Hennessy v. City of Melrose
Case Date: 10/25/1999
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 98-2011
| Download 98-1719-01A | |
|
For the First Circuit No. 98-2011 ROBERT J. HENNESSY, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. CITY OF MELROSE, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge] Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lipez, Circuit Judge. William P. Monahan for appellant. Regina M. Gilgun, with whom Douglas I. Louison and Merrick, Louison & Costello were on brief, for municipal appellees. Salvatore M. Giorlandino, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief, for remaining appellees. October 22, 1999 SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal implicates the delicate balance between the need of educational institutions to have a relatively unfettered hand in order to perform their core mission effectively and the rights of teachers (and aspiring teachers) freely to express themselves. On particular facts, the district court reconciled that balance against plaintiff-appellant Robert J. Hennessy. At the same time, the court rejected several other claims that Hennessy had brought. Hennessy now appeals. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND In accord with the summary judgment standard, we limn the facts as hospitably to the appellant's claims as the record permits, indulging all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 53 F.3d 454, 456 (1st Cir. 1995). The Commonwealth of Massachusetts operates Salem State College. Matriculation there offers students, inter alia, the opportunity to obtain both a baccalaureate degree in education and a teaching certificate (a sine qua non to securing a faculty position in a public school within the Commonwealth). The issuance of such a certificate, in turn, hinges on successful completion of a student teaching practicum. When the events giving rise to this suit transpired, the appellant had completed three years of a four-year curriculum at Salem State. In the first semester of his senior year, he enrolled in a class on multiculturalism taught by Dr. Mary-Lou Breitborde, the chair of Salem State's Department of Education. Over the course of the semester, Breitborde became concerned about the appellant's unusually forceful espousal, at inappropriate times, of religiously oriented views on subjects such as homosexuality and abortion (e.g., his submission of a paper wrapped in a picture of a fetus, even though the paper had nothing to do with reproductive rights). In light of these experiences and corroborative reports received from other docents, Breitborde met with the appellant to address his suitability for pursuing a teaching career in the public schools. At the meeting, Breitborde expressed concerns about the appellant's ability to adhere to state-mandated professional standards, especially in regard to respect for diversity among school children. When she specifically asked for an assurance that he would refrain from proselytizing in the classroom, he indicated that such an assurance would be hard to provide in view of his strong belief that children should regard Jesus Christ as their salvation. The audience concluded with Breitborde's statement that she would need to ponder whether the appellant could continue in Salem State's teacher certification program. A faculty member subsequently told Breitborde that the appellant had completed an earlier part-time placement in a public school without incident. This piece of information apparently tipped the balance and she decided to give him the benefit of the doubt. In January of 1996, Salem State, acting with Breitborde's approval, placed the appellant at the Horace Mann Elementary School, Melrose, Massachusetts, for a student teaching practicum, and assigned him to assist Richard McDermod in instructing a fourth-grade class. Dr. John Mangini, a Salem State faculty member responsible for evaluating the appellant's performance at Horace Mann, reported during the initial stages of the practicum that he was doing well. In March, the situation began to deteriorate. Four incidents occurred. We summarize what the record shows. The Everson Conversation. During a conversation that took place on an undetermined date, the appellant showed a picture of an aborted fetus to a teacher, Carol Everson. His behavior and demeanor frightened Everson and she voiced her trepidation to Horace Mann's principal, Dr. Judy DeLucia. Family Fiesta Night. On March 26, the appellant balked at participating in a multicultural assembly called "Family Fiesta Night" an event in which his fourth-grade class was actively involved. When McDermod directed the appellant to attend, he did so grudgingly. Once there, he called the dancing "silly" and "inappropriate," and left almost immediately. He made no bones about the fact that he considered the performances lewd and offensive to principles of "biblical sobriety." Regarding Art. Three days later, the appellant's class attended a presentation by parent volunteers entitled "Regarding Art." One of the presenters introduced a well-known painting by Renato Cesaro which parodied a traditional (Leonardo da Vinci) rendition of the Last Supper and depicted Hollywood stars in lieu of Christ and the apostles. The appellant termed the display "disgusting," branded the Cesaro painting "obscene," and stormed out of the class. He did not return for over an hour. Thus, he was not available to conduct a previously scheduled teaching assignment and McDermod had to pinch-hit for him. The DeLucia Interview. The contours of the practicum called for the appellant to function as the fourth-grade class's sole instructor during the following week. Worried about that configuration in light of recent developments, McDermod expressed his concerns to DeLucia. At about the same time, the parent who had introduced the Cesaro painting told DeLucia that she would not be comfortable with the appellant handling her son's class. DeLucia nonetheless permitted the appellant to take over the class on Monday, April 1. In mid- day, she summoned him to her office and inquired about the Family Fiesta Night and Regarding Art episodes. The appellant explained that "you can't serve God and Mammon," that he had chosen the former, and that he was more interested in pleasing God than in pleasing the principal. According to DeLucia, he then stated that he viewed her as "the devil" and the Horace Mann faculty as her disciples. When the appellant persisted in arguing that it was wrong to allow religion to be denigrated in the public schools, DeLucia terminated the interview and the appellant returned to his fourth-grade class. On the afternoon of April 1, DeLucia instructed the appellant to meet with the school superintendent. He declined, indicating that he first wanted to discuss the matter with his priest. DeLucia then told the appellant that he could not resume practice teaching until a consultation took place with Salem State. She simultaneously notified the local police department that she was concerned about his erratic behavior. The next day, DeLucia informed a Salem State official that the appellant would not be allowed to continue his practicum. In a follow-up letter, she cited the four incidents catalogued above. Salem State promptly convened a meeting of faculty members and administrators who decided that the appellant's behavior, as reported, appeared to violate numerous provisions of the applicable student code of conduct. On this basis, Salem State temporarily suspended the appellant and notified him that he was entitled to an immediate hearing. The suspension was carried out in accordance with the student judicial system's emergency procedures. The appellant contacted the appropriate college official and learned the nature of the charges, who had made them, and how the hearing process worked. Although offered a hearing within 24 hours, the appellant demurred, ostensibly because he did not wish to go forward without first having retained a lawyer. By the time that he procured counsel late April DeLucia had told Salem State that she would not testify at a disciplinary hearing. In view of her recalcitrance, Salem State rescinded the temporary suspension and dropped the disciplinary proceedings. Despite this turn of events, the Melrose school system stood firm in its refusal to allow Hennessy to resume student teaching. On May 15, Salem State sent him a letter advising that he had (a) failed his student teaching practicum due to the premature termination of his placement, and (b) failed to meet four of the common teaching competencies (communication skills, self- evaluation, equity, and professionalism) required for certification by the Massachusetts Department of Education (MDOE). Although the letter invited the appellant to continue in Salem State's non- certification education program, he neither accepted this invitation nor sought to be heard on the subject of his ouster from the certification program. The battle then shifted to a judicial forum. Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(3), and 1986, the appellant sued a throng of defendants. For ease in reference, we divide them into moieties: DeLucia and the City of Melrose (collectively, the Melrose defendants) on one hand, and the Commonwealth and numerous Salem State hierarchs (collectively, the Salem State defendants) on the other. He alleged myriad violations of his rights to free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and due process. Following some preliminary skirmishing, not relevant here, the district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. This appeal ensued. II. ANALYSIS Summary judgment is appropriate where "[t]he pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Appellate review of summary judgment orders is de novo. See Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir. 1997); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990). The particulars attendant to such review are familiar, see, e.g., Coyne, 53 F.3d at 457 (listing applicable principles and citing representative cases), and it would be pleonastic to rehearse them here. In mounting his appellate arguments, Hennessy opts for quantity over quality. We have sifted through his asseverational array and conclude that most of his claims do not require comment because they are patently frivolous, entirely lacking in record support, or both. For example, it is transparently clear that the appellant has no equal protection claim against anyone; he has not brought himself within any protected class and he has failed to show that others, similarly situated, were treated differently. See Alexis v. McDonald's Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 354 & n.13 (1st Cir. 1995). By like token, he has failed to identify a relevant custom or policy of the City of Melrose, thus negating any claim of municipal liability. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981). He has made no showing that the defendants' conduct originated in an invidiously discriminatory class-based animus, and, thus, his conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) founders. See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996). This same circumstance dooms his section 1986 claim. See Creative Env'ts., Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 834-35 (1st Cir. 1982). We therefore restrict our discussion to the appellant's two most promising assertions, namely, (1) that the Melrose defendants violated his First Amendment rights, and (2) that the Salem State defendants abridged his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. A. The First Amendment Claim. In order to put this claim into perspective, we first must intuit the nature of the relevant relationship. The appellant argues ferociously that he should be treated as a student vis- |