Globe Newspaper v. Beacon Hill

Case Date: 11/22/1994
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 94-1538







January 2, 1997 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 94-1538

GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

BEACON HILL ARCHITECTURAL COMMISSION,
Defendant - Appellant.

____________________

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this court issued on November 12, 1996 is
amended as follows:

On page 42, line 6, insert "are" between "we" and "aware" so
that the sentence reads "While we are aware. . ."










































UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1538
GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
BEACON HILL ARCHITECTURAL COMMISSION,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this court issued on November 12, 1996 is
amended as follows:
Page 30, line 5, "not" should be deleted.
Page 34, line 5 of footnote 19 should read "utterly" instead
of "unterrly".


















































UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 94-1538

GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

BEACON HILL ARCHITECTURAL COMMISSION,

Defendant - Appellant.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge] ___________________

____________________

Before

Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________

Cummings* and Cyr, Circuit Judges. ______________

_____________________

John R. Devereaux, with whom Merita A. Hopkins and Gerald _________________ __________________ ______
Fabiano were on brief for appellant. _______
Edward N. Costikyan, Michael S. Gruen and David Nissenbaum ____________________ ________________ ________________
on brief for The National League of Cities, The United States
Conference of Mayors and The Municipal Art Society of New York,
amici curiae.
James C. Heigham, with whom Choate, Hall & Stewart and __________________ ________________________
Alice Neff Lucan were on brief for appellees. ________________



____________________

November 12, 1996
____________________
____________________

* Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.












TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. We visit this controversy for TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. ___________

the second time in as many years. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. ___ ____________________

Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 40 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1994). We ________________________________

are left to decide important issues that require a balancing

between First Amendment rights and governmental interests.

Defendant-Appellant Beacon Hill Architectural

Commission (the "Commission") enacted a regulation, the Street

Furniture Guideline, which effectively bans newspaper

distribution boxes from the public streets of the Historic Beacon

Hill District in Boston, Massachusetts (the "District"). The

validity of this regulation was challenged in a suit filed in

district court by Plaintiffs-Appellees, a group of newspaper

publishers (the "Newspapers"). The district court held that the

Commission lacked the authority to adopt the regulation and also

that it violated rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. See ___

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 847 F. ___________________ ________________________________

Supp. 178 (D. Mass. 1994).

In the ensuing appeal by the Commission, we concluded

that the appropriate course of action was to certify the

dispositive issue of state law to the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts (the "SJC") and so proceeded. To the question

Did the Beacon Hill Architectural Commission
have the authority under 1955 Massachusetts
Act Chapter 616 (as amended) to adopt the
"Street Furniture Guideline"?

the SJC answered in the affirmative. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. ___ ___________________

Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 421 Mass. 570 (1996). In its ________________________________

response, the SJC held that the Commission had authority to

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regulate newsracks and other "street furniture" through

rulemaking and to completely ban entire classes of structures

such as newsracks. Id. at 590-91. Specifically, it said: ___

As to streets and sidewalks, the
[C]ommission's jurisdiction is concurrent
with appropriate municipal agencies.
Regulation of the sidewalks is rationally
related to the goal of preserving the
Historic Beacon Hill District. Section 4 of
the enabling [A]ct provides the [C]ommission
with the authority to issue rules that govern
private conduct within its particular
geographic area of responsibility. We
conclude that, apart from constitutional
considerations, outright bans on certain
classes of structures are merely a practical
consequence of the [C]ommission's ability to
proscribe inappropriate exterior
architectural features within the [D]istrict.

Id. We thus focus our attention on the constitutional issue, ___

which requires us to determine whether the Street Furniture

Guideline violates rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to

the Newspapers. We conclude that it does not and reverse the

decision of the district court.

BACKGROUND BACKGROUND __________

The Historic Beacon Hill District was created by an act

of the Massachusetts General Court in 1955. See 1955 Mass. Acts ___

ch. 616 ("the Act"), as amended by 1958 Mass. Acts ch. 314 & 315,

1963 Mass. Acts ch. 622, 1965 Mass. Acts ch. 429, 1975 Mass. Acts

ch. 741, and 1982 Mass. Acts ch. 624. The Act is intended to

promote the educational, cultural, economic
and general welfare of the public through the
preservation of the historic Beacon Hill
district, and to maintain said district as a
landmark in the history of architecture and
as a tangible reminder of old Boston as it
existed in the early days of the

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commonwealth.

1955 Mass. Acts ch. 616, 2. The District's historical

significance can hardly be doubted. See Opinion of the Justices, ___ _______________________

333 Mass. 783, 786-87 (1955). Indeed, it was listed in the

National Register of Historic Places and designated a National

Historic Landmark on October 15, 1966, pursuant to the National

Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C.A. 470 et seq. ______

The Commission was created to review proposed changes

to the "exterior architectural feature[s]" of "structures" within

the District. See 1955 Mass. Acts ch. 616, 7; see also id. at ___ ________ ___

3 (defining an "exterior architectural feature"); Mass. Gen. L.

ch. 143, 1 (providing definition of "structure"); Globe _____

Newspaper, 43 F.3d at 20. Anyone wishing to construct, _________

reconstruct or alter an exterior architectural feature is

required to apply to the Commission for a certificate of

appropriateness. The Commission, "[i]n passing upon

appropriateness," shall consider, inter alia, "the historical and __________

architectural value and significance, architectural style,

general design, arrangement, texture, material and color of the

exterior architectural feature involved and the relationship

thereof to the exterior architectural features of other

structures in the immediate neighborhood." 1955 Mass. Acts ch.

616, 7. Furthermore, the Commission must "spread upon its

records the reasons for [its] determination" that a certificate

of appropriateness should not issue. Id. An aggrieved party may ___

appeal the Commission's decision to the Superior Court for


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Suffolk County, which "shall annul the determination of the

[C]ommission" if it is "unwarranted by the evidence" or

"insufficient in law." Id. at 10. ___

As previously noted it was not surprising that, "given

the stream of applications for certificates of appropriateness,

the Commission developed uniform policies toward certain

recurring types of proposed alterations." Globe Newspaper, 40 ________________

F.3d at 20. Specifically, in 1981, it formally adopted the

policies as "guidelines." These guidelines regulate exterior

architectural features such as masonry, roofs, windows, sash and

shutters, doors, trim, paint, and ironwork. One of the

guidelines states that "[f]reestanding signs are not permitted."



In the District, the Newspapers distribute their

publications via home delivery, mail, store sales, street

vendors, and "newsracks."1 Newsracks, we explained, are

____________________

1 The record shows that the Newspapers' publications are
distributed by the following methods:

HERALD USAa GLOBE WSJb NYTc TAB

Home Delivery 21% 5% 7% 97.7% 53.3% 0%

Store Sales 46% 78% 65% 1.9% 39.6% 0%
Street Vendors 23%d 0% 16%e 0% 0% 0%

By Mail 0% 5% 0% 0% 0% 79%
Newsracks 10% 11% 12% 0.4% 7.1% 21%


aAbbreviation is to USA Today. bAbbreviation is to The Wall _________ ________
Street Journal. cAbbreviation is to The News York Times. _______________ _____________________
dStreet vending occurs between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. eStreet
vending occurs between 5:30 a.m. and 9:30 a.m.

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newspaper distribution boxes painted in various colors and

featuring the name of the newspaper and other advertising logos,

which are commonly anchored to lampposts, signposts, or fixtures

on the sidewalk. The plaintiffs maintain a total of thirty-nine

newsracks in the district.2 Within the District, there are

eleven stores that distribute, or are available to distribute,

the Newspapers' publications. Outside the District, but within

one block of the District's boundaries, the Newspapers'

publications are sold through stores and newsracks.3 It is

undisputed that no point within the District is more than 1,000

feet (approximately 1/5 of a mile) from a source of the

Newspapers' publications.

Newsracks were first introduced to the District in the

early 1980s, and by 1983, Beacon Hill residents had begun to


____________________

2 The thirty-nine newsracks maintained by the Newspapers are
broken down as follows: Boston Globe (9); Boston Herald (10); _____________ ______________
The New York Times (8); The Wall Street Journal (4); USA Today ___________________ ________________________ _________
(3); and TAB (5). In addition to the Newspapers' newsracks, at ___
least five other publishers maintain newsracks within the
District. Agreed Statement of Facts at 4, p. 16.

3 The record shows that the Newspapers' publications are
available in stores and newsracks near the District as follows:

HERALD USA GLOBE WSJ NYT TAB

Stores within
one block of 4 2 10 2 4 0
the District
Newsracks
within one 4 9 7 1 6 7
block of the
District



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complain of the "unsightliness, congestion and inconvenience

associated with the vending machines." The Commission believed

that the newsracks violated the guideline prohibiting

free-standing signs. It took no enforcement action, however,

because a city-wide regulation of newsracks was being discussed

in the early 1980s.

In 1990, no regulation having been adopted, the Beacon

Hill Civic Association petitioned the Commission for a guideline

to exclude newsracks from the District. After holding a public

meeting regarding the petition,4 the Commission conducted a

survey and completed, in January, 1991, a study entitled the

"Publication Distribution Box Report (the "Report"). See Exhibit ___

H (in the record). Soon thereafter, on February 21, 1991, the

Commission held a public hearing5 on the proposal to adopt

guidelines for newsracks and, ultimately, adopted the following

guideline:

Publication distribution boxes (any boxes
placed on the sidewalks to distribute
publications, whether for charge or not)
visible from a public way are not allowed
within the District.

In its decision, the Commission indicated that the publication

distribution guideline ("PDG") was consistent with its guideline

banning freestanding signs and the Commission's decisions denying
____________________

4 Although notice of this meeting was mailed to the Newspapers'
main offices, notice was not received by their Circulation
Departments and, of the Newspapers, only the TAB appeared and
commented on the petition.

5 Again, although notice was mailed, the Newspapers' Circulation
Departments did not receive the notice and, thus, did not attend.

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the installation of traffic signal control boxes on the

sidewalks, and the regulation of the installation of a cable

television system in the District.

A few months later, on April 1, 1991, the Commission

notified the Newspapers of the new guideline. One month later,

it requested that the Newspapers remove their newsracks by June

1, 1991. Then, after the Newspapers requested that the

Commission reconsider its decision to adopt its regulation, the

Commission heard testimony from the Newspapers in July, 1991.

After voting to deny reconsideration, the Commission extended the

removal deadline until October 1, 1991. Within a month, the

Newspapers brought suit in district court seeking declaratory

relief, damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief

from the regulation, on the grounds that it violated their First

Amendment right to distribute newspapers in the District.

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the court

ruled from the bench that the regulation offended the First

Amendment:

. . . , "instead of being narrowly tailored
with respect to the limitation on speech[,
the PDG] is narrowly tailored to focus only
on speech. It applies to no form of visual
clutter other than public[ation] distribution
boxes. . . ." Significantly, the trial judge
was "troubled whether there is statutory
authority for the particular kind of
legislative rule making" illustrated by the
guideline. He did not decide the case on
state law grounds, however, because "the
questions about the Architectural
Commission's authority are at least debatable
on the present record . . . and perhaps would
require some supplementation of the record in
order for the Court to resolve them. . . ."

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Globe Newspaper, 40 F.3d at 20 (quoting bench trial transcript). _______________

After the bench ruling but before judgment had entered,

the Commission adopted a new guideline--the present Street

Furniture Guideline--that bans all "street furniture," not just

newsracks, from the District:

Street furniture, as defined below, shall not
be permitted in the Historic Beacon Hill
District with the exception of approved
store-front merchandise stands and those
structures erected or placed by authorized
public agencies for public safety and/or
public welfare purposes. Street furniture is
defined as any structure erected or placed in
the public or private ways on a temporary or
permanent basis.

Authorized public safety/public welfare
street furniture includes, but is not limited
to, such structures as street lights, traffic
lights, mail boxes, fire hydrants, street
trees, and trash receptacles. Any such
authorized public safety/public welfare
street furniture or approved store-front
merchandise stands shall be subject to
Commission review and shall be in keeping
with the architectural and historic character
of the District and the criteria for exterior
architectural features as specified in
Chapter 616 of the Acts of 1955 as amended.

Having done so, the Commission moved for reconsideration of the

judgment, arguing that the new guideline was free from the

constitutional defects of the old. This time, the district judge

not only held that the new guideline fared no better under the

First Amendment, but also that the Commission lacked authority

under Massachusetts law to adopt the new regulation.6 See Globe ___ _____

Newspaper, 847 F. Supp. at 189. _________
____________________

6 We decline the Commission's invitation to pass upon the
validity of the original regulation as that issue is moot.

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DISCUSSION DISCUSSION __________

I. The First Amendment and the Street Furniture Guideline I. The First Amendment and the Street Furniture Guideline

A. Standard of Review A. Standard of Review

In an appeal from an adverse ruling after a bench trial

on the merits, our review is ordinarily quite circumscribed: we

review de novo the district court's legal determinations, ________

according a significant amount of deference to the court's

factual determinations and to most of its resolutions of mixed

fact/law issues, letting them stand unless they are clearly

erroneous. See AIDS Action Comm. v. MBTA, 42 F.3d 1, 7 (1st ___ _________________ ____

Cir. 1994). In a case such as this one, however, "where the

trial court is called upon to resolve a number of mixed fact/law

matters which implicate core First Amendment concerns, our

review, at least on these matters, is plenary so that we may

reduce the likelihood of "'a forbidden intrusion on the field of

free expression.'" Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of ___ __________ __________________

U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting New York Times Co. ____ ____ __________________

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964))). Besides furthering ________

other interests, see AIDS Action, 42 F.3d at 7, "de novo review ___ ___________ _______

of the trial court's application of a First Amendment standard to

the facts before it "ensures that the federal courts remain

zealous protectors of First Amendment rights." Id. (quoting ___

Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139, 142-46 (1st Cir. 1989)). _____ _______

B. Legal Framework B. Legal Framework

The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no

law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."


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U.S. Const. amend. I. It is beyond dispute that the right to

distribute newspapers is protected under the First Amendment.

See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. ___ _________________ ____________________________

750, 768 (1988); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); ______ _______

Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 ______________________________ ________

(11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S. Ct. 337 ____________

(1995). Here, the parties do not dispute that the Street

Furniture Guideline effectively bans the use of newsracks as a

method of distributing newspaper in the District. The issue, of

course, is whether under the circumstances of the case, the

Newspapers' First Amendment rights are impinged. We know that

few constitutional rights, if any, are absolute, and in most

constitutional litigation what courts are called upon to do is to

balance competing fundamental rights. See, e.g., Denver Area ___ ____ ___________

Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. Federal _________________________________________________ _______

Communications Comm'n, ___ U.S. ___, ___; 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2384 _____________________

(1996); Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, ___ U.S. ___, ___; 116 _______________________ ______

S. Ct. 2342, 2352 (1996). Such is the present situation.

It is by now axiomatic that the degree of protection

provided by the Constitution depends "on the character of the

property at issue." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' _________________ ______________________

Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).7 In the instant case, the _____

____________________

7 Distinguishing between, say, commercial and non-commercial
speech is a relevant factor. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. ___ ____ __________________
Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). Here, we need not make precise ___
classifications because we test, and ultimately uphold, the
Street Furniture Guideline under the more stringent standards
governing noncommercial speech.

