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Docket No. 88454-Agenda 8-September 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ANTHONY CRANE, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 19, 2001.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

We are asked to decide whether defendant Anthony Crane'sconstitutional right to a speedy retrial was violated when 26months elapsed between the time the appellate court reverseddefendant's conviction for murder and defendant filed his motionfor dismissal on speedy-retrial grounds. After balancing theopposing interests in light of the circumstances of this case, weconclude defendant's constitutional right to a speedy retrial wasnot violated.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on October 31, 1989, for possessionof drugs. While in custody, he was questioned about a robbery andarson murder which occurred at McHugh's tavern earlier thatmonth. On the following day, defendant gave an assistant State'sAttorney a signed, handwritten statement admitting to the arsonmurder. Defendant was tried in the circuit court of Cook Countyand convicted of aggravated arson and first degree murder andsentenced to natural life imprisonment.

On May 28, 1993, the appellate court reversed the convictions(People v. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1993)), finding that thetestimony presented at the suppression hearing failed to establishprobable cause for defendant's arrest and, consequently, that thetrial court erred when it denied defendant's motion to suppress hisconfession. Defendant's convictions were overturned and thematter was remanded for a new trial.

The State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We deniedthe petition on October 6, 1993. People v. Crane, 152 Ill. 2d 566(1993). The State then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari withthe United States Supreme Court. The appellate court's mandatewas recalled pending resolution of the State's petition. 155 Ill. 2dR. 368.

On February 28, 1994, the Unites States Supreme Courtdenied the State's application. Upon receiving notification of thedenial, the appellate court's mandate should have been reissued.See 155 Ill. 2d R. 368. However, in this case the mandate was nottransmitted to the circuit court until February 2, 1995.

After the mandate was received, the case was placed on thecircuit court docket. On March 15, 1995, defendant made his firstappearance before the trial court. On that date, defendant'sattorney was unavailable and a continuance was granted to March21, 1995. On March 21, 1995, defendant agreed to a May 31,1995, trial date. On May 31, 1995, defendant answered ready anddemanded trial. The case was continued on the State's motionuntil July 31, 1995. On July 31, 1995, defendant moved fordismissal of the charges against him, alleging the State violated hisconstitutional right to a speedy retrial because "more than areasonable length of time has elapsed since cert was denied by theU.S. Supreme Court." Defendant also alleged his statutory right toa speedy retrial was violated because "more than 120 days haselapsed since [his] case was remanded." On September 7, 1995,the trial court denied defendant's motion for dismissal, giving noexplanation for its decision.

After other pretrial issues were resolved, defendant's secondtrial commenced on October 15, 1996.⁽¹⁾ Defendant again wasfound guilty of first degree murder and aggravated arson. He laterwas sentenced to a term of 75 years' imprisonment on the murderconviction and a concurrent term of 30 years' imprisonment forthe aggravated arson.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant'sconvictions. 307 Ill. App. 3d 816. Applying the balancing test setforth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct.2182 (1972), the appellate court ruled that defendant'sconstitutional right to a speedy retrial had been violated. Inassessing defendant's claim, the appellate court held: the delay inbringing defendant to trial after his convictions were reversed-aperiod of 26 months until defendant moved for dismissal-waspresumptively prejudicial; that defendant did not waive his rightto a speedy trial by his inaction; and that defendant was severelyprejudiced because he remained incarcerated during the entire 26-month period. In addition, the appellate court held the unexplaineddelay of 11 months, though not a deliberate attempt to circumventdefendant's speedy-trial rights, was unjustified. Based on thisunexcused "lengthy delay," the appellate court concluded thatdefendant had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trialand dismissed the indictment.

We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2dR. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution ofIllinois guarantee to anyone accused of a crime the right to aspeedy trial. See U.S. Const., amend. VI ("[i]n all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy andpublic trial"); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,