In all likelihood, however, part of every tenant's utility reimbursement is based on an energy-related utility allowance. In fact, some tenants receive utility reimbursements only for energy utilities. Named plaintiff Felix St. Peter's utility reimbursement, for example, is a two party check made jointly payable to him and Maine Public Service Company. See 24 C.F.R. 813.108, 913.108 ___ (providing that HUD utility reimbursements may be made payable to utility providers). The energy and nonenergy components of a utility allowance are itemized when the allowance is approved by FmHA and HUD; this information may be used to determine what fraction of a utility reimbursement -10- is energy-related. FmHA regulations require a landlord to list each utility allowance separately when seeking FmHA approval for the allowance, and to provide this information to the tenant. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exh. A-6.III to -A.6.V. The local public housing agency operating a HUD public housing project must maintain similar lists of utility allowances, and this information is available to the tenant. 24 C.F.R. 965.473, 965.474. Although HUD regulations for section 8 privately-owned housing do not explicitly require that itemized information on utility allowances be retained for the tenant, this is the implication of regulations requiring that HUD or the local public housing agency approve proposed allowances and that allowances be reviewed annually for adjustments. See, e.g., id. 813.102, 882.116, ___ ____ ___ 882.214. We assume that HUD and the local public housing agency would retain records of utility allowances and would make this information available to the tenant whose rent depends on that allowance. Such information may be used to determine how much of a utility reimbursement is in fact a subsidy for energy costs. See South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs., 824 F. Supp. ___ __________________________________ at 1477 ("computing the energy and non-energy components of [utility reimbursements] would be a simple matter of arithmetic, not a great administrative burden"). If 60% of a utility allowance is attributable to energy costs, then 60% -11- of the utility reimbursement is a payment assisting the purchase of energy. According to a construction of the statute consistent with its plain language, only 40% of the reimbursement may be counted as income under the Food Stamp Act. -12- B. Structure of the Act: Deductions and Exclusions B. Structure of the Act: Deductions and Exclusions Turning to an analysis of the structure of the Act, we consider whether reading the energy assistance exclusion in context renders counter-intuitive or ambiguous Congress's intent on the meaning of "energy assistance." The Secretary argues that the structure of the Food Stamp Act indicates that utility reimbursements are not "energy assistance." Income eligibility determinations for food stamps resemble income tax calculations, see Department ___ __________ of Health & Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 900 (9th Cir. ____________________ _____ 1986); that is, net food stamp income equals gross income, minus any payments that are excluded by statute, minus the standard deduction and any other deductions applicable to the household. The Food Stamp Act's "standard deduction" and "excess shelter cost deduction" account for utility costs. See 7 U.S.C. 2014(e). According to the Secretary, ___ excluding utility reimbursements as "energy assistance" would subtract utility costs twice: once as an exclusion and again as a deduction. The argument that a payment may not be excluded because it offsets a cost already accounted for by the standard deduction is not persuasive. All households, regardless of size, receive the standard deduction, which only in the most general sense reflects energy utility costs, just as it reflects many other costs. The standard deduction -13- is a fixed sum that is adjusted annually according to the Consumer Price Index "for items other than food and the homeowners' costs and maintenance and repair component of shelter costs." 7 U.S.C. 2014(e). The deduction for excess shelter costs specifically accounts for energy utilities, but it does not capture the entire cost of energy utilities. The statute allows a household to deduct shelter expenses, including rent and utilities, only "to the extent that the monthly amount expended by [the] household for shelter" exceeds 50% of the household's income after all other deductions have been taken. Id. Deductible expenses include rent, property ___ taxes, property insurance, and mortgage payments and interest, as well as fuel, electricity, water, sewerage, trash collection, and telephone service. See 7 C.F.R. ___ 273.9(d)(5)(ii). The cap on the deduction is adjusted to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index for the shelter, fuel, and utilities components of housing costs. 7 U.S.C. 2014(e). According to the Secretary, Congress could not have intended to exclude the energy component of utility reimbursements, given the existence of the excess shelter cost deduction. But the Secretary does not offer an alternative construction of the Act that absolutely precludes deducting energy utility costs whenever energy assistance -14- payments are excluded from income. Even if the energy assistance exclusion were intended to cover only payments offsetting rising energy costs, as USDA contends, any payments designed to offset rising energy costs would be excluded, while the energy costs themselves would be deductible. Implicit in any construction of the energy assistance exclusion is that Congress intended energy assistance to be excluded and energy utility costs to be deducted, to the extent that all shelter costs exceed 50% of monthly income. This is borne out in the legislative history of the energy assistance exclusion: "If a household receives an energy allowance or grant, that allowance or grant is not to be included in income at all, but the energy costs which it covers may continue to be treated as a potentially deductible shelter expense when billed or due." H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra, at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. _____ As a practical matter, there is unlikely to be a substantial overlap between households excluding the energy component of utility reimbursements and those deducting excess shelter costs. Tenants receiving utility reimbursements pay no rent and incur no homeowners' expenses. They are entitled to the excess shelter cost deduction only to the extent that their utility costs alone exceed half of _____ their monthly income, including the nonenergy component of -15- their utility reimbursements.3 In other words, the poorest food stamp recipients living in public housing would exclude the energy component of their utility reimbursements, then deduct the fraction of their utility bills exceeding half of their income. This result is consistent with the Act's purpose to alleviate hunger and malnutrition by augmenting the food purchasing power of participating low-income households. See 7 U.S.C. 2011. We do not find that the ___ structure of the Food Stamp Act requires that the energy assistance provision be construed contrary to its plain language. Our reading of the provision in context reinforces our determination that the plain language manifests Congress's intent. C. Legislative History C. Legislative History ____________________ 3For administrative convenience in calculating the excess shelter expense deduction, a "standard utility allowance" (SUA) may be used in lieu of a household's actual utility costs. 7 C.F.R. 273.9(d)(6). Households receiving "energy assistance" may use the SUA only if they incur "out-of- pocket" heating or cooling expenses. 7 U.S.C. 2014(e). The Third Circuit, having previously found impermissible the USDA policy of counting utility reimbursements as income, see ___ West, 879 F.2d at 1132, subsequently upheld a USDA policy ____ preventing recipients of utility reimbursements from using the SUA unless their actual utility costs exceeded their public housing utility allowances, see West v. Sullivan, 973 ___ ____ ________ F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2934 _____________ (1993). Plaintiffs argue that they may use the SUA, even if their utility reimbursements are energy assistance, because they must pay 30% of household income for utilities. We do not address this argument because it is not an issue in this case. -16- We next consider the legislative history of the energy assistance exclusion, to determine whether the legislative intent we find clearly expressed in the statutory language is clouded or contradicted by any statements of members of Congress.4 When the exclusion was enacted in 1980, the House Committee on Agriculture issued a report noting that certain energy grants and allowances, designed to offset the rising cost of energy, had been excluded from food stamp income calculations in prior years by express provisions in other statutes. H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra, at _____ 122, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955. The report cites examples of energy assistance programs that were designed to offset the rise in energy costs in the late 1970s and in 1980, id. at ___ 121-22, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 954-55, and notes that the exclusions for assistance provided under these programs ensured that food stamp recipients would be held "harmless" for their benefits. Id. at 122, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955. ___ Preferring that amendments to the Food Stamp Act be made under its aegis, the committee drafted the energy assistance exclusion, which "incorporate[s] the essence" of these prior exclusions. Id. The committee stated that the ___ ____________________ 4We reject the parties' invitation to delve into the language and legislative history of the Housing and Community Development Reauthorization Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 927, 106 Stat. 3672, 3885-86 (1992). That statute addresses neither how utility reimbursements should be treated under the Food Stamp Act, nor the proper interpretation of the energy assistance exclusion. -17- provision would exclude "all energy assistance provided households through the use of Federal, State, or local funds flowing from . . . laws that focus on the problem of energy assistance." Id. at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. The ___ committee further stated that the provision would "exclude from income any direct payments made to households by the Federal Government" under "crisis intervention" or "regular energy assistance" programs. Id. This aspect of the ___ committee report does not define "energy assistance," but does indicate that section 