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"property at issue" is the District's streets and sidewalks. The

Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized public streets "as the

archetype of a traditional public forum." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 ______ _______

U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (noting that "[n]o particularized inquiry

into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary" as all

public streets are public fora). In these traditional public

fora, "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have

been devoted to assembly and debate," Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, _____

government's authority to restrict speech is "sharply

circumscribed." Id. As the Court in Perry explained, ___ _____

[f]or the state to enforce a content-based
exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end.

Id. In traditional public fora, content-based restrictions are ___

presumptively invalid and subject to "strict" scrutiny. See, ___

e.g., Ackerly Communications of Mass., Inc. v. City of Cambridge, ____ _____________________________________ _________________

88 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1996); National Amusements, Inc. v. Town _________________________ ____

of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 736 (1st Cir. 1995). The Court in Perry _________ _____

made clear, however, that in traditional public fora

[t]he state may also enforce regulations of
the time, place, and manner of expression
which are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.

Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Such time, place, and manner regulations _____

are subject to "intermediate" scrutiny. See, e.g., National ___ ____ ________

Amusements, 43 F.3d at 736. __________

Given the "differing analytic modalities, it is

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unsurprising that many First Amendment battles over the

constitutionality of government regulations start with a debate

about what level of scrutiny is appropriate." Id. at 737. The ___

instant case is no exception. The key issue is thus determining

whether the Street Furniture Guideline is content-based or

otherwise has a content-based impact in which publications,

particularly newspapers, are singled out for negative treatment,

as is claimed by the Newspapers, or is content neutral on its

face and application, as is alleged by the Commission. The

answer to this inquiry will allow us to establish what level of

scrutiny, strict or intermediate, is appropriate, a finding which

will ultimately settle the outcome of this controversy.

C. Content-Neutrality and Content-Based Impact C. Content-Neutrality and Content-Based Impact

As this circuit has noted, "[t]he concept of what

constitutes a content-based as opposed to a content-neutral

regulation has proven protean in practice." Id. at 737. The ___

Court's cases "teach that the 'principal inquiry in determining

content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place,

or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has

adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the

message it conveys.'" Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, ___ ____ ___________________

491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). "A regulation that serves purposes

unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if

it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not

others." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. ____

Under this test, the Street Furniture Guideline seems


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to be the very model of a content-neutral regulation. It does

not make or otherwise demand reference to the content of the

affected speech, either in its plain language or in its

application. Indeed, as applied to newsracks, it operates as a

complete ban without any reference to the content of a given

publication whatsoever: uniquely concerned with the physical

structure housing the speech, it restricts only the mode of

distribution and would plainly apply even if they were empty. As

such, it seems to be an example of the very kind of total ban on

newsracks which Justice Stevens was willing to assume arguendo ________

might be constitutional in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery ___________________ _________

Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427-28 (1993) (holding ban on _____________

newsracks to be content-based because determining whether a

newsrack fell within ban required reference to a publication's

content).8 Furthermore, like the ban on posted signs which the

Court upheld in City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 ___________________ _____________________

____________________

8 Commenting on Justice Steven's observation in Discovery _________
Network, the district court noted that "[t]he notion seems _______
strange that a broader ban on speech is more acceptable than a
narrower ban." Globe Newspaper, 847 F. Supp. at 195-96 (citing ________________
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting statement in Discovery Network __________________
that "it scarcely seems logical that the First Amendment compels
such a result"). Discussing whether First Amendment doctrine
creates--to use the district court's phrase--a "perverse
incentive to regulate more speech," id. at 195, does not alter ___
out ultimate conclusion that the present regulation is content-
neutral. We, therefore, decline the invitation to engage in this
unnecessary dialogue. We note in passing, however, that it is
not unprecedented in constitutional jurisprudence that "broader"
regulations are constitutional while "narrower" ones are not.
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, ___ U.S. ___, ___ ____ ____________________ ____________
___, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1513 n.20 (1996) (citing R.A.V. v. St. ______ ___
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) and Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, ____ __________ _________________
507 U.S. 410 (1993)).

