FDIC v. Monterrey, Inc.
Case Date: 01/18/1995
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 94-1543
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January 18, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 94-1543 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. MONTERREY, INC., Defendants, Appellants. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, U.S. District Judge] ___________________ ____________________ Before Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________ Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________ and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________ ____________________ John M. Garcia with whom Garcia & Fernandez was on brief for _______________ ___________________ appellants. David A. Felt, Counsel, with whom Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior _____________ ______________________ Counsel, Ann S. Duross, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Deposit ______________ Insurance Corporation, and Gustavo A. Gelpi and Feldstein, Gelpi & _________________ ___________________ Gotay were on brief for appellee. _____ ____________________ ____________________ Per Curiam. Having heard oral argument, and read __________ the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We see no need to add substantially to the rationale in the district court's opinion and order. See ___ Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Monterrey, Inc., 847 F. Supp. ___________________________ _______________ 997 (D.P.R. 1994). While, on appeal, appellants still contest and struggle to overcome the burden of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc. _________________________ v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), the district court's analysis ____ of that issue is plainly correct. See also FDIC v. Caporale, ________ ____ ________ 931 F.2d 1 91st Cir. 1991). We find nothing convincing in appellants' arguments based on the purported lack of consideration to Monterrey. Monterrey was not incorporated at the relevant time, and lack of consideration is unavailing for other reasons set out by appellee. Nor, viewing the summary judgment materials in a light most favorable to plaintiff, do we find anything that could overcome the presumption of liability of the conjugal partnership. Mr. Pou's alleged reservations on this score, supposedly made verbally to agents of the failed bank, could not accomplish this for present purposes. While Mrs. Pou did not sign the note, the conjugal partnership was liable for the debts and obligations of either of its members. As one partner, Mrs. Pou stood to benefit from use of the loan proceeds to reduce her husband's debt unless it could be -2- demonstrated, for some reason, that that particular debt was beyond the joint and several liability of the partnership. Evidence showing this is lacking. See FDIC v. Perez Perez, ___ ____ ___________ 637 F. Supp. 358 (D.P.R. 1986); WRC Properties, Inc. v. ______________________ Santana, 16 Official Translations of the Supreme Court of _______ P.R. 160 (1985). Nor is there reason to treat the Mi Tacita stock, although registered to Mr. Pou, as beyond the purview of the conjugal partnership. No reason is suggested that the stock should be deemed to belong to Mr. Pou exclusively, rather than forming part of the pool of assets within the conjugal partnership and belonging to both spouses. If so, the use of loan proceeds to pay Mi Tacita's debt and to whatever extent, enhance the value of its stock, benefited both partners, not just Mr. Pou alone. We have considered appellants' other arguments and are satisfied that the judgment below was correctly rendered. Affirmed. Costs for appellee. ________ -3- |