Fournier v. Reardon
Case Date: 11/13/1998
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 98-1316
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For the First Circuit ____________________ No. 98-1316 MARK J. FOURNIER, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. CHARLES REARDON, ETC., ET AL., Defendants, Appellants. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge] ____________________ Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges. _____________________ William P. Breen, Jr., with whom John J. Davis and Morrison, Mahoney & Miller were on brief, for appellants. Thomas C. Regan, with whom Pearl, McNiff, Crean, Cook & Sheehan was on brief, for appellee. ____________________ November 10, 1998 ____________________ TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Defendant-appellants appeal the final order and judgment denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff-appellee, Mark J. Fournier ("Fournier"), claims that he is entitled to monetary damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' alleged deprivation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Fournier asserts that the defendants are liable under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, 11I. For the following reasons, we reverse. BACKGROUND Fournier was employed by the Essex County Sheriff's Department as a corrections officer for more than ten years prior to entering a basic training academy ("academy") run by the Essex County Sheriff's Department. On May 1, 1995, Fournier and twenty other corrections officers began attending a nine week basic training course which the Essex County Sheriff's Department required for full-time employment. The academy was staffed by other Essex County Sheriff's Department corrections officers. It offered both classroom and physical training such as standing at attention, instruction as to chain of command, and protocol in interacting with superior officers. On the second day of the course, Fournier was ordered to report to the academy training staff's office. Protocol taught and enforced at the academy required that Fournier, an academy recruit: (1) knock outside the instructors' office door; (2) announce his presence; and (3) request permission to enter before entering the instructors' office. Fournier breached academy protocol when he failed to follow this regimented procedure and entered the office unannounced. To punish Fournier for violating academy protocol, one of the drill instructors present in the room ordered Fournier to turn around and bend over. When Fournier complied, the drill instructor placed handcuffs on his wrists and informed Fournier that he was being placed under "house arrest" for entering the instructors' office without having requested permission. The drill instructor then allegedly put Fournier's written reports in his mouth and ordered him to return to the classroom. The other drill instructors in the room failed to intervene on Fournier's behalf. Fournier returned, in handcuffs, to the classroom. Within five minutes of the "house arrest," the drill instructor entered the classroom. Pursuant to academy protocol, the recruits rose to attention upon the entrance of a superior officer. When the drill instructor ordered the class to be seated, Fournier attempted to seat himself. Unfortunately, Fournier missed his chair and fell to the ground, allegedly sustaining serious personal injuries, including a fractured vertebra. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Although most denials of motions to dismiss are not "final decisions," and thus are not independently appealable, a district court's rejection of a qualified immunity defense is a "final decision," Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985), and thus we review it here. Because "[a] necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all," Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), we will consider whether Fournier has asserted a violation of any constitutional right in his complaint. II. Section 1983 Claims Section 1983 states, in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). "To succeed, a section 1983 plaintiff must show a violation of a right secured by federal law." Skinner v. City of Miami, 62 F.3d 344, 346 (11th Cir. 1995). Fournier claims three separate constitutional violations: (1) a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. None of his arguments is persuasive. A. Fourth Amendment The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Mendenhall test, formulated by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in later cases, see Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988): "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Fournier argues that when the drill instructor placed him under "house arrest" and handcuffed him behind his back, he was seized for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. We disagree. Under the Mendenhall test, a court must look at all the circumstances surrounding the incident to determine if a reasonable observer would have believed that Fournier was not free to leave. Although Fournier was handcuffed, no evidence presented would support a finding that he was not free to leave at any point during the scenario. Fournier understood that "house arrest" was part of the basic training academy course. He submitted to being handcuffed, and then returned to the classroom. We grant that if he did object to being handcuffed, there could possibly have been negative consequences for his continued employment as a corrections officer. However, the possible effect that refusing to be handcuffed may have had on his employment status is not an issue for us to consider. Rather, the question is whether a violation of Fournier's right to be free from seizure occurred. In view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable observer would conclude that Fournier was the subject of improper hazing, which might give rise to a state law claim based on tort or employment theories, but would not believe that Fournier was not free to call an end to the "house arrest" and have the handcuffs removed. B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims The Fourteenth Amendment states that a "State [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Due process claims may take either of two forms: "procedural due process" or "substantive due process." Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991). Procedural due process requires that the procedures provided by the state in effecting the deprivation of life, liberty or property are adequate in light of the affected interest. Id. Substantive due process, however, imposes limits on what a state may do regardless of what procedural protection is provided. Id. (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)). In this case, Fournier invokes the latter prong of due process protection: (1) by arguing that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being disciplined only as set forth in the Essex County Sheriff's Department Training Manual; and (2) by contending that the county owed him and others similarly situated a constitutional right to safe conditions and freedom from bodily restraint. 1. Disciplinary Procedure Due Process Claim It is well established that a state actor's failure to observe a duty imposed by state law, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish a 1983 claim. See Mart |