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U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984), the Street Furniture Guideline is

directed at aesthetic concerns and is unrelated to the

suppression of ideas: indeed, nothing in the record suggests

that the challenged regulation arose out of an effort to suppress

any particular message communicated through the newsracks, nor do

the Newspapers even contend as much.9 That the Street Furniture

Guideline results in a total ban on newsracks is nothing more

than an incidental effect of its stated aesthetic goal of

enhancing the historic architecture of the District by reducing

visual clutter: there is nothing in the record to contradict

this.

The Newspapers contend, however, that this directive

has a content-based impact, because it singles out publishers,

and most significantly daily newspapers, serving Boston for

special, negative treatment. In advancing its "targeting,"

"differential treatment," and "censorial effects" arguments, the

Newspapers urge us to test the Street Furniture Guideline against

Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. ___________________________ ________________________

575 (1983), and Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991). The ________ _______

district court, in their view, correctly concluded that because

the regulation exempts store-front merchandise and public

safety/welfare structures, it singles the press for special
____________________

9 We note further there is no suggestion, let alone argument,
that the Street Furniture Guideline is content-based because it
is "format-based," applying only to print media, or
"distribution-based," applying only to newsracks: in other
words, no argument that the SFG is designed to suppress a
particular message carried only through either of these two
media.

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treatment and, thus, raises "similar concerns . . . of 'censorial

effects'" as found by the Court in Minneapolis Star. Globe ________________ _____

Newspaper, 847 F. Supp. at 199. _________

We disagree. As an initial matter, we are of the view

that reliance upon Minneapolis Star by both the Newspapers and _________________

the district court is misplaced in the instant case. First,

Minneapolis Star, one of a line of cases establishing rules for ________________

the economic regulation of the press, did not involve a time,

place and manner restriction. The tax on newsprint there was

held unconstitutional, because it applied only to the press and

discriminated in favor of one class of publishers over another;

i.e., it was not generally applicable. Minneapolis Star, 460 ___ ________________

U.S. at 581. More importantly, unlike the Street Furniture

Guideline which adversely affects only one method of

distribution, the regulation there rendered all forms of

circulation more burdensome. Second, unlike the case of a

discriminatory tax, the Commission asserts, and the Street

Furniture Guideline present regulation advances, colorable non-

content-discriminatory purposes: aesthetics. Last, we believe

it is not coincidental that neither of the two newsrack cases

decided by the Court, Discovery Network and Plain Dealer, engaged _________________ ____________

in a Minneapolis Star analysis. Indeed, none of the cases that ________________

have dealt with restrictions on newsracks have found the _________

restrictions to be content-based, have a content-based impact, or

otherwise trigger strict scrutiny because they singled-out the _______

press for regulation; in fact, Minneapolis Star is not even _________________


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mentioned in the two newsrack cases decided by the Court. See ___

generally Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410; Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. _________ _________________ ____________

750.10 That aside, even "inspect[ing] this case through the

precedential prism of Minneapolis Star and Leathers," National ________________ ________ ________

Amusements, 43 F.3d at 740, leaves us unpersuaded that there is a __________

cognizable basis for invoking strict scrutiny.

In National Amusements, a panel of this court _____________________

extensively discussed Minneapolis Star and Leathers. After _________________ ________

noting the Court's statement in Minneapolis Star that _________________

"differential treatment, unless justified by some special

characteristic of the press, suggests that the goal of the

regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expression, and

[that] such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional,"

Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585, the panel went on to discuss ________________

that in Leathers "the Court refined the analysis it had crafted ________

in Minneapolis Star[.]" National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 739. ________________ ____________________

Leathers explains "that targeting engenders strict scrutiny only ________

when regulations (1) single out the press, (2) take aim at a

small group of speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the

content of protected speech." Id. at 739-40. Essentially, then, ___

because the Street Furniture Guideline does not discriminate on

the basis of content, the Newspapers' arguments for strict

____________________

10 The only mention of Minneapolis Star is in Chief Justice ________________
Rehnquist's dissent in Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 797 & n.17 _____________
(finding Minneapolis Star-based argument that provision was _________________
invalid because it applied only to newsracks and not other
"users" of the public streets to be "inapposite and unpersuasive"
in that case).

