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JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Patrick Hagberg, wasconvicted of the unlawful possession of a controlled substance(720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1998)) and of a traffic violation. Forthe unlawful possession count, the circuit court of McHenryCounty sentenced him to 24 months' probation. Defendantappealed only his unlawful possession conviction. The appellatecourt reversed defendant's conviction and vacated his sentence,holding that (1) a field test cannot be sufficient to sustain a findingthat a substance is a controlled substance and (2) the State failedto prove the field test's reliability. 301 Ill. App. 3d 491. Wegranted the State's petition for leave to appeal.

The State now asks this court to reverse the appellate courtand reinstate defendant's conviction. Defendant argues that theevidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and also cross-appeals, claiming that he did not knowingly and understandinglywaive his right to a jury.

BACKGROUND

Only two witnesses, both police officers, testified atdefendant's trial. One officer testified regarding a vial of cocainethat the State ultimately failed to prove was defendant's and thatdid not form the basis of defendant's conviction.

The other officer, William Bukovsky, testified concerning thesubstance that did form the basis of defendant's conviction.Bukovsky, a patrolman, stated that he stopped defendant becausedefendant was driving a vehicle with a broken taillight. Through hiscomputer, Bukovsky discovered that defendant's driver's licensewas suspended. Defendant was arrested for that violation.

Bukovsky took defendant into custody, and defendant rode inthe back of Bukovsky's squad car to the police station. The officerinspected the squad car daily and had not had any passengers in theback seat of his car since the last inspection. After defendant leftthe car, he asked Bukovsky to look into the car because defendanthad dropped his wallet. While searching for the wallet, Bukovskyfound a "folded-up piece of paper" on the floor of the back seat.Inside the paper was a "white, powdery substance." Bukovsky thenasked defendant if it was his, and defendant denied ownership.

Bukovsky performed a field test on the substance. He testifiedthat the test

"is basically several contained little packets with-I guess,the easiest thing to say, it's got a little glass vial in there,you put the substance in there, you shake it, you wait acouple minutes and when it turns a certain color that tellsyou if it tested positive for cocaine. There are different testkits for different kinds of drugs."

Bukovsky could not remember what color the substance becamewhen it tested positive for cocaine. He recalled that the directionsfor the test, including the correct color, were listed on the packet.Bukovsky had performed between 20 and 30 field tests but hadused the test for cocaine only five or six times. He had alsoreceived approximately four to six hours of training in field tests atthe University of Illinois Corrections Academy. The State offeredno other evidence regarding either the field test that was conductedby Bukovsky or the identification of the substance in the whitefolded paper. The State stipulated that the substance was nevertested in a laboratory.

ANALYSISSufficiency of the Field Test

The State argues that this court should reinstate defendant'sconviction because the field test was sufficient to prove that thesubstance was a controlled substance. Defendant contends that afield test alone is never sufficient to support a conviction forpossession. Defendant further argues that, even if a field test canbe sufficient, the field test in this case was not.

This court discussed the sufficiency of a field test in People v.Clark, 7 Ill. 2d 163 (1955). In Clark, a police informant, who wasa drug addict, told the defendant that he "had some topcoats forwhich he wanted to get some 'stuff.' " Clark, 7 Ill. 2d at 165. Theinformant went to the defendant's apartment and purchased twosealed packets of powder for $10. Those packets were taken to thepolice officer, who field tested them. The white powder testedpositive for a derivative of opium. Later, the powder was tested bya chemist and determined to be heroin, which is a derivative ofmorphine, a principle alkaloid of opium.

The defendant argued that there was some doubt as towhether the powder tested by the chemist was the same powderthat was sold by the defendant. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d at 171. This courtheld that the lack of a proper chain of custody did not mandatereversal because a field test had been done on the substancepurchased from the defendant, and that field test had yielded apositive result. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d at 171.

As defendant correctly notes, in People v. Judkins, 28 Ill. 2d417 (1963), this court found a field test to be insufficient. Judkins,however, is distinguishable from Clark. In Judkins, the officertestified that the field test could show only that the substance"might be" narcotics. Judkins, 28 Ill. 2d at 419. No other evidencewas presented to demonstrate that the substance actually wasnarcotics. In Clark, by contrast, the officer testified that thesubstance was a derivative of opium. Clark, 7 Ill. 2d at 171. Thus,Judkins did not hold that field tests categorically are insufficientbut only that the particular test used in that particular case wasinsufficient.

Contrary to defendant's assertions, we agree with the Statethat this court has never held that a field test is insufficient toidentify the substance as a narcotic simply because the test was afield test. Although the situation in which the test is conductedmight be relevant to the accuracy of the test, the fact that it is afield test by itself does not make the test insufficient. This court'sprior case law does not suggest such a general rule, and we see noreason to create one now.

Given that a field test can be sufficient in some cases, we nowconsider whether the field test in this case was sufficient to sustaindefendant's conviction. When determining whether the evidenceagainst a defendant was sufficient to prove guilt beyond areasonable doubt, the relevant question is whether, after viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimebeyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261(1985). In a controlled substance case, the State must presentsufficient evidence that the substance at issue is a controlledsubstance. People v. Park, 72 Ill. 2d 203, 211 (1978).

In this case, the State's only evidence regarding the identity ofthe powder found in the folded white piece of paper was thetestimony of Officer Bukovsky. Bukovsky had performed a fieldtest on the substance and determined from that test that thesubstance was cocaine. During cross-examination, however,Bukovsky admitted that he could not remember the name of thetest, the instructions for performing the test (although he did testifythat the instructions were listed on the test itself), the color thatindicated that the substance was cocaine, or the color that thesubstance actually turned. Officer Bukovsky merely asserted thatthe substance somehow turned the right color, whatever that colormight be. Standing alone, such vague and speculative testimony isby no means sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Wetherefore hold that the evidence was insufficient to convictdefendant of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

Jury Waiver

Defendant also claims that he did not knowingly andunderstandingly waive his right to a jury under section 103-6 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West1998)). Defendant claims that, because he was not present at thecourt appearance at which the jury waiver was filed, his waiver wasnot proffered with the proper understanding. We have alreadyreversed defendant's conviction and therefore do not reach thisissue.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we agree with the appellate court that defendant'sconviction should be reversed. We do so not because we endorsethe general rule that a field test can never be sufficient but becausethe evidence in this case did not sufficiently support defendant'sconviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate court isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring:

I concur in the majority's holding that the evidence in this casewas insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that thesubstance found in defendant's possession was a controlledsubstance. The opinion falls short, however, in failing to hold thatfield tests currently in use, which seek to identify the compositionof an unknown substance on the basis of a color change, are neversufficient to prove the composition of that substance beyond areasonable doubt.

While positive results from a color-change test conducted inthe field may well be sufficient as a preliminary screeningmechanism and thus give rise to probable cause, such tests are, bytheir nature, nonspecific.⁽¹⁾ In other words, such tests can indicateonly that a substance may contain, for example, cocaine. Thesetests cannot, and do not purport to, exclude the possibility that atested substance may be something other than the controlledsubstance which the test seeks to identify.

Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, Iwould further hold that the State may never meet its burden toprove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based solely upon thetestimony of a police officer concerning the results of a color-change test conducted in the field.

1. ¹See, e.g., P. Gianelli & E. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence