Charles and Dolores Sabino v. Dir, Div of Taxation
Case Date: 03/01/1995
Docket No: none
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL
TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
Charles A. and Dolores C. :
Director, Division
Joseph Fogelson for defendant (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
them (Partnership Agreement).
Agreement, Taxpayer's proportionate share of the Contributions was
$ 3,315. of the following categories of income and deduction: (i) "Income (Loss)", which includes items of "net" ordinary income (loss) of the partnership and requires the partnership to set out separately: Guaranteed Payments to the individual partners; Dividends qualifying for the (then) allowable exclusion from Federal gross income; Net short-term (and long-term) capital gain (loss); Net gain (loss) under IRC § 1231; See footnote 5 and any "Other" income; (ii) "Deductions", including Charitable Contributions set out in accordance with the applicable percentage limitation categories of IRC § 170(b); IRC § 179 expense deductions (i.e. whereby a taxpayer takes an immediate expense deduction rather than a depreciation deduction) See footnote 6; IRA payments; 401(k) and Simplified Employee Pension Plan payments; and "Other" Deductions; (iii) "Credits", including Jobs Credits, Credit for Alcohol Used as Fuel, Credit for Income Tax Withheld and "Other" credits; (iv) "Net Earnings From Self Employment", in conjunction with the computation of the self employment tax; (v) "Tax Preference Items"; (vi) "Investment Interest expense items"; (vii) "Foreign Taxes"; (viii) "Other items and amounts not [previously] included...that are required to be reported separately..."; and (ix) "Investment Credit and Investment Credit Recapture Items". In general, the Schedule accommodates the requirements of IRC § 703(a)(1) that "[t]he taxable income of a partnership ... be computed in the same manner as in the case of an individual [i.e. the netting process whereby the partnership's "ordinary income (loss)" is determined], except that... (1) the items described in section 702(a) shall be separately stated...." The items set out in IRC § 702(a) are items which, if separately earned or incurred by the individual partner (i.e. not in his capacity as a partner), would result in an income tax liability for that partner different from the income tax liability which would result if the item had been netted with other partnership items and passed out as part of the partner's distributive share of the partnership's "ordinary income(loss)". See footnote 7
For example, Taxpayers' itemized deduction available under IRC §
170 for its share of the Contributions paid by Peat Marwick was
entered on the 1985 Federal K-1 as a separately stated item. IRC
§ 170(b) would require Taxpayers to aggregate all Contributions,
whether made by them individually, or by allocation from Peat
Marwick or any other "pass through" entity in which they may have
had an interest, in the taxable year and apply the percentage
limitations of IRC § 170(b) to this total in order to determine the
deduction allowable for the 1985 taxable year. See footnote 8 The 1985 K-1
therefore directs a taxpayer to the Instructions to Federal Form
1040 Schedule A to complete the calculation. Lumping the
Contributions together with the "ordinary" income and expense items
of the partnership at the entity level might lead to the avoidance
of the IRC § 170(b) percentage limitations at the partner level,
with a resultant distortion of Federal taxable income. In similar
fashion, the 1985 K-1 required that items of capital gain and loss
be passed through separately to the individual partners in order
that the netting process and the limitation on deductibility of
capital loss apply at the partner level. See IRC § 1201 et seq.
In computing their New Jersey Gross Income Tax liability
(N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1, et seq.) Taxpayers deducted the $3,315 in
Contributions set out on the Peat Marwick K-1 and the $7,488 in the
(unreimbursed) Direct Expenses, reported on Taxpayers' Schedule E
from the sum of the Schedule K-1 distributive share items of
income.
following bases for disallowance of the deductions:
As To The Direct Expenses: The Division has disallowed the deduction claimed by Mr. and Mrs. Sabino in their Gross Income Tax category "net [sic] distributive share of partnership income" for the $ 7,488 of Direct Expenses because (i) Peat Marwick did not pay such expenditures in the course of its business of accountancy, did not claim a deduction for them in determining its taxable income from its business of accountancy, was not entitled to claim a deduction for them in determining its taxable income from its business of accountancy and did not specifically allocate such a deduction to Mr. Sabino, and (ii) even if the reasons set forth in clause (i) do not provide a proper basis for the denial, Mr. and Mrs. Sabino have not established to the Division's satisfaction that the Direct Expenses were ordinary and necessary expenses of Peat Marwick's business
of accountancy. Subsequent to oral argument on the cross motions for summary judgment and prior to this Court's issuance of its decision on the merits of those motions, the Director withdrew the 1985 Gross Income Tax assessment relating to the items at issue in this case. The Director then moved for dismissal of the Complaint for lack of standing and mootness. The Court denied that motion by oral opinion, concluding that an actual controversy, which was bona fide and adversarial in nature, persisted between the parties and was cognizable under the Declaratory Judgments Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51. See footnote 10 It was further found that the Act's stated purpose, to "settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status and other legal relations", was met by treating
Taxpayers' claim as one for declaratory relief. N.J.S.A. 2A:16-51.
