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Docket No. 86232-Agenda 14-March 1999.

LOUIS K. JONES, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sea Sprite Boat Company, Appellee).

Opinion filed November 18, 1999.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

Section 19(f)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996)) requires a party seekingjudicial review of a decision of the Industrial Commission (the Commission) to file a request for summons with the clerk ofthe circuit court within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the Commission's decision. Section 19(f)(1) also provides that "norequest for a summons may be filed and no summons shall issue" unless the party seeking judicial review exhibits to theclerk of the circuit court proof that the probable cost of preparing the record of proceedings has been paid to theCommission.

The question presented in this appeal is whether the circuit court obtained subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal fromthe Commission when the party seeking review filed a request for summons in the circuit court within the required 20-dayperiod, and exhibited proof of payment for the probable cost of the record within the 20-day period, but exhibited the proofof payment after filing the request for summons. The appellate court held that jurisdiction did not vest in the circuit court.No. 1-97-1810WC (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgmentof the appellate court.

Background

On December 2, 1991, the petitioner, Louis K. Jones, filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Commission inwhich he alleged that he was injured in an accident during the course of his employment with the respondent, Sea SpriteBoating Company. Following an ex parte hearing, an arbitrator determined that petitioner was permanently totally disabledand that he was entitled to substantial benefits. On appeal, the Commission reversed the arbitrator's decision. TheCommission concluded that there was no evidence to show that petitioner had notified respondent of his injury within 45days of the accident, as required by the Act (820 ILCS 305/6(c) (West 1996)).

Thereafter, petitioner sought judicial review of the Commission's decision pursuant to section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS305/19(f)(1) (West 1996)). Section 19(f)(1) provides that judicial review of a decision of the Commission is initiated byfiling a request for a summons with the clerk of the circuit court. This request for summons must be filed within 20 days ofthe receipt of notice of the decision. Section 19(f)(1) also provides that "no request for a summons may be filed and nosummons shall issue unless the party seeking to review the decision of the Commission shall exhibit to the clerk of theCircuit Court proof of payment" of the probable cost of the record in the form of a receipt or an affidavit from an attorneythat the cost has been paid. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996).

Petitioner's attorney received the decision from the Commission on October 25, 1996. On November 8, 1996, petitioner'sattorney filed a request for summons with the circuit court, and the summons was issued on the same day. The summonsinstructed respondent and the Commission to file their appearances in the circuit court by December 24, 1996. Within 20days of the receipt of the Commission's decision, on November 14, 1996, petitioner's attorney filed an affidavit with theclerk of the circuit court stating that a payment of $35 had been made to the Commission for the probable cost of preparingthe record.

Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's appeal. Respondent maintained that petitioner had failed tostrictly comply with the requirements of section 19(f)(1) and, therefore, that the circuit court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over petitioner's appeal. According to respondent, the summons should not have been issued prior to theexhibition of proof that the $35 fee for preparing the record had been paid to the Commission. The circuit court agreed andgranted respondent's motion to dismiss.

The appellate court, with two justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. No. 1-97-1810WC(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The majority reasoned that strict compliance with section 19(f)(1) isnecessary to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction. The dissenting justices, in contrast, stated that denying petitionerjudicial review elevated form over substance. In the view of the dissenting justices, the court's attention should not havebeen focused "on the order in which the tasks were completed" but on "the fact that petitioner fulfilled all requirementswithin the requisite 20 days." The two dissenting justices certified the cause for further review, and we granted petitioner'spetition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

Analysis

Section 19(f)(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:

"[T]he Circuit Court *** shall by summons to the [Industrial] Commission have power to review all questions of lawand fact presented by such record.

A proceeding for review shall be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of theCommission. The summons shall be issued by the clerk of such court upon written request returnable on a designatedreturn day, not less than 10 or more than 60 days from the date of issuances thereof ***. ***

***

In its decision on review the Commission shall determine in each particular case the amount of the probable cost ofthe record to be filed as a part of the summons in that case and no request for a summons may be filed and nosummons shall issue unless the party seeking to review the decision of the Commission shall exhibit to the clerk ofthe Circuit Court proof of payment by filing a receipt showing payment or an affidavit of the attorney setting forththat payment has been made ***." 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1996).

Respondent maintains that section 19(f)(1) requires strict compliance with all its provisions. Respondent contends that therequest for summons which was filed on November 8, 1996, was improper because no proof of payment of costs wasexhibited to the clerk of the circuit court. Therefore, according to respondent, the summons which was issued in response tothe request was void and without effect, and jurisdiction never vested in the circuit court.

Petitioner, in contrast, emphasizes that all the steps necessary to commence review were completed within the statutory20-day period. Petitioner concedes that, under a literal or strict construction of the statute, the circuit court may not havehad jurisdiction when the summons was issued on November 8, 1996. Petitioner argues, however, that when the costs to theCommission were paid, and the receipt exhibited to the clerk on November 14, 1996, all the elements of the statute hadbeen fulfilled. According to petitioner, the only other step the clerk could have taken, under a strict interpretation of thestatute, was to take the summons already on file and stamp it again with a new date. In petitioner's view, resting thepresence or absence of jurisdiction on this "meaningless ministerial act" would elevate form over substance and unjustlydeny him judicial review of his claim.

It is well settled that "[t]he method of bringing before the circuit court for consideration the record of the IndustrialCommission is purely statutory, and the court can obtain jurisdiction of the proceeding only in the manner provided bystatute." Moweaqua Coal Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 322 Ill. 403, 405 (1926); Peter H. ClarkLodge No. 483, I.B.P.O.E. of W. Elks v. Industrial Comm'n, 48 Ill. 2d 64, 68 (1971). "[C]ompliance with the statutorilyprescribed conditions is necessary before the circuit court obtains subject matter jurisdiction." Boalbey v. IndustrialComm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 217, 218 (1977). Hence, our inquiry in the case at bar must focus on identifying precisely what isrequired under section 19(f)(1), and on determining whether those requirements have been satisfied under the facts of thiscase.

This court has consistently held that the timely filing of a request for summons, and the timely exhibition of proof ofpayment for the probable cost of the record, are jurisdictional requirements which must be strictly adhered to in order tovest the circuit court with jurisdiction over an appeal from the Commission. See, e.g., Boalbey v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill.2d 217, 219 (1977) (the "requirement that a petitioner file for a writ of Certiorari [the statutory predecessor of a summons]within a certain time period may, by its nature, only be satisfied by literal compliance"); Perusky v. Industrial Comm'n, 72Ill. 2d 299, 301 (1978) (same); Peter H. Clark Lodge No. 483, I.B.P.O.E. of W. Elks v. Industrial Comm'n, 48 Ill. 2d 64, 71(1971) (because "the record clearly reflect[ed] that the receipt for costs was not exhibited within the statutory period and[because] this requirement could not be waived, we must hold that the circuit court had no jurisdiction"). This court'sconclusion that the timely initiation of appeal proceedings is a jurisdictional requirement comports with one of the primarypurposes of the workers' compensation law, which is to determine whether an employee is entitled to receive compensationfor his or her injuries as quickly as possible. See, e.g., J.L. Simmons Co. ex rel. Hartford Insurance Group v. Firestone Tire& Rubber Co., 108 Ill. 2d 106, 112 (1985), quoting Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 352 Ill. 405, 410 (1933)(" 'The object of the act is the allowance of compensation for accidental injuries to employees as promptly and cheaply asmay be' "); 1 T. Angerstein, Illinois Workmen's Compensation