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scrutiny based on targeting and differential treatment hinge on

one or both of the first two criteria identified in Leathers. ________

We note first that, to the extent the Newspapers'

"targeting" and "differential treatment" arguments essentially

rest upon the notion that strict scrutiny is always justified

when the practical effect of a regulation is to regulate the

First Amendment rights of a select group, this notion is

misguided. National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 739. Simply put, ____________________

this notion

flies in the teeth of the secondary effects
doctrine. Under [this] formulation, any
regulation that has an effect on fewer than
all First Amendment speakers or messages
could be deemed to be a form of targeting and
thus subjected to strict scrutiny. Yet the
Supreme Court has recognized that a
municipality lawfully may enact a regulation
that "serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression . . . even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or
messages but not others."

Id. at 740 (quoting Ward, 490 U.S. at 791). More importantly, ___ ____

[i]n Minneapolis Star, the Court did not ________________
condemn all regulations that single out First
Amendment speakers for differential
treatment; rather, the Court acknowledged
that certain forms of differential treatment
may be "justified by some special _________________________________
characteristic" of the regulated speaker. ______________

National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 740 (quoting Minneapolis Star, ___________________ ________________

460 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added)). Most relevant to the instant

case, noting that "[s]econdary effects can comprise a special

characteristic of a particular speaker or group of speakers,"

this court concluded that "the language . . . quoted from

Minneapolis Star comfortably accommodates an exception to the _________________

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prohibition on differential treatment for regulations aimed at

secondary effects, so long as the disparity is reasonably related

to a legitimate government interest." National Amusements, 43 ____________________

F.3d at 740.

The Street Furniture Guideline falls within that

exception. As an initial matter, we note that there is no

indication that the Commission's alleged "targeting" or

"differential treatment" was done in a purposeful attempt to

interfere with the Newspapers' First Amendment activities: while

it clearly takes away one method of distribution, other methods

are left untouched. See ante at 5 n.1 and at 6 n.3; see also ___ ____ ________

Gold Coast, 42 F.3d at 1345 (rejecting disparate treatment ___________

argument where there was no evidence regulation was enacted

because of a dislike with the message conveyed). Cf. Leathers, ___ ________

(finding tax measure avoided pitfalls because, for example, there

was "no indication" that Arkansas "targeted cable television in a

purposeful attempt to interfere with . . . First Amendment

activities").

More importantly, "street furniture" can obviously

create or add to visual clutter in different ways such that

solutions calling for differential treatment might be warranted.

Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1985) ___ ______ ________________________

(noting that city treats certain movie theaters differently based

on the markedly different effects upon their surroundings). See ___

Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 430 (noting that unlike speech in __________________

Renton "there [were] no secondary effects attributable to" the ______


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commercial-publication newsracks that distinguished them from the

non-commercial publications newsracks). While the Newspapers

complain that the Street Furniture Guideline "affects no other

similarly situated object" in the District, the truth of the

matter is that there simply is no other such object. Not only is

there no record evidence that any other entity--public or

private--uses newsracks or other objects that are similarly

anchored to lampposts, signposts, or fixtures on the sidewalks to

distribute its product to the public, but there is also no record

evidence that such an entity would not be subject to the

challenged regulation. In our view, that there is no such

evidence, let alone a suggestion to that effect, only underscores

the "uniqueness" of the newsracks and the way in which they

impact upon the District.