Hungersford & Terry, Inc. v. Geschwindt,
24 N.J. Super. 385, 393
(Ch. 1953) aff'd
27 N.J. Super. 515. "A declaratory judgment may
be rendered under N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53 where there is an actual
controversy between the parties which involves differing views on
the meaning of applicable statutory provisions." N.J. Ass'n for
Retarded Citizens v. Human Services,
89 N.J. 234, 242 (1982). See
also Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Union County Park
Comm'n,
41 N.J. 333, 336 (1964); Hammond v. Doan,
127 N.J. Super. 67, 72 (Law 1972).
expenses were ordinary and necessary...costs
and expenses of the partnership's business and
also the tax matters partner states that the
...partnership and the partners have agreed on
three points: (1) that the economic burden of
such costs and expenses be borne by the
[individual] partner; (2) the partnership has
not reimbursed and will not reimburse the
partner for the expense; and (3) that the
partnership has allocated to the partner who
incurred the expense the deduction.... The
second alternative is if the partner who is
seeking the deductible expense on his gross
income tax return attaches to this return
other evidence to demonstrate the facts that
would have been contained in the tax matters
partner's statement and clearly and
convincingly proves that such cost and expense
was an ordinary and necessary cost and expense
of the partnership's business.
Clearly, while Taxpayers concurred in the Director's change in
position with respect to the threshold requirement for
deductibility being "...if the expense would have been deductible
by the partnership...then it will be deductible by the partner...",
the controversy continues over the standard for deductibility.
That is, Taxpayers do not agree that the Director's "ordinary and
necessary" standard is within the contemplation of N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b. That disagreement continues notwithstanding the Director's
intention with respect to an amended regulation.
particular payment as [a] charitable
contribution deductible under Section 170 for
Federal income tax purposes, the Director can
rely on that characterization ...as indicating
that the expense is not an ordinary and
necessary expense of the partnership's
business....[Stated differently], [if a] sole
proprietor on his Federal tax return
characterized a payment to a charity as a
charitable contribution deductible under 170
yet sought to deduct that payment as a
business expense for Gross Income Tax
purposes, ...[the Division] could conclusively
rely on his characterization of the item on
his Federal return.....[T]he taxpayer cannot
rebut the presumption by providing evidence to
the Director. The only way [to change the
result would be by]...the taxpayer...in the
sole proprietor's case, or the partnership, in
the partnership's case,...filing an amended
[Federal] return.... And changing it on the
Federal return.
Taxpayers disagree with the Director's stated interpretation as to
the standard for deductibility of the Contributions in two
respects. First, Taxpayers do not agree that the character of the
Contributions under the Gross Income Tax Act turns upon the
character of the Contributions for Federal income tax purposes.
Second, Taxpayers do not agree that the "ordinary and necessary"
standard applies to determine the deductibility of the
Contributions, any more than it applies with respect to the Direct
Expenses.
to the State of New Jersey. The Director's withdrawal of the
contested assessments has no binding effect upon the Division's
future conduct and does not relate to the underlying issues in this
matter; that is, to the meanings and proper interpretations of the
statute and regulations. Accordingly, we turn now to the
substantive issue which remains - the standard for deductibility
under the Gross Income Tax Act of the Contributions and Direct
Expenses. While the Gross Income Tax Act includes "distributive share of partnership income" as a category of items falling within the definition of New Jersey "gross" income , nowhere does it define this term. See footnote 12 This lack of definition, when coupled with the significance of that term under Federal law, led, in the early years following the enactment of the Gross Income Tax, to confusion
as to its meaning under the Act. Smith v. Director, Divisions of
Taxation,
108 N.J. 19 (1987) (Smith) resolved the conflict by
rejecting the Federal law definition.
A. The ordinary and necessary standard for deductibility set out
in IRC § 162 does not apply under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b.
expenses) See footnote 13 may be used to compute a partner's "distributive
share" of income for New Jersey Gross Income Tax purposes. The
Director argues that if Contributions are reported by the
Partnership as deductible by a partner under the authority of IRC
§ 170, they are conclusively presumed not to constitute ordinary
and necessary expenses, with the result that they may not be used
to reduce a partner's New Jersey distributive share.
...Gross Income Tax Act on the Internal
Revenue Code....No evidence has been presented
that the Legislature intended to equate
"distributive share" ...or ... "income" and
"gain" with analogous terms used in the
Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, when the
Legislature intended to incorporate federal
income tax concepts, it did so explicitly....
The Act's legislative history clearly
indicates that the Legislature intended to and
did reject the federal income tax model in
favor of a gross income tax act in order to
avoid tax loopholes under federal
law.[citation omitted] Since the Legislature
rejected the federal model of taxing income,
other branches may not superimpose the Code
upon the Gross Income Tax Act in the guise of
statutory construction.
The "ordinary and necessary" standard set out in IRC § 162, not
being expressly incorporated into either of subsections N.J.S.A.
54A:5-1b or k, cannot be engrafted thereon by either the court or
the Director. The Legislature simply did not manifest any intent
to equate "all costs and expenses incurred in the conduct [of
business]" in N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b with IRC § 162's "ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred ...in carrying on any trade or
business." See footnote 14
other categories if it were not earned in the regular course of a
business", from inclusion in a partner's distributive share of
partnership income, Id. at 27, so we must conclude that the
Legislature intended that partners, like sole proprietors, would
deduct all costs and expenses incurred in the regular course of
their business. The Court there articulated that the crucial
inquiry for purposes of N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b was whether the expense
was incurred in the conduct of the ordinary (or regular) business,
profession or other activity of the partnership.
with the taxpayer's method of accounting, See footnote 15
even if such deductions relate to expenses
incurred in earning business income exempt
from taxation under the Gross Income Tax Act,
or expense which are partly or wholly
nondeductible for Federal income tax purposes
or expenses under rules which limit the
deductibility of particular business expenses
under the Internal Revenue Code.
We specifically reject, as we must under Smith, the Federal
standard for deductibility contained in IRC § 162 and the
Regulations thereunder. While, it is now unnecessary for us to
decide whether the Contributions would have been an allowable
deduction under this standard, we note that, there being no dispute
that the payment of the Contributions occurred in the conduct of
the partnership's business, it would seem that Taxpayers have met
the standard.
ordinary course of its business. No business
expenses are being applied against income
derived from an unrelated source.
This decision merely applies that reasoning.
under IRC § 162 has no connection with the standard therefor under
N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b and k. Suffice it to say that the tension
between IRC § 162 and § 170 has the objective of preventing
avoidance of the percentage limitations under § 170 by classifying
a payment as a § 162 expense; not disallowing a deduction in its
entirety. See footnote 17 The attempted distinction between "business" and
"non-business" Charitable Contributions made in N.J.A.C. 18:35-14,
example 7, engrafts upon the Gross Income Tax Act's standard a
mutated version of the Federal law character ("deductible under §
170 vs. deductible under § 162".) Example 7 must be disregarded as
an impermissible extension of the statute. See footnote 18 GE Solid State, Inc.
v. Director, Division of Taxation,
132 N.J. 298 (1993).
II
In light of the Director's determination to amend N.J.A.C.
18:35-14(c)7, resolution of whether a partner's unreimbursed
expenses may be deducted is accomplished simply by reference to the
standard which we held above to be provided under N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1b
- "paid or incurred in the conduct of the business, profession or
other activity of the partnership." As with respect to the
Contributions, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the
Direct Expenses would have been an allowable deduction under the
standard articulated today. It would appear, however, that as the
Director has abandoned N.J.A.C. 18:35-14.1(c)7, the only issue is
whether the Expenses were incurred in the conduct of the
partnership's business. Defendant did not oppose this
characterization and, therefore, the Direct Expenses would have
been deductible.
Footnote: 1 N.J.S.A. 54A:5-1 provides in part:
New Jersey gross income shall consist of the
following categories of income:
...b. Net profits from business. The net
income from the operation of a business,
profession, or other activity, after
provisions for all costs and expenses
incurred in the conduct thereof, determined
accordance with the method of accounting
k. Distributive share of partnership income.
Under the provisions of N.J.S.A. 54A:5-4, the partnership entity
is not itself subject to the Gross Income Tax, however "...the
income or gain of a member of a partnership...[is] subject to the
tax and the tax [is] imposed upon [each partners'] share, whether
or not distributed, of the income or gain received by the
partnership...for its taxable year...." In this regard the
scheme of partnership taxation under the Gross Income Tax is
similar to that under Federal law.
Footnote: 2 Taxpayers and the Director agree that, under the terms of
the Partnership Agreement, each of the Partners will be a
licensed certified public accountant in a state of the United
States, actively engaged in the business of accountancy.
Footnote: 3 Under the provisions of IRC § 170 payments of charitable
contributions are deductible, subject to certain percentage
limitations set out in § 170(b), against an individual taxpayer's
adjusted gross income, as an itemized (Schedule A) deduction. The
term "charitable contribution" is defined at IRC § 170(c) to
include, in general, payments made within the taxable year to
corporations, organizations, trusts and foundations which
themselves enjoy an exemption from Federal income taxation
pursuant to the provisions of IRC § 501 et seq. This exemption
relates to the purposes for which an organization
This income tax accounting treatment clearly reflects the nature
of the partnership, a creature of state law, as an aggregate of
its members.
Footnote: 8 IRC § 170(b) provides a limitation on the amount of an
individual's (or corporation's) deduction in any given taxable
year. For individuals the limitation is expressed as a
percentage of "adjusted gross income". In general, in tax year
1985, there were three limitations, 50%,30" and 20" depending on
the nature of the recipient organization (i.e. "public" vs.
"private" charities), and the character of property gifted (i.e.
cash vs. property with unrecognized capital gain.)
Footnote: 9 The Director refers to the Contributions as "Section
501(c)(3) Payments" apparently to mean that the payments were in
the nature of deductions allowable under IRC § 170.
Footnote: 10 Interestingly, under similar circumstances, the United
States Tax Court ruled that the IRS's withdrawal of a deficiency
assessment after a petition contesting the deficiency was filed
with the Tax Court does not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Bowman v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 681 (1951); Conklin v.
Commissioner, 1
987 T.C.Memo 411. In Bowman, the Court stated
that once it acquired jurisdiction:
In another United States Tax Court matter addressing the
issue of jurisdiction, the court found that:
it is not the existence of a deficiency but the
Commissioner's determination of a deficiency that
provides a predicate for tax court jurisdiction. Footnote: 14 IRC § 162 and the Regulations issued thereunder have spawned an enormous body of Federal law. The stated standard under IRC 162 ("ordinary and necessary") has become "ordinary, reasonable and necessary" over the years. We are at a loss as to how the Director would pick his way through this body of law (replete with the interrelationship with other IRC sections) to find that portion which is consistent with Gross Income Tax principles. Footnote: 15 In general, a taxpayer's method of accounting will affect the timing of his (her, its) inclusion of items of income and allowance of items of loss and deduction. For example, Cash Basis taxpayers will take items into income and be entitled to deduct items in the taxable year when the income is received and the expense paid. Accrual Basis taxpayers will look to the taxable year in which all events have occurred fixing their right to income and their obligation to pay, which may occur in a taxable year different from that in which payment is received or made. The method of accounting is thus a procedural aspect. It has of course no effect upon the substantive issues of includibility/deductibility of items of income and deduction. Footnote: 16 We note, but need not here address, that the effect of the Director's "irrebuttable (conclusive) presumption" is the creation of substantive law. Clearly, the Legislature alone possesses this power. Footnote: 17 See Regs. § 1.162-15. "In general. No deduction is allowable under § 162(a) for a contribution or gift by an individual or corporation if any part thereof is deductible under section 170. For example, if a taxpayer makes a contribution of $ 5,000 and only $ 4,000...is deductible under section 170(a)...no deduction is allowable under section 162(a) for the remaining $ 1,000." Footnote: 18 It must be noted that the attempted categorization of "business" vs. "non-business" charitable contributions does not exist under Federal law, where the classification is either "trade or business deduction" or "charitable contribution deduction". The premise of the Director's conclusion has no viability.
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