Flynn v. Raytheon Company
Case Date: 08/19/1996
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 96-1019
|
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION] UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT ____________________ No. 96-1019 SHAWN M. FLYNN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. RAYTHEON COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge] ___________________ ____________________ Before Cyr, Circuit Judge, Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges. _____________________ ____________________ Laurence E. Sweeney for appellant. ___________________ Douglas T. Schwartz, with whom David C. Casey and Peckham, Lobel, ___________________ ______________ _______________ Casey, Prince & Tye were on brief for appellee. ___________________ ____________________ August 19, 1996 ____________________ Per Curiam. Plaintiff Shawn Flynn appeals from a Per Curiam ___________ summary judgment order dismissing his Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") claim against Raytheon Company for refusing to rehire him after he had completed his fourth inpatient treatment program for alcoholism. Following careful review of the entire record, we affirm the district court judgment. Over approximately nine years, Flynn compiled an employment record marred repeatedly by alcohol-related absenteeism and tardiness, interspersed with numerous sanctions and renewed opportunities to meet Raytheon's minimum job requirements. Raytheon finally fired him for reporting to work while under the influence of alcohol, in direct violation of its work rules. See also 42 U.S.C. 12114(c)(1), (2), (4). After ___ ____ completing the fourth inpatient treatment program, Flynn presented Raytheon with a progress report from his supervising physician, proposed to submit to random alcohol testing, and requested reinstatement. When Raytheon declined, Flynn filed the present action. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for Raytheon, and Flynn appealed. Flynn does not contend that Raytheon violated the ADA by firing him, nor could he do so successfully. See id. ___ ___ 12114(c)(4) (acknowledging that employer may "hold an employee . . . who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and behavior [as it] holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism of such employee . . . ."). 2 Instead, he maintains that Raytheon's refusal to give him another _______ chance, by rehiring him on the terms he proposed, including ______ random alcohol testing, violated the ADA. Flynn seems to contend that Raytheon conditionally agreed to rehire him subject to evidence of successful rehabilitation. He relies on a statement made by a Raytheon representative during the union grievance proceeding that took place following his firing and his completion of the fourth inpatient treatment program. Flynn states that he was told "it was too soon for [him to return to work, and if [he received] a paycheck [he would] just . . . go out and get drunk again." At the same time, according to Flynn, he was told that "once [he had] proved [him]self then things could happen." (emphasis ____ _____ added). He maintains that these representations generated a trialworthy issue as to whether Raytheon would have rehired him if it believed he was or could be rehabilitated. The district court correctly concluded that Flynn did not generate a trialworthy issue of material fact. First, the language Flynn attributes to the Raytheon representative "once [Flynn had] proved [him]self then things could happen." ____ _____ constituted neither a promise that "things would happen" if and _____ when he proved himself, nor an evaluative assessment that Flynn had yet proven himself, especially in the extant temporal context described by the same Raytheon representative; viz., "it was too ____ soon for [Flynn to return to work and if [he received] a paycheck [he would] just . . . go out and get drunk again." Although 3 Flynn plainly would prefer the cart before the horse, Raytheon acceded to no such arrangement. Even assuming the language relied upon were subject to the interpretation urged by Flynn, however, it would not give rise to an ADA claim. Flynn's contention confuses a conditional promise to consider a future ________ ______ request to rehire with a putative ADA-based obligation to rehire __________ at present. The ADA does not require an employer to rehire a _______ former employee who was lawfully discharged for repeated disability-related failures to meet its legitimate job requirements; viz., punctuality and sobriety. See 42 U.S.C. ___ ___ 12114(c); see also Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 ___ ____ _______ _____________________________ F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A second chance . . . is not an accommodation, as envisioned in the ADA.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting ADA claim by employee who failed to monitor his diabetes despite employer's legitimate expectation that he would do so). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Siefken, since the discharged employee was not asking for any _______ "accommodation" within the contemplation of the ADA, but simply "another chance to allow him to change his monitoring ___ technique[,]" the ADA did not require the employer to afford him another chance. Id. at 666-67. ___ Finally, Flynn cites no authority for the claim that the ADA entitles him to a "second chance" to meet Raytheon's legitimate work requirements, see id., nor for claiming, if ___ ___ indeed he does, that a conditional promise to reconsider based on a future rehiring request gave rise to an actionable ADA-based 4 claim, cf. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) __ _____ ____ ("qualified individual with a disability" requirement under ADA does not refer to "an individual's future ability to perform the ______ essential functions of his position," only to his present ability _______ to do so). Accordingly, even assuming the statements attributed to Raytheon were made, as we must at summary judgment, McCabe v. ______ Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 544 (1st Cir. _________________________________ 1996), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3808 (U.S. May 29, ________ ___ ____ _____ 1996) (No. 95-1929), Flynn has not demonstrated a colorable ADA- based right to rehiring. See Siefken, 65 F.3d at 666-67. ___ _______ The district court judgment is affirmed. The district court judgment is affirmed _______________________________________ 5 |