2014(d)(11), by incorporating the essence of similar, program-specific provisions in other statutes, was intended to exclude "any" payments providing energy assistance under "any" federal law. The committee report further states: Where energy assistance provided _________________________________________ households through the use . . . of _________________________________________ Federal, State, or local funds flowing _________________________________________ from Federal, State, or local laws not _________________________________________ specifically dealing with energy _________________________________________ assistance is concerned, such as Aid to _________________________________________ Families with Dependent Children or _________________________________________ General Assistance, the Committee also _________________________________________ intends to guarantee excludability _________________________________________ provided that [USDA] is satisfied that _________________________________________ the increase in benefits awarded by the _________________________________________ State or local government (either on a _________________________________________ matching basis with the Federal _________________________________________ Government or on its own) is, in fact, an _________________________________________ energy assistance-related increase and _________________________________________ not simply a general welfare increase _________________________________________ that would have occurred even were energy _________________________________________ costs not a factor and that, therefore, ___________________ should be viewed as income for food stamp program purposes. Only where energy ___________________ costs are a but-for cause of the _________________________________________ increased payment should the payment be _________________________________________ -18- excluded from income and, then, only to _________________________________________ the extent that the increase is _________________________________________ attributable to high heating costs rather _________________________________________ than general inflationary conditions. _________________________________________ The Committee obviously expects that State legislatures and local councils will . . . not take advantage of this exclusion by labeling every . . . regular welfare allotment adjustment an energy assistance increase in order to take advantage of this exclusion . . . . Id. (emphasis added). ___ The Secretary argues that the highlighted statements support a narrow definition of "energy assistance" for the purpose of section 2014(d)(11)(A). Our scrutiny of the context, however, leads us to conclude that these remarks were prompted by the concern that state and local governments might pass off increases in existing, nonenergy-related welfare program payments as "energy assistance." See ___ Maryland Dep't of Human Res., 976 F.2d at 1470-71. Because _____________________________ the federal government pays the entire cost of food stamp benefits, 7 U.S.C. 2013(a), such a ploy would increase the allotments of food stamps to a state's residents at no substantial cost to the state. To thwart such efforts, Congress subsequently amended the exclusion for energy assistance payments provided under state and local laws.5 ____________________ 5Section 2014(d)(11)(B) excludes from food stamp income, any payments or allowances made for the purpose of providing energy assistance . . . under any State or local laws designated by the State or local legislative body authorizing such payments or allowances as energy -19- See Maryland Dep't of Human Res., 976 F.2d at 1471. Utility ___ ____________________________ reimbursements, in contrast, are provided under federal regulations that specify that the payments account for energy and nonenergy utility costs. Although we do not dispute that the committee intended that "energy assistance" include benefits offsetting the rising cost of energy, the legislative history of the provision reveals no intent to circumscribe the plain language of the provision so that it would apply only to such benefits. Furthermore, we note that the Secretary's interpretation of the energy assistance exclusion causes a result at odds with the legislative history. The 1980 House Report indicates that typical energy assistance programs "hold low-income households harmless by permitting them to buy the same amount of energy they would have utilized in past years without having to diminish their already marginal ____________________ assistance, and determined by the Secretary to be calculated as if provided by the State or local government involved on a seasonal basis for an aggregate period not to exceed six months in any year even if such payments or allowances (including tax credits) are not provided on a seasonal basis because it would be administratively infeasible or impracticable to do so. Unlike the exclusion for federal energy assistance, this statute expressly provides the Secretary a role in determining whether payments designated by state or local governments as "energy assistance" should be counted as income. -20- incomes." H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra, at 122, 1980 _____ U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955. An exclusion for such assistance, according to the House Report, guarantees that low-income households are held harmless for the assistance they receive. Id. Utility reimbursements with energy components are ___ designed in part to ensure that tenants, on average, will be able to purchase energy utilities without spending more than 30% of household income. The allowances underlying these reimbursements are adjusted annually to reflect substantial energy cost increases. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. ___ ____ C, exh. E.IX.C; 24 C.F.R. 882.214, 965.478. In this manner, utility reimbursements ensure that a household's expenditures for energy remain constant as a percentage of household income, from year to year. USDA's practice of counting the energy component of utility reimbursements as income does not hold tenants "harmless" for the assistance they receive. The Secretary argues that Congress ratified USDA's interpretation of the statute when it amended the energy assistance exclusion in 1988. Prior to 1988, section 2014(d)(11)(A) exempted from income "any payments or allowances made under any Federal law for the purpose of providing energy assistance." See West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d at ___ ____ _____ 1130. Congress reworded the statute in 1988 so that the provision currently excludes "any payments or allowances for -21- the purpose of providing energy assistance under any Federal law." A Senate committee report indicates that this "technical amendment" clarified that USDA and local agencies do not need to conduct an inquiry into the purpose of a federal statute before excluding federal "payments for the purpose of energy assistance." The law as now written could be read to require this analysis. The crucial question should be whether the purpose of the payment is energy assistance, not whether the statute, as a whole, is primarily for energy assistance or includes other human services as well. This change is not intended to change _________________________________________ current policy. _______________ S. Rep. No. 397, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in ____________ 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2239, 2266-67 (emphasis added). The Secretary urges us to read the last sentence in the quoted text as endorsing the agency's policy of ________ restricting the definition of energy assistance solely to payments offsetting dramatic increases in the cost of energy. The problem with the Secretary's argument is that USDA's policy of applying the exclusion only to payments offsetting dramatic increases in the cost of energy did not exist at the time the Senate Report was drafted. Although USDA treated utility reimbursements as income before 1988, the agency based this practice on the faulty interpretation of the energy assistance exclusion that the 1988 amendment was designed to correct. The two cases construing the statute -22- prior to 1988, West v. Bowen, No. 84-3883 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, ____ _____ 1987), rev'd, 879 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir. 1989) and Mitchell v. _____ ________ Block, No. 82-3297-3, slip op. at 10 (D.S.C. June 22, 1983), _____ held, consistent with USDA's interpretation at that time, that utility reimbursements are not "energy assistance" because they were authorized by federal housing laws, rather _______ than energy assistance laws.6 _________________ Viewed in this light, the plaintiffs' interpretation of the 1988 amendment and the Senate Report is more persuasive: the amendment was not intended to change congressional policy, but in effect it repudiated the _____________ agency's litigation position by clarifying that any payments ___ for energy assistance be excluded, regardless of the purpose of the law authorizing the payments. Further support for this interpretation is that the committee described the rewording of the statute as a "technical amendment." The statement in the legislative history that the amendment "is not intended to change current policy" reaffirms that it is not a substantive revision of the statutory language. The Secretary's final argument based on the legislative history is that Congress expressed tacit approval of USDA's interpretation by leaving it in place when it ____________________ 6The district court in Mitchell cited the legislative history ________ of the energy assistance exclusion as an alternate basis for upholding the practice of counting utility reimbursements as income. See Mitchell, No. 82-3297-3, slip op. at 13-28. ___ ________ -23- amended the statute in 1988. Inaction may signify acquiescence to an agency interpretation. See, e.g., Bob ___ ____ ___ Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-01 (1983). A ___________ _____________ logical prerequisite to inferring approval or ratification from silence is that the agency's interpretation antedates any relevant amendments. That is not so here. Although USDA has invariably deemed utility reimbursements to be income under the Food Stamp Act, the agency's rationale for this practice has changed over time. Prior to the 1988 amendment of the Act, the agency asserted in litigation that the exclusion applied only to payments made under federal laws specifically enacted to provide energy assistance. The 1988 amendment condemned this interpretation, see West v. Bowen, ___ ____ _____ 879 F.2d at 1322, and the agency abandoned it in favor of the position it espouses in this case, that "energy assistance" refers only to payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. The interpretation of the statute at issue on appeal thus does not predate the 1988 amendment. We have considered USDA's unvarying treatment of _________ utility reimbursements as an "interpretation" of the statute capable of ratification by silence, but we do not find great significance in Congress's inaction. "Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis." Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 _____ _____ (1969). Legislative silence is most significant when the -24- "area is one of traditional year-by-year supervision, like tax, where watchdog committees are considering and revising the statutory scheme." Id. In the baker's dozen years that ___ have passed since the Food Stamp Act energy assistance exclusion was enacted, the Act has been amended many times, but the exclusion itself has been amended only twice. The 1981 amendment affected only the provision excluding state and local energy assistance payments. The legislative history of the 1988 amendment reflects a senate committee's appreciation that USDA misread the statute, but does not indicate the committee's awareness of USDA's treatment of utility reimbursements. See S. Rep. No. 397, supra, at 28, ___ _____ 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2266 (stating that "USDA and local agencies do not need to conduct an inquiry into the purpose of a federal statute before excluding" energy assistance). Therefore, even if what the senate committee recognized about the agency's prior misreading of the statute were attributable to the entire Congress, this would not prove congressional cognizance of the treatment of utility reimbursements. There are still fewer facts outside the legislative history supporting an inference of congressional awareness. USDA has not embodied its interpretation of the federal energy assistance exclusion in a regulation. Moreover, our research uncovered nothing suggesting that the agency -25- embodied its position on utility reimbursements in any agency publication prior to 1990, when it issued policy statements on the matter. And the only courts considering USDA's treatment of utility reimbursements prior to 1988 issued unpublished opinions. E.g., West, No. 84-3883; Mitchell, No. ____ ____ ________ 82-3297-3. Furthermore, the policy of including utility reimbursements in food stamp income affects only very poor FmHA and HUD tenants, persons unlikely to have the resources to publicize their plight. We cannot infer from the legislative history and from these facts that congressional silence signals ratification of the agency's policy. Nor do we find in the legislative history any statements belying our determination that Congress's intended meaning for the energy assistance exclusion is manifested by its plain language. D. Deference D. Deference The Secretary argues that we must defer to the agency's judgment on the applicability of the energy assistance exclusion to utility reimbursements because this authority has been expressly delegated to the agency. According to the Secretary, Congress explicitly called on USDA to determine whether any payments provided under federal "laws not specifically dealing with energy assistance" were "energy-assistance related." H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra, at _____ 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. An agency's reasonable construction of a statute is entitled to deference when -26- Congress delegates to the agency the power to interpret the statute. See St. Luke's Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human ___ ________________ ___________________________ Servs., 810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 1987). ______ We previously quoted the passage from the House Report cited by the Secretary in support of this argument, see H.R. Rep. No. 788, supra, at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at ___ _____ 956, and we noted that the remarks reflected the committee's concern that state or local governments might pass off increases in general welfare as energy assistance. Utility reimbursements, in contrast, are authorized by federal regulations specifying that the payments account for energy utility costs. The legislative history cited by the Secretary does not empower USDA to refine the energy assistance exclusion so that it does not apply to the energy component of a utility reimbursement. Finally, the Secretary contends that USDA's policy should be upheld because, under Chevron, courts must defer to an agency's _______ reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers. Chevron prescribes that courts employ a two-step analysis of _______ an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers. See ___ Dion, 933 F.2d at 14-15. Deference is appropriate only when ____ the legislative intent is unclear. See St. Luke's Hosp., 810 ___ ________________ F.2d at 331. In this case, the plain language of the statute manifests Congress's intent on the question at issue: any payment designed to offset energy costs is excluded from food -27- stamp income, not just payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. We conclude that the energy component of a HUD or FmHA utility reimbursement, as a subsidy for the purchase of energy, must be excluded from food stamp income calculations. Any policy of USDA to the contrary is impermissible. The decision of the district court is |