In reaching our conclusion, we are not swayed by the

district court's findings that "[g]overnmentally-placed street

furniture is exempted, and merchandise-store fronts are subjected

to no more stringent review than they ever were" and/or that the

"only apparent effect of the [Street Furniture Guideline] will be

the removal of [the Newspapers'] publication boxes." Globe _____

Newspaper, 847 F. Supp. at 199. Contrary to the Newspapers' _________

contentions, that exempt street furniture, store-front signs, or

other tangible signs of modern life may also constitute or add to

"visual clutter" does not necessarily render the differential

treatment unjustified: this argument ignores legitimate, if not

obvious, differences among those on-street or other visible


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objects that are essential to the public safety and welfare--

street and traffic lights, mail boxes, fire hydrants, street

trees, traffic and parking signs, trash receptacles, parking

meters and hitchposts--and the preferred distribution means of

private entities. See Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 797-98 ___ _____________

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding difference between "public

services of a quasi-governmental nature" and newsracks to be

significant). Although the record is devoid of any facts

regarding store-front stands,11 the Newspapers' argument also

seems to ignore practical and historical differences between

merchants' on-site signs and bulky newsracks anchored along the

sidewalks. It is safe to assume, at least in the absence of

record evidence to the contrary, that the newsracks' overall

bulky structure is reasonably predictable as compared to store-

front signs, which lend themselves more readily to case-by-case

review: designing the newsracks' appearance may reduce their

complained-of "unsightliness" but it does not eliminate their

complained-of "congestion and inconvenience."

Perhaps most importantly, we disagree with the district

court's conclusion that, as in Minneapolis Star, "[s]imilar _________________

concerns . . . in the sense of 'censorial effects' are raised by

the . . . Street Furniture Guideline[]," Globe Newspaper, 847 F. _______________

Supp. at 199. Not only is there no record evidence to support

____________________

11 Interestingly enough, the Newspapers did not raise the
differential treatment of store-front signs when they challenged
the first regulation banning newsracks, despite the fact that it
would have the same effect of exempting those structures.

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the conclusion that, because of the regulation, publishers might

be chilled by the threat of restrictions on other methods of

distribution, we fail to countenance any reasonable basis upon

which to ground such a fear: none of the other methods of

distribution depend upon structures which are subject to the

Commission's jurisdiction. Furthermore, because it is a complete

ban upon newsracks, it does not provide for, or otherwise grant,

the Commission any--let alone unbridled--discretion in

determining what newsracks will be allowed. See Plain Dealer, ___ ____________

486 U.S. at 769-72. As to the Newspapers' claim that the

censorial effects of the Street Furniture Guideline extend beyond

the District, we find nothing in the record, other that this bald

assertion, to merit such a conclusion. The allegation that this

regulation "sends affected publishers the message that if they

criticize, annoy or otherwise offend any official with power over

any forum, they may face another expensive and futile court

battle" implies that the Commission has acted in a retaliatory

manner by enacting this legislation, an argument which is totally

unsupported by any evidence.

Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Newspapers claim

that, because the regulation deprives publishers of an already

significant and still growing percentage of their readers, its

impact is hardly "incidental." While, as alleged by the

Newspapers, newsracks may indeed be the "indisputable workhorse"

of the daily press (a contention belied by the evidence regarding

the District, ante at 5 n.1), nothing in the record suggests, let ____


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alone demonstrates, how the removal of the District's newsracks

is so burdensome that it is not "incidental." As we see it, the

Newspapers' complaint boils down to the potential reader passing

through the District or the non-subscribing resident and, as we

discuss later, ample alternative channels exist for the

Newspapers to reach even these accidental transients passing

through the District as well as those readers with more frequent

ties to the District.

In sum, we find no cognizable basis for invoking strict

scrutiny and, thus, apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.

D. The Street Furniture Guideline Under Intermediate Scrutiny D. The Street Furniture Guideline Under Intermediate Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny aside, restrictions on the time, place

and manner of protected expression in a public forum--and the

Street Furniture Guideline's effective ban on newsracks upon the

District's public and private ways certainly qualifies as such a

restriction--should be upheld so long as they are "content-

neutral, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant

governmental interest, and allow for reasonable alter