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Martin v. Sullivan
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MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 1997 ME 49
Docket: CUM-96-300
Argued November 6, 1996
Decided March 18, 1997
Panel: WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, and
LIPEZ, JJ.
MARJORIE MARTIN
v.
JEFFREY SULLIVAN
DANA, J.
[¶1] Marjorie Martin appeals from a partial summary judgment
entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Bradford, J.) on Counts
II and III of her legal malpractice action against Jeffrey Sullivan. Martin
argues that her constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when the case
was transferred to the nonjury trial list because she failed to pay the
required fee, and that the court erred in granting a judgment as a matter of
law on Counts II and III because there were genuine issues of material fact.
We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The case arises from attorney Sullivan's handling of Martin's
defense of an action brought against her. After discovery Sullivan became
persuaded that Martin would lose and be subject to treble damages and costs
if the case went to trial. In October 1990 on the day the trial was to begin,
Sullivan convinced Martin to accept a settlement offered by the plaintiff.
[¶3] In August 1993 Martin began the present action, a four count
complaint alleging (I) attorney malpractice, (II) unfair and deceptive trade
practices, (III) intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
(IV) fraud. In October 1993 Martin filed a pretrial scheduling statement
demanding a jury trial. In November 1993 the court entered an expedited
pretrial order requiring the clerk to place the case on the jury trial list 30
days after the close of discovery. After discovery, however, the clerk placed
the case on the nonjury trial list because Martin had failed to pay the
required $300 jury fee.
[¶4] In August 1994 Martin filed a motion to transfer the case to the
jury trial list and to waive the jury fee due to her indigence, or alternatively,
to transfer the case and extend the time for paying the jury fee. The court
denied her motion. Before the trial the court granted a partial summary
judgment in favor of Sullivan on Counts II and III. Thereafter, Count IV was
dismissed and the trial proceeded on Martin's only remaining claim, Count
I, attorney malpractice. After the nonjury trial, the court found for Sullivan
and a judgment was entered accordingly.
I
Trial By Jury
[¶5] Martin argues she did not waive her right to a jury trial merely
because she failed to pay the required fee, or alternatively, the court abused
its discretion in not granting her a waiver of the fee or additional time to pay
it. Her contentions are without merit. The trial court based its decision on
an administrative order of the Supreme Judicial Court and, contrary to
Martin's contentions, the order applies in this case. The order provides in
pertinent part:
1. . . . [I]n all civil actions filed on or after [February 1, 1991,]
the jury fee shall be paid upon the filing of a Pretrial Scheduling
Statement.
. . .
6. In the event that the jury fee is not paid as set forth above,
notwithstanding any other requests, the parties shall be deemed
to have waived trial by jury.
7. The civil jury fee is payable by the plaintiff.
Me. Rptr., 576-588 A.2d CXXXV-CXXXVI. Martin failed to pay the jury fee
even though she was informed of the requirement by her attorney. She also
failed to request a waiver due to indigence until almost one year after filing
the scheduling statement. In light of such circumstances, the court
properly determined Martin waived a trial by jury pursuant to the
administrative order. Moreover, the court's refusal to grant her motion for a
waiver or more time, filed nearly one year after the fee was due, was not an
abuse of discretion.
II
Appeal of Partial Summary Judgment
[¶6] Martin argues the court erred in granting a summary judgment
in favor of Sullivan on Counts II and III because genuine issues of material
fact exist as to whether Sullivan's conduct was unfair or deceptive pursuant
to the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 205-A-214 (1989 &
Supp. 1996), and/or whether such conduct constitutes the intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress. We do not reach these issues
because such error, if any, was harmless.
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