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Docket No. 85186-Agenda 11-September 1999.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RENARD ANDERSON, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 2, 1999.

JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Renard Anderson, was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with aggravated possession ofa stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 1992)), possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992)), and possession of burglary tools (720 ILCS 5/19-2 (West 1992)). Following a bench trial,defendant was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial judge sentenced defendant as a Class Xoffender to six years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 294 Ill. App. 3d 1039. Weallowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of the appellatecourt and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The following evidence was presented at trial. Velyne Zumm testified that on July 20, 1994, her dark-blue 1989 PontiacTrans Am was stolen from her driveway. Zumm stated that, at the time of the theft, her car was in running condition withno damage. Zumm further testified that she did not give anyone permission or authority to use her car. Zumm next saw hercar two days later, on July 22, 1994. On that date, Zumm observed that the passenger door lock and trunk lock werepunched out, the steering column was torn apart, and the stereo and spare tire were missing. Zumm further observed in thecar several packages of meat and two screwdrivers: neither the meat nor the tools were hers.

Anthony Bartolomei, a Chicago Heights police officer, testified that on July 22, 1994, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he andhis partner, Alex Ramano, were in an unmarked vehicle stopped at the corner of 16th and Halsted Streets in ChicagoHeights. There they observed a dark-blue Pontiac Trans Am heading east on 16th Street. Both officers noticed that thedriver of the Trans Am looked like the suspect wanted for a shooting earlier that evening in another part of ChicagoHeights. The officers activated their emergency lights and attempted to stop the Trans Am. As the officers moved behindthe Trans Am, they observed two individuals in the Trans Am simultaneously look back at them. Rather than stopping, theTrans Am sped off. After a high-speed chase, the Trans Am swerved off the road, collided with a planter, and came to rest.Prior to the Trans Am's coming to rest, both occupants jumped out and attempted to flee. Bartolomei testified that, once thetwo individuals were in custody, he learned that the Trans Am was stolen. An examination of the vehicle revealed that boththe trunk and passenger side locks were punched out, the steering column was ripped out, the radio was missing, and nokeys were in the ignition. There were, however, two screwdrivers on the driver's side floorboard.

Bartolomei testified that, later that day, he spoke to defendant and then prepared a written account of defendant's oralstatement. Defendant reviewed and signed the following statement:

"I was in Dolton at Fairway Foods. I went inside to boost some meat. I met up with a guy I recognized who wasboosting also. I asked him if he had a car. He told me yeah, he did.

He asked me if I was going to boost anything. I said yeah I was. He told me when I come [sic] out that he would havethe car running on the side of the store.

He walked out, waited for me to come out.

I left the store about five minutes later. He got into a blue Pontiac Grand [sic] Am that he was driving.

We drove to an unknown block around 127th Street in Chicago and sold the meat I took from the store.

We then drove to another area in Chicago and bought two bags of rock cocaine. We smoked the dope inside and wewanted more.

At this point the car dies out and I ask him where's [sic] your keys. He told me that he didn't need his keys because itwas started from the column.

He then stuck a screwdriver in the left side of the column and restarted the car.

He then drove to a Jewel Food Store where he again boosted four packages of meat and we decided to come south toChicago Heights and try to sell the meat, to get more dope.

It was shortly after this that the police got behind us.

He floored the gas pedal in [an] effort to run from the police. I told him don't run, we're caught, just stop. He said noman, I'm dirty. And then drove into a yard where we both jumped out of the car and were both caught by the police."

Alex Ramano, Bartolomei's partner, also testified. Ramano stated that on July 22, 1994, at approximately 1:20 a.m., heobserved defendant exit the passenger side of the Trans Am and placed him under arrest. Ramano testified that as defendantwas being placed under arrest, defendant stated, "I wasn't with him; I wasn't in that car."

At the conclusion of the State's evidence, defendant moved for a directed finding. The trial judge directed a finding fordefendant on the charge of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 1992). Thedefense did not present any evidence.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992)) and not guilty of possession of burglary tools (720 ILCS 5/19-2 (West 1992)). The trial judgeconcluded that defendant knew the car was stolen and was in joint possession of it with the driver. Following a sentencinghearing, the trial judge sentenced defendant as a Class X offender to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant argued that, because he was only a passenger in the Trans Am, he did not possess the car and,therefore, could not be convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting,agreed with defendant and reversed his conviction. 294 Ill. App. 3d 1039. The appellate court stated that "for a passenger ina stolen motor vehicle to be found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the element of possession must be provenby evidence that the passenger exercised sufficient control over the vehicle or participated in the theft of the vehicle or theftof a part of the vehicle." 294 Ill. App. 3d at 1044. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)),and now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.

DISCUSSION

The offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle is defined in section 4-103(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. Thatsection provides in pertinent part:

"It is a violation of this Chapter for:

(1) A person not entitled to the possession of a vehicle or essential part of a vehicle to receive, possess, conceal, sell,dispose, or transfer it, knowing it to have been stolen or converted ***." 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992).

In order for a person to be convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the State must prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that defendant possessed the vehicle, that he was not entitled to possession of the vehicle, and that he knew that thevehicle was stolen. People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 296 (1996); People v. Rivera, 141 Ill. 2d 528, 533 (1990); 625 ILCS5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992).

In this case, the trial judge found, and the appellate court agreed, that the evidence clearly established that defendant knewthe Trans Am was stolen. Before this court, defendant does not contest this finding. Therefore, the narrow issue before us iswhether a person is in possession of a stolen motor vehicle when that person joins in the use of the stolen motor vehicle infurtherance of other crimes.

The State argues that the appellate court erred when it held that defendant could not be considered in possession of thestolen Trans Am even though defendant knew it was stolen and, as a passenger, used it in furtherance of other crimes withthe driver. Defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in possession of the stolenTrans Am. He contends that merely riding as a passenger in a stolen motor vehicle, without more, does not rise to the levelof criminal possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant asserts that to find a passenger in possession of a stolen motorvehicle, the State must prove that the passenger was exercising some control over the vehicle.

In support of this contention, defendant cites this court's opinion in People v. Abrams, 360 Ill. 594 (1935). In Abrams,defendant was found guilty of larceny of an automobile. To sustain the conviction in Abrams, the State argued that, becausedefendant was in possession of a recently stolen vehicle, he was guilty of the larceny of that vehicle. However, this courtrejected the State's contention. The court explained that "possession must be such as to indicate that the defendant, and notsomeone else, took the property." Abrams, 360 Ill. at 595. The court noted that the evidence showed only that defendantwas riding in the back seat of a recently stolen automobile that was being driven by another. Abrams, 360 Ill. at 596.Consequently, this court reversed defendant's conviction for larceny.

We believe Abrams to be inapposite to the case at bar. Here, defendant was charged not with theft of a motor vehicle butwith possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Possession of a stolen motor vehicle is a distinct offense and, unlike theft, doesnot require evidence that defendant stole the motor vehicle. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 455-56 (1989); 625 ILCS5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992). As noted earlier, possession of a stolen vehicle requires proof that defendant possessed thevehicle, that he was not entitled to possession of the vehicle, and that he knew that the vehicle was stolen. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2dat 296; Rivera, 141 Ill. 2d at 533; 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992).

Although we are not bound by decisions of the appellate court, we believe that People v. Tucker, 186 Ill. App. 3d 683(1989), People v. Davenport, 176 Ill. App. 3d 142 (1988), and People v. Santana, 161 Ill. App. 3d 833 (1987), provideuseful insight into what may constitute possession of a stolen motor vehicle.

In Tucker, codefendant Ester was found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. On appeal, Ester argued that theevidence was insufficient to establish guilt for that offense. Specifically, Ester asserted that there was no evidence that hehad control of the car, drove it, or was observed stripping it. The appellate court affirmed Ester's conviction. The courtnoted that Ester was a passenger in the stolen motor vehicle, kept a lookout while codefendant Tucker tampered with thevehicle, fled the scene when the police arrived, and possessed a tool commonly used to remove wheels. The courtconcluded that all of these facts and circumstances were sufficient for the jury to find Ester guilty of possession of a stolenmotor vehicle.

A similar result was reached in Davenport. There defendants Brown and Davenport were observed removing lug nuts froma vehicle. As they were approached by police officers, they dropped a wrench and walked toward the officers. Afterlearning the car had been stolen, the officers placed defendants under arrest. Both defendants were found guilty ofpossession of a stolen motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendants contended that the evidence failed to prove that they were inpossession of a stolen motor vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court disagreed. The court stated thatdefendants' conduct in attempting to remove the tires from the vehicle with tools that had been taken from the vehicleclearly constituted possession under the statute. Thus, the appellate court held that there was no merit to defendants'contentions that the evidence was insufficient and that they were not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, in Santana, defendants Perez and Santana were found guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. There,defendants were observed leaning into a stolen car with their arms moving. Among other things, the hood of the car wasremoved and the front seats were out of place. On appeal, defendants argued that their mere presence in the garage, wherethe stolen vehicle was located, did not constitute possession of the vehicle. The court believed that the evidence, consideredas a whole, supported a finding that defendants were in possession of the stolen motor vehicle. Thus, the appellate courtaffirmed defendants' convictions.

With the above as background, we examine defendant's actions in this case. The evidence presented in this case establishedthat defendant was engaged in an illegal activity, shoplifting, prior to meeting another individual who was also shoplifting.Defendant asked the person if he had a car. The individual said he did and stated that he would wait for defendant outside inthe car. On leaving the store, defendant got in the Trans Am and left with the second individual. Defendant and the driverthen drove to another location and sold the shoplifted goods. Moreover, the evidence established that after defendant andthe driver sold the shoplifted goods, they drove to yet another location and purchased rock cocaine. After smoking the rockcocaine, defendant and the driver continued on their criminal venture by driving to another store where the driver shopliftedmore goods. Furthermore, the evidence showed that defendant and the driver used the stolen Trans Am to avoid capturewhen approached by the police.

A criminal conviction will not be set aside on appeal unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that thereremains a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1997); People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 13(1990). The question on review is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, anyrational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).

Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we believe that there was sufficient evidence presented for the trier of fact, thetrial judge in this case, to find defendant in possession of the stolen vehicle. Defendant was not merely a passive occupantwho did not know that the Trans Am was stolen. Rather, defendant was actively engaged in using the stolen vehicle infurtherance of a criminal venture for his personal benefit. Thus, based on all the evidence, defendant's joint use of thevehicle with the driver constituted possession of the vehicle within the meaning of the statute. On this record, the trial judgeproperly found defendant guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1992).

Given our result above, we need not address the State's contention that defendant was guilty of possession of a stolen motorvehicle under accountability principles.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the judgment of the circuit court of CookCounty, is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.