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Employees who are temporarily assigned to duties which require using skills for higherrated work other than those contained in their job description shall be paid at the higherrate. If on any day an employee performs such work for more than three (3) hours theemployee shall be paid at the higher rate for the entire day, provided that time and one-halfthe higher rate will be paid for all time worked in excess of eight (8) hours per day."

In 1995, petitioner's purchasing department was staffed with five contract clerks who providedclerical and administrative support for procurement administrators. Procurement administratorsare responsible for reviewing bids and awarding contracts for petitioner's purchase of parts,supplies, and services. All five contract clerks had the same duties and responsibilities, and noneof them had supervisory responsibilities. The five clerks had different job titles, pay grades, andwages, however. Grade 5 pay was higher than Grade 4 pay. Some clerks were dual-rated, whichmeant that they were classified as Grade 4, but received Grade 5 pay when they performed Grade5 duties. Toni Shelby was a Contract Clerk I, Grade 4; Valerie Townsend, Aracelia Gaeta, andAnnie Perez were classified as Contract Clerk II, Grade 4; and Rosalba Marton was a ContractClerk II, Grade 5. Marton was paid at a full grade 5 rate. Townsend, Gaeta, and Perez had dual-rated pay status pursuant to section 4.12 of the Agreement and were paid at a grade 5 rate for allhours worked and received grade 4 pay for sick time, vacation, and holiday pay. Townsend hadbeen dual-rated since 1992, Gaeta since 1990, and Perez since 1990 or 1991. Shelby had been aContract Clerk I, Grade 4 in the purchasing department since August 1993. Shelby did not havedual-rated pay status, however, and received only grade 4 pay.

Since 1993, Shelby had been complaining to both her manager and Union executive boardmember that she wanted to be dual-rated. On February 6, 1995, William Roman, petitioner'sGeneral Manager, Quality Assurance, sent a memorandum to Thomas Czech, petitioner's Vice-President, Human Resources, requesting a job study on the duties of the Contract Clerk I andContract Clerk II positions. Roman noted in the memorandum that Townsend, Perez, and Gaetahad been "consistently dual-rated," but Shelby had not. According to Roman, a managementreview of the job descriptions for the two positions "reveal[ed] many similarities between bothdescriptions, as well as, some functions which are no longer valid." He requested the job study"to accurately rate each incumbents' level of responsibility" so that petitioner could "assure equityamong all incumbents."

On February 7, 1995, Shelby filed a grievance with the Union, seeking to be dual-rated as aContract Clerk II, Grade 5. In the grievance, Shelby stated that "[b]oth the Contract Clerk I andContract Clerk II job responsibilities are currently the same and have been since the restructuringof the Purchasing Department." She also stated that "we all have the same job responsibilities." On February 9, 1995, Williams and Shelby presented the grievance to Shelby's supervisor, RonTabor, who agreed with the grievance and promised to discuss it with the General Manager ofPurchasing, Ed Gronkowski. Gronkowski also agreed with the grievance and promised to submita request to Roman to make Shelby dual-rated.

Meanwhile, petitioner's Human Resources Department conducted the job study. For the study,Sameena Noetzel, an industrial organizational psychologist employed by petitioner, sent detailedquestionnaires to the contract clerks. When the clerks received the questionnaires in lateFebruary 1995, they met with Abner Williams, a member of the Union's executive board. Williams explained that the questions were for a job study and that it could result in areclassification of the contract clerk positions. Noetzel analyzed the responses to thequestionnaires and determined that the actual job duties performed by the five contract clerkswere similar. She submitted the redrafted job description to three other CTA industrialorganizational psychologists for their assistance in determining the appropriate pay grade for theposition. Although Noetzel rated the contract clerk position a grade 5, the composite from theother psychologists resulted in a grade 4 rating. Noetzel therefore recommended that the positionreceive grade 4 pay. The general manager of personnel programs and the vice-president ofhuman resources approved the recommendation. Petitioner then reclassified the Contract Clerk Iand II positions as a single Contract Clerk classification, removed the dual-rating, and paid thepositions at grade 4. All of the Contract Clerks lost their dual-rated status and their grade 5 pay.

On August 9, 1995, Czech sent a letter to Isiah Thomas, the Union's president, notifying him thatpetitioner decided to combine the Contract Clerk I and II positions into the single classification ofContract Clerk, Grade 4, and to eliminate the dual-rating. Czech stated that despite thereclassification, "Ms. Marton, currently assigned a grade 5, will retain this grade level." Hefurther stated, "[s]hould you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. GrantWard, General Manager, Industrial relations." No one responded to Czech's letter, and petitionerdiscontinued its payment of grade 5 wages to the four grade 4 clerks at the end of the next payperiod, which was on or about August 19, 1995.

On February 9, 1996, the Union filed its unfair labor practice charge with the Board. The Board,on September 10, 1996, issued a complaint alleging in part that petitioner failed to bargain ingood faith with the Union regarding the Contract Clerk reclassification. On March 19, 1997, theALJ issued a recommended decision and order finding that petitioner did not violate the Act andrecommended that the complaint be dismissed. The Union filed exceptions to therecommendation, and on June 4, 1997, the Board rejected the ALJ's recommendation.

In its July 21, 1997 decision and order, the Board concluded that petitioner did not violate section10(a)(4) of the Act by failing to bargain with the Union over the reclassification of the ContractClerk positions. Applying the balancing test set forth in Central City Education Association,IEA/NEA v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992),the Board found that petitioner's decision to consolidate the Contract Clerk I and II titles into asingle Contract Clerk position was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Board decidedthat the reclassification was not a mandatory subject of bargaining because: (1) thereclassification was a matter of wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment, and (2) amatter of inherent managerial authority, but (3) the benefits of bargaining did not outweigh theburdens on the CTA's authority. According to the Board, "as a result of the job audit, CTAlearned that, based on revisions that had taken place in the employees' actual job duties over theyears, the existence of two separate Contract Clerk titles was no longer warranted." It found thatthe Union "presented no evidence or legal argument to demonstrate that the benefits ofbargaining over the particular reclassification decision involved herein outweighed the burdensthat bargaining would impose on CTA's authority to administer its position classificationsystem." Therefore, it found that petitioner was not obligated to bargain over the reclassificationof the Contract Clerk positions.

Nevertheless, relying on section 4 of the Act, the Board found that petitioner "was clearlyobligated to bargain with [the Union] over the effects of that decision on the Contract Clerks'wages and other conditions of employment." (Emphasis in original). Citing section 4 of the Act,the Board found that even though the reclassification was a matter of inherent managerialauthority, the CTA was required to bargain over the impact of the reclassification. It found thatthe consolidation of the job titles eliminated the clerks' ability to earn grade 5 dual-rated pay, andthat "the determination of what wage rate to assign the newly created classification wasundoubtedly a matter involving the employees' 'wages, hours and terms and conditions ofemployment.'" Therefore, according to the Board, the wage rates to be assigned to the newclassification constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining.

Moreover, the Board disagreed with the ALJ's conclusion that the Union "waived its right tobargain over these matters by agreeing to the temporary assignments provision in Article 4 of theparties' collective bargaining agreement." It found that the ALJ's conclusion that petitioner wasproperly administering the Agreement by implementing the reclassification was "without anyrational basis in fact or law." The Board found that according to article 4.12 of the Agreement,the Union did not expressly waive its right to bargain over the effects of the reclassificationdecision on members of the bargaining unit. In addition, the Board held that the CTA's decisionto classify the new contract clerk position as a grade 4 position was made "without prior notice toor consultation with the Union," and that it simply announced the decision as a fait accompli,rather than giving the Union the opportunity to bargain in good faith. The Board ordered theCTA to cease and desist from refusing to bargain with the Union on several issues, "including theimpact thereon of a decision to reclassify bargaining unit employees." It also ordered the CTA torescind the reclassification of the contract clerks "and make such employees whole for the loss ofany pay or benefit resulting from the failure to negotiate over the impact of the reclassification." The Board required the CTA to post at all places where employee notices are normally placed,"in conspicuous places for a period of 60 consecutive days" a notice from the Board. It orderedthat the notice state that the CTA violated the Act, and that the CTA pledged that it would notrefuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union and would not interfere with theexercise by CTA employees of their rights under the Act. The notice was further required to statethat the CTA was rescinding the consolidation of the Contract Clerk I and II positions and that itwould make such employees whole. Finally, the notice was required to state that the CTApledged to bargain with the Union over the impact of the consolidation of the two contract clerkpositions.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

On appeal, petitioner contends that the Board erred by: (1) holding that, pursuant to section 4 ofthe Act, petitioner could not implement the job reclassification without first bargaining with theUnion; (2) failing to consistently apply the applicable balancing test set forth in Central City; (3)holding that petitioner was required to bargain over the reclassification when the contractrequired that wages be paid according to the grade of work performed; and (4) holding thatpetitioner failed to bargain in good faith, because the Union itself showed no interest in suchbargaining after it received written notice of the reclassification.

OPINIONPetitioner contends on appeal that the Board's decision was in error. The Board's findings andconclusions on questions of fact are deemed to be prima facie true and correct. City of Belviderev. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). We must deferto the Board's factual conclusions and will reverse the Board's decision only if it was against themanifest weight of the evidence - only if no rational trier of fact could have reached thechallenged conclusion, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board. AldenNursing Center - Morrow, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 259 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 632 N.E.2d 66 (1994). TheBoard's factual determinations are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only "wherethe opposite conclusion is clearly evident." City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204, 692 N.E.2d at301. We will not interfere with the Board's expertise and authority unless they were exercisedarbitrarily and capriciously. Chief Judge v. American Federation of State, County and MunicipalEmployees, 153 Ill. 2d 508, 607 N.E.2d 182 (1992); National Union of Hospital and Health CareEmployees, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. TheCounty of Cook, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 692 N.E.2d 1253 (1998). In examining the Board'sfactual findings, we will not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of theBoard. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 204, 692 N.E.2d at 301. In contrast, we review theBoard's conclusions on questions of law de novo. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205, 692N.E.2d at 302. We generally accord deference to the Board in its interpretations of the Act (Cityof Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 538 N.E.2d 1146 (1989); seeSandburg Faculty Ass'n, IEA-NEA v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 248 Ill. App.3d 1028, 1034, 618 N.E.2d 989, 993 (1993) (Board's finding on a question of law is not bindingon reviewing court)), however, because courts appreciate that the Board can make informedjudgements based on its experience and expertise (Davis v. The Human Rights Comm'n, 286 Ill.App. 3d 508, 676 N.E.2d 315 (1997)). The Board's interpretation of the Act should beoverturned only if it was clearly erroneous (County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor RelationsBoard, 266 Ill. App. 3d 53, 639 N.E.2d 187 (1994)) or constituted an abuse of discretion (ForestPreserve District v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 190 Ill. App. 3d 283, 546 N.E.2d 675(1989)). Therefore, where a mixed question of fact and law is presented, the applicable standardof review should be "between a manifest weight of the evidence standard and a de novo standardso as to provide some deference to the Board's experience and expertise." City of Belvidere, 181Ill. 2d at 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302. Our supreme court has held that for such a mixed question offact and law a clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2dat 205, 692 N.E.2d at 302, citing T. O'Neill & S. Brody, Taking Standards of Appellate ReviewSeriously: A Proposal to Amend Rule 341, 83 Ill. B.J. 512 (1995).

Petitioner first argues that the Board erred in holding that, pursuant to section 4 of the Act,petitioner could not implement the job reclassification without first bargaining with the Union,and that it erred by failing to consistently apply the applicable Central City balancing test. TheBoard first applied the three-part test for determining whether a matter is a mandatory subject ofbargaining, as set forth in Central City. Under Central City, if the matter is not one of "wages,hours and terms and conditions of employment," then the employer is under no duty to bargain. If it is, then the second question is whether the matter is also one of inherent managerialauthority. If it is not, then the matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining. If it is also a matterof inherent managerial authority, then the trier of fact "should balance the benefits that bargainingwill have on the decisionmaking process with the burdens that bargaining imposes on theemployer's authority." Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 523-24, 599 N.E.2d at 904-05; City ofBelvidere, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295. "Which issues are mandatory, and which are not,will be very fact-specific questions." Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 523, 599 N.E.2d at 904.

Under section 7 of the Act, petitioner is required "to negotiate over any matter with respect towages, hours and other conditions of employment," unless bargaining over such issues isexcluded by section 4 of the Act. 5 ILCS 315/7 (West 1996). Section 4 states in pertinent partthat "[e]mployers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy,which shall include such areas of discretion as the function of the employer, standards ofservices, its overall budget, the organizational structure and selection of new employees,examination techniques and direction of employees." 5 ILCS 315/4 (West 1996). Section 4further states that petitioner is required to bargain collectively regarding "policy matters directlyaffecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as the impact thereonupon request by employee representatives."

According to petitioner, it was not required to bargain over the effects of the reclassificationbecause it had "inherent managerial authority under section 4 of the Act [(5 ILCS 315/4 (West1996))] to correct an erroneous overpayment of wages when that correction did not change thewages, terms or conditions of employment to which the clerks were entitled under the Contract." We note that petitioner's argument that it was merely correcting overpayments to the employeesdesignated as Contract Clerk I, made for the first time on appeal, is waived. See Metz v. IllinoisState Labor Relations Board, 231 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 596 N.E.2d 855 (1992).

We find no error in the Board's application of the Central City test or in its application of section4 of the Act. In applying the test, the Board found that the job reclassification itself was not amandatory subject of bargaining. Even though it found that the reclassification was a matter ofwages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as a matter of inherent managerialauthority, it found that the burdens of bargaining outweighed the benefits. The Board thencorrectly applied section 4 of the act, which states that an employer is required to bargain overeven policy matters which directly affect wages, hours and terms and conditions of employmentin addition to their impact. The job reclassification had an impact on the wage rates for the newposition and resulted in the removal of the dual-rating system. Petitioner provides no persuasivesupport for its argument that the Board failed to apply the Central City test again to the questionof bargaining over the effects of the job reclassification. The Board properly applied the CentralCity test and section 4 of the Act, which are not in conflict. Cf. American Federation of State,County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. The Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 190 Ill.App. 3d 259, 268-69, 546 N.E.2d 687, 693-94 (1989) ("Regardless of whether [employer] mustbargain on the topic of introducing a drug policy, however, it must still negotiate 'with regard topolicy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well asthe impact thereon.'"). Furthermore, we are persuaded by the Board's argument that even if it hadapplied the Central City test to the issue of bargaining over the effects of the reclassification, theresult would not have changed because under the third part of the test, the benefits of bargainingover the new wage rates and removal of the dual-rating system would have outweighed theburdens to petitioner.

Petitioner next contends that the Board erred in holding that petitioner was required to bargainover the reclassification when the contract required that wages be paid according to the grade ofwork performed. According to petitioner, the Union had waived its right to bargain over thewage issue because it had already been resolved by sections 3.1 and 4.12 of the collectivebargaining agreement. We disagree. "[A] party to a collective bargaining agreement may waiveits rights to bargain under [the Act] where the contractual language evinces an unequivocal intentto relinquish such rights." American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 274 Ill. App. 3d 327, 334, 653 N.E.2d 1357, 1362 (1995). "'Evidence that a party to a labor agreement intended to waive a statutory right must be clear andunmistakable.'" American Federation, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 334, 653 N.E.2d at 1362. Our reviewof sections 3.1 and 4.12 of the agreement shows that they do not specifically address the effectsof the job reclassification decision and do not evince the Union's unequivocal intent to relinquishtheir rights to bargain over such effects.

Finally, petitioner argues that the Board erred in holding that petitioner failed to bargain in goodfaith, because the Union itself showed no interest in such bargaining after it received writtennotice of the reclassification. Again, we disagree. Our review of the record shows that theAugust 9, 1995 letter did not constitute an invitation to bargain, but rather simply announced thejob reclassification and changes in wage rates. Although the letter stated that petitioner wouldaddress questions, it presented the matter as a fait accompli.

In sum, we find that the Board properly applied the Central City test and section 4 of the Act, thatthe Union did not waive its right to bargain over the effects of the job reclassification, and thatpetitioner's August 9, 1995 letter did not constitute an invitation to bargain over those effects. Accordingly, we affirm the decision and order of the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board.

Affirmed.

O'BRIEN, P.J., and O'MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.