MAZZA v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Case Date: 12/18/1995
Docket No: SYLLABUS
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(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
DENNIS MAZZA V. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Argued September 26, 1995 -- Decided December 18, 1995
PER CURIAM
Dennis Mazza, a park patrolman for the Essex County Park Commission for over sixteen years,
seeks accidental disability benefits for an injury that occurred while on mounted patrol in the South
Mountain Reservation. As Mazza was attempting to cross a stream, his horse unexpectedly bucked and
"reared up," causing his body to twist in the saddle and suffer a disabling rupture of spinal discs. Officer
Mazza's body went numb; he slumped over and lay on the saddle until his horse brought him back to the
stable. The injury left Mazza permanently disabled.
Officer Mazza will receive ordinary disability benefits, equal to about forty percent of his average
final compensation. Mazza seeks additional compensation up to an approximate total of sixty-six and two-thirds percent of final compensation if the disability is determined to be "a direct result of a traumatic event
occurring as a result of... regular or assigned duties..."
Accidental disability entitles an injured or disabled employee to greater benefits than he or she
would receive on retirement for an ordinary disability. To qualify for accidental disability, a member of the
Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PERS) must: 1) be permanently or totally disabled as a direct
result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a direct result of the performance of their regular duties;
2) not suffer the disability because of the member's willful negligence; and 3) be mentally or physically
incapacitated from the performance of his or her usual duty or any other available duty.
It is undisputed that Mazza has established the second and third requirements for accidental
disability benefits. The Division of Pensions and Benefits determined that Mazza did not satisfy the first
requirement that the injury be the result of a traumatic event. Following the Report and Recommendation
of an Administrative Law Judge empaneled to hear Mazza's appeal of the rejection of his claim, the Board
of Trustees of PERS (Board) reaffirmed its original decision denying accidental disability benefits.
Mazza appealed to the Appellate Division. A majority of that court affirmed the decision of the
Board. One member of the panel dissented, reasoning that the ALJ had created an artificial form of
disqualification for "lifting and twisting cases" and that, in this case, although Mazza was not thrown from the
horse onto a hard surface, the violent twisting force of the large horse met the definition of a traumatic event
because it clearly constituted a great rush of force or uncontrollable power and was not expected by the
officer.
Mazza appealed to the Supreme Court as or right based on the dissent in the Appellate Division.
HELD: Under the circumstances of this case, the twisting that was the source of Dennis Mazza's injuries
was not a traumatic event entitling him to accidental disability benefits because it did not involve a
great rush of force or uncontrollable power. 1. The Board and the Appellate Division did not create an artificial category of disqualification for accidental disability benefits, but rather found, under the standards of Kane v. Board of Trustees, Police &
Firemen's Retirement System, that Mazza was not injured in a traumatic event that would entitle him to
accidental disability benefits. (p. 3)
2. For an injury to arise from a traumatic event and qualify for accidental disability benefits, a worker must
establish that: 1) his or her injuries were not induced by the stress or strain of normal work effort; 2) he or
she met involuntarily with the object or matter that was the source of the harm; and 3) the source of the
injury was a great rush of force or uncontrollable power. As found by the ALJ, the third factor was not
satisfied on the facts of this case because the injury did not constitute a great rush of force or uncontrollable
power. (pp. 3-4)
3. The Court has a limited role in reviewing the decision of the Board. It can intervene only when the
agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission or with other State policy. Here, there was
sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the conclusions of the ALJ and the Board; the application of the
facts to the law is not so unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion. The
Court affirms, not because lifting or twisting cases can never be considered traumatic, but because this
twisting case was found by the Board not to be traumatic. (pp. 4-5)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICE HANDLER, dissenting, in which JUSTICE STEIN joins, is of the view that, in Kane, this
Court did not posit the need for an actual impact with the physical object constituting the originating source
for the force or power that causes the injury. In the absence of a tangible impact, common sense and
experience should guide the determination of what creates a great rush of force. If a 1000 pound horse
unexpectedly rears up spinning, violently throwing the body of the rider, the rider will be subjected to a great
rush of force. Thus, Mazza should be entitled to receive accidental disability benefits because he has
satisfied the statutory requirements, including the requirement of suffering a traumatic event as defined in
Kane and Cattani.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN and GARIBALDI join in this
PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE
STEIN joins. JUSTICE COLEMAN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DENNIS MAZZA,
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND
Respondent-Respondent.
Argued September 26, 1995 -- Decided December 18, 1995
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division.
William I. Strasser argued the cause for
appellant (Strasser & Associates, attorneys;
Mr. Strasser and Robert J. Bavagnoli, on the
briefs).
Richard L. Evert, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Deborah T.
Poritz, Attorney General of New Jersey,
attorney; Joseph L. Yannotti, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Josh Lichtblau,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
barn." It is undisputed that Officer Mazza will receive at least
ordinary disability benefits, which approximate 40 per cent of
his average final compensation. At issue is his eligibility for
additional compensation up to an approximate total of 66-2/3 per
cent of final compensation if the disