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Docket No. 84739-Agenda 6-November 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. LADRESHA F. BROWNLEE, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 17, 1999.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

In the circuit court of Champaign County, the State charged the defendant, Ladresha F. Brownlee, with the offense ofpossession with intent to deliver a controlled substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1994)). Thedefendant moved to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence against her. Following a hearing, the circuit court grantedthe defendant's motion. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1)(145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 293 Ill. App. 3d 315. Weallowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the appellate court.

The State's Attorney of Cook County filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the State. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

BACKGROUND

Urbana police officers Carlos Guerrero and Duane Maxey testified regarding the November 7, 1995, events that led to thedefendant's arrest. The officers were on a "special detail" patrol looking for illegal drug activity and illegal weapons.Around 9:10 p.m., Guerrero observed a white car stop in front of an apartment complex. He drove by the car, turned around,and then observed the car leaving. The car had been stopped for about one minute.

As the officers drove past, Maxey watched one person exit the vehicle, knock on a residence door, and then leave. Maxeytestified that he did not know whether the door was answered, but he believed that it was not. Nonetheless, this behavioraroused his suspicion because the area was known for its "crack houses" and because "it's commonplace for a [drugpurchaser] to pull up, run up to a home for just a moment, make a buy and leave." According to Maxey, he and Guerreroverbally agreed to stop the car if probable cause for a traffic stop arose. Guerrero, however, stated that no conversationoccurred on this subject. Maxey also testified that, while driving by the car, Guerrero informed him that Guerrerorecognized the car's driver from past encounters. In contrast, Guerrero stated that he was not even able to identify the raceor sex of the car's occupants.

The officers followed the car. The car proceeded without violating the law until it stopped at an intersection and turned left.Guerrero observed that the car failed to activate its turn signal within 100 feet of approaching the intersection and that, atthe intersection, the car stopped two feet beyond the stop sign. Maxey also observed the traffic violations and described thecar as stopping about "one-half a car length" past the stop sign. The officers decided to stop the car for violating the trafficlaws. Guerrero admitted that he wanted "to see if something would come of it." To his recollection, he had never beforeissued a traffic citation for either of these violations.

The officers approached the car, Guerrero toward the driver's side and Maxey toward the passenger's side. The driver andfront seat passenger were young-adult males. Two young female passengers, one of whom was the defendant, sat in thebackseat. The officers obtained the identities of all four occupants because identifying everyone in a vehicle was commondepartmental practice. Maxey observed that the defendant was holding an unopened bottle of beer, which did not violate thelaw. The officers then returned to their car and checked for outstanding warrants. They found none. The officers decided notto issue any traffic citations, but agreed to ask the driver for permission to search the car.

The officers re-approached the car. Guerrero testified that he returned to the driver his license and insurance card, andexplained that no citations would be issued. He did not advise the driver that he could leave. Rather, Guerrero then "pauseda couple [of] minutes." Following this pause, he asked the driver if he could search the vehicle. When asked what words heused in this regard, Guerrero explained that he told the driver that "we were concerned that there might be more alcohol inthe car" and that he "just wanted permission to take a look inside the vehicle." The driver asked Guerrero whether he had achoice in the matter. Guerrero replied that the driver did have a choice and that he was "asking" if he could search thevehicle. The driver stepped out of the car and said, "Okay, you can search."

The three passengers were ordered out of the car and directed to stand with Maxey. Guerrero found an open beer bottle onthe backseat floor where the defendant's feet had been. He also found two "blunts" lying underneath a man's jacket bundledup in the center of the front seat. A "blunt" was described as a hollowed-out cigar refilled with marijuana. No one claimedownership of the blunts. The officers believed that the blunts were within reach of all the car's occupants because the frontseat was split with a small armrest in the middle. When the four occupants exited the car, all were wearing coats with theexception of the male passenger.

Maxey testified that the defendant denied having any knowledge of the blunts. The other female passenger told Maxey thatthe blunts belonged to the men, but that all four individuals had been smoking them. The officers, however, noted that theblunts were not burned. Moreover, while searching the car, neither officer had noticed the odor of marijuana.

According to Maxey, the officers determined that they had probable cause to arrest all four individuals in the car because(1) the blunts were within reach of all four individuals, (2) no one claimed ownership of the blunts, (3) the other femalepassenger stated that all four individuals had smoked the blunts, and (4) the defendant stated that she had smoked marijuanabefore joining the others. Police searched the defendant incident to her arrest. On her person, police found the controlledsubstance that forms the basis of the present charge filed against her.

In the circuit court, the defendant filed a motion to quash her arrest and suppress the evidence against her. The motioncharged, in pertinent part, that "the search of said vehicle violated Defendant's *** constitutional rights in that thecontinued detention and search of said vehicle were unrelated to the original *** basis for the stop of said vehicle and anyconsent was the product of such unlawful detention." Defense counsel presented oral argument on this issue:

"[The officers] go back to their squad car. They run a warrant check and find that none of them have any outstandingwarrants. At that point Officer Guerrero told us *** that *** they are not going to issue any [traffic] citations ***, but*** they were going to try to get consent to search the vehicle just to see if there was anything there.

Under Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)] and the [line of] cases which followed,even if that stop is justified, they have no right to further detain the vehicle to do an exploratory search just to see ifsomething is there.

* * *

*** The continued detention of the occupants of the vehicle, including my client, violates her rights. The scope of thatdetention violates her rights."

In further support of this position, defense counsel asked the court to consider State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d 59, 463N.E.2d 1237 (1984). In Chatton, an officer observed a vehicle without front or rear license plates. The officer effected atraffic stop and approached the vehicle on foot. Once the officer reached the vehicle's window, the officer observed atemporary license placard. Despite the officer's observation of the placard, he continued to detain the driver. Ultimately, aweapon was discovered underneath the driver's seat and the driver was arrested for a weapons violation. The SupremeCourt of Ohio held that the officer lacked the authority to continue to detain the driver after observing the license placard,because the officer no longer had reasonable suspicion to suspect the driver of a traffic violation. Because the court foundthe officer's continued detention of the driver to be unconstitutional, it suppressed the weapon that was found as a result ofthat detention. Chatton, 11 Ohio St. 3d at 63, 463 N.E.2d at 1241.

The circuit court here first ruled that the initial traffic stop was permissible because the officers observed traffic violations.In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's separate argument that the traffic stop was invalid because the officers hadeffected a pretextual stop with the subjective intent to look for illegal drugs and weapons. Nonetheless, the circuit courtquashed the defendant's arrest and suppressed the evidence against her. After referencing the line of cases pointed to bydefense counsel, the court explained the basis for its ruling from the bench:

"[I]t simply seems to me the kind of a case, when the officers testified they decided that as far as the traffic matterswere concerned it was clear there weren't going to be any citations, I simply think that line of cases *** is talkingabout a situation like this where, in effect, the matter has been cleared as far as the traffic stop was concerned andthere was nothing else to create any reasonable or articulable suspicion of any other illegal activity, *** consentnotwithstanding, I think you cannot go any further, and I am going to allow the motion."

The circuit court thus held that, after the purpose for the traffic stop was cleared, the officers should not have proceededbecause they lacked reasonable suspicion of any other illegal activity, consent notwithstanding. In rendering this decision,the court explicitly rejected the State's argument that the controlling fact in the case was that the driver gave consent tosearch the car. It also mentioned the Ohio case cited by defense counsel. All of the court's comments, when consideredalong with defense counsel's motion and argument, show that the court agreed with the defendant's position that (1) afterthe officers determined not to issue any traffic citations, their continued detention of the car's occupants violated thedefendant's constitutional rights, and (2) the driver's consent to search the car was tainted as the product of that unlawfuldetention.

The State appealed. The State argued in the appellate court only that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the searchof the car and that the search was valid based on the driver's consent. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court ofthe United States issued Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996). In Robinette, the Courtheld that the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution does not require a police officer to tell a motorist that themotorist is free to leave before asking for consent to search the motorist's car. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, 136 L. Ed. 2dat 355, 117 S. Ct. at 421. The appellate court determined that Robinette controlled the disposition of this case. People v.Brownlee, 285 Ill. App. 3d 432 (1996). After stating that Officer Guerrero was not required to inform the driver that he wasfree to leave before requesting permission to search the car, the appellate court reversed the circuit court's decision andremanded for further proceedings. The appellate court never addressed the defendant's argument, made in support of thecircuit court's decision, that the officers' continued detention of the car, after declining to issue any citations, wasunconstitutional. The defendant had maintained that this continued detention violated both the state and federalconstitutions.

The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. Her main allegation of error therein was that the appellatecourt wrongly reversed the circuit court's decision in her favor without addressing her argument that the officers' continueddetention of the car violated the state constitution. Utilizing our supervisory powers, we vacated the appellate court'sjudgment and remanded the cause to the appellate court with directions that it consider the defendant's argument under theIllinois Constitution of 1970. On remand, the defendant filed a supplemental brief reasserting her argument that the officers'continued detention of the car violated our state constitution, notwithstanding the driver's consent. The State, in contrast,filed a supplemental brief on the issue of whether our state constitution imposes an affirmative duty upon officers to informa motorist that the motorist is free to leave before requesting permission to search the motorist's car. The appellate courtheld that section 6 of article I of our state constitution, like the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, does notimpose a duty upon officers to inform a motorist that the motorist is free to leave before requesting permission to search themotorist's car. 293 Ill. App. 3d 315. Based on that holding, the appellate court once again reversed the circuit court'sdecision and remanded for further proceedings. As before, the appellate court did not address the defendant's argument thatthe officers' continued detention of the car was unconstitutional. The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from theappellate court's judgment, which we allowed.

PREFATORY NOTE

In this court, the State filed a motion to strike portions of the defendant's brief. The motion claimed that the defendantshould not be permitted to raise her continued-detention argument because the appellate court never addressed it. Weentered an order denying the State's motion to strike. It is well established that a reviewing court may affirm the circuitcourt's decision based on any ground in the record. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 205 (1996); People v. Thomas, 164Ill. 2d 410, 419 (1995). Here, the defendant is not just advancing a ground in the record as a basis for affirming the circuitcourt's decision, but is advancing the very rationale that the circuit court gave as the reason for its decision. The defendantis entitled to raise this argument in this court. Hence, we denied the State's motion to strike. We further directed the State tobrief the continued-detention issue for our consideration. The State has filed its supplemental brief, to which the defendanthas filed a supplemental reply brief.

ANALYSIS

The defendant contends that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court's decision to quash her arrest andsuppress the evidence against her. According to the defendant, the circuit court was correct in concluding that, after theinitial purpose for the traffic stop was concluded, the officers' continued detention of the car and its occupants violated herconstitutional rights and thereby invalidated the subsequent consent to search the car and her arrest. She invokes both thefederal and state constitutions in support of her claim. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,