Laurin v. Providence Hospital
Case Date: 07/31/1998
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 98-1020
|
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT No. 98-1020 SHARON LAURIN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. THE PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL AND MASSACHUSETTS NURSES ASSOCIATION, Defendants, Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge] Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Campbell and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges, Tani E. Sapirstein, with whom Charles A. Lynch III and Sapirstein & Sapirstein, P.C. were on brief for appellant. Maurice M. Cahillane,with whom Egan, Flanagan & Cohen was on brief for appellee Providence Hospital. Jack J. Canzoneri, with whom McDonald & Associates was on brief for appellee Massachusetts Nurses Association. July 28, 1998 CYR, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Sharon Laurin, a registered nurse who was discharged from her employment, challenges a summary judgment ruling which dismissed her claims for relief under the Americans With Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) ("ADA"), its state-law counterpart, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, 4(16) ("Chapter 151B"), and the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between her former employer and her union. We affirm the district court judgment. I BACKGROUND From 1989 until August 1995, Laurin worked as a staff nurse in the 24-hour maternity unit at The Providence Hospital ("Hospital"). Staff nurses principally worked one of three shifts: days (7:00 a.m. - 3:30 p.m.), evenings (3:00 p.m. - 11:30 p.m.), or nights (11:15 p.m. - 7:15 a.m.). In order to cover the less desirable evening and night shifts, the Hospital required all non- senior day nurses to work approximately one-third of their scheduled hours either on the evening or the night shift. Laurin worked this so-called "days rotating" position throughout her tenure. In 1993, Laurin returned to graduate school on a part- time basis after receiving permission from her supervisor to reduce her work week from 40 to 32 hours. During the 1995 spring semester, her supervisor authorized a further, temporary reduction from 32 hours to 24, which enabled Laurin to retain the benefits commensurate with a 32-hour position. The Hospital posted neither of these part-time nursing positions before offering them to Laurin. Notwithstanding her reduced work schedule, Laurin continued to rotate shifts. After completing the night shift on April 26, 1995, Laurin blacked out at the wheel while driving home. Her primary- care physician, as well as a neurologist, diagnosed the event as syncope, or fainting. The neurologist concluded that Laurin should refrain from "long periods without sleep" and keep to a "regular schedule of work hours," or "one [consistent] shift." He added that a regular daytime shift would be "most beneficial" since Laurin had small children who were primarily in need of her attention during daytime hours. Laurin presented the neurologist's report to her immediate supervisors, and requested permanent reassignment to a days-only position in the maternity unit. According to Laurin, her supervisors initially observed, "in a laughing manner," that "they probably weren't going to be able to accept this note" because other days-rotating nurses with small children inevitably would beg off their shift-rotation assignments as well. Laurin then contacted a representative from the Massachusetts Nurses Association ("MNA"), the union representing staff nurses at the Hospital. At a meeting attended by the MNA representative, Laurin was advised by her supervisors that "they would check into it [viz., the requested accommodation]." Meanwhile, the MNA polled the staff nurses in the maternity unit, the majority of whom objected to a days-only position for Laurin and refused to volunteer to cover her evening and night shifts. On May 24, 1995, the Hospital's human resources department sent a letter advising that shift rotation was an "essential function" of Laurin's position, mandated by the CBA between the Hospital and the MNA. Nevertheless, as a temporary accommodation the Hospital proposed to assign Laurin to a days-only schedule for six weeks, during which time she was to consult with human resources personnel about any alternative days-only job positions (e.g., operating room) available at the Hospital. Notwithstanding her refusal to sign the proposal letter due to its characterization of her medical condition as a "lifestyle problem," the Hospital nonetheless granted Laurin a temporary days-only assignment for the six-week period. On the early morning of June 17, 1995, Laurin suffered a seizure while at home sleeping. Her neurologist responded with a report to the Hospital, adjusting his diagnosis from syncope to seizure disorder. Concluding that the seizure had been induced by fatigue, the neurologist opined that "a daytime position is absolutely necessary." The Hospital nevertheless refused to reconsider its earlier decision to deny Laurin a days-only position, but did agree to extend the temporary accommodation until August 7, when she was scheduled to resume work on the evening shift. Once again Laurin contacted the MNA. Upon reviewing her complaint the MNA declined to submit a grievance, on the grounds that the Hospital had not violated the CBA, other staff nurses could not be compelled to cover Laurin's evening and night shifts, and the MNA would not support an individual member's complaint to the detriment of its other members. Instead, the MNA recommended that Laurin consider obtaining an unpaid medical leave of absence, working straight- evening shifts, or rotating day-evening shifts (i.e., no nights). After Laurin refused, the MNA informed her in writing that she had the right to pursue a grievance, and outlined the procedures. On August 4, Laurin filed a Step 1 grievance with the Hospital. Notwithstanding repeated warnings that she would be terminated, Laurin failed to appear for work on the evening of August 7. Following her termination, Laurin reiterated her request that the MNA file a grievance in her behalf. The MNA again refused. In August 1995, Laurin filed her own Step 1 and Step 2 grievances, which were denied by the Hospital following a hearing. After Laurin filed a Step 3 grievance based on substantially similar allegations, the Hospital declined to respond. For its part, the MNA informed Laurin that it would not assist in presenting her grievances to arbitration. Laurin filed the present action in federal district court in January 1996. The six-count complaint alleged that by refusing to assign her to a days-only schedule on a permanent basis the Hospital had violated the ADA and its state counterpart, Chapter 151B, and breached the CBA; and, further, that by refusing to file grievances and to pursue arbitration in her behalf the MNA had violated the ADA and Chapter 151B, and breached its duty of fair representation. After the defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all counts, Laurin appealed. II DISCUSSION A. The ADA and the Chapter 151B Claims Against the Hospital Laurin first contends that the Hospital was not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA and Chapter 151B claims because the issue as to whether shift rotation was an "essential function" of her former position presented a quintessential question of fact for the jury. An ADA claimant alleging handicap discrimination must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she was "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was a "qualified individual," i.e., that either with or without reasonable accommodation she was able to perform the "essential functions" of her former position; and (3) her discharge was due, in whole or in part, to her disability. See EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 141 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1996). It is well settled that an employer need not accommodate a disability by foregoing an "essential function" of the employment position. See, e.g., Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Under the ADA, the employer avoids all liability if the plaintiff would have been fired because incapable of performing the essential functions of the job . . . ."); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1995) (similar); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 73 (1990); accord Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F. Supp. 1496, 1502 (N.D. Iowa 1997) ("[T]he request to perform only some of the essential functions of a job is not a request for reasonable accommodation."). EEOC interpretive regulations afford guidance in assessing whether a particular job requirement is an "essential function" for purposes of the ADA: (1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term "essential functions" does not include the marginal functions of the position. (2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. (3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n); see Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA, while not controlling, constitute "'a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts . . . may properly resort for guidance'") (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. 12111(8). The initial salvo by Laurin is aimed at what she considers the inappropriately high level of deference the district court accorded the Hospital's determination, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(3)(i), that shift-rotation is an essential function. Such deference is not appropriate, Laurin says, because she had adduced direct evidence of the Hospital's discriminatory attitude toward her particular handicap. Cf. Amego, 110 F.3d at 145 (endorsing considerable deference to employer's judgment as to "essential function" "[w]here the plaintiff has presented noevidence of discriminatory intent, animus, or even pretext") (emphasis added). Specifically, Laurin contends that the Hospital and her supervisors responded to her requests for accommodation with "incredulous refusal[s]," declined to take them "seriously," and belittled her medical condition as a mere "lifestyle problem." On the contrary, close inspection of Laurin's record citations, even viewed in their most favorable light, belie her contention. Assuming arguendo that Laurin plausibly interprets Amego, the only concrete allegation among the lot is that her direct supervisors (viz., Claire Margosiak and the director of nursing, Joan Richter) reacted in a "laughing manner" to her initial request for accommodation. Even assuming as much, Laurin's claim is nonetheless flawed, since she was not diagnosed as having a seizure disorder until later, after experiencing her second episode. Such spontaneous remarks, made long before the supervisors had an opportunity adequately to assess the merits of the requested accommodation, could be considered only marginally probative of any discriminatory animus on their part. Furthermore, the supervisors explained to Laurin that the shift-rotation requirement would be rendered obsolete were the Hospital to waive it for all staff nurses with small children who might experience episodes of fatigue. Nor was their characterization of Laurin's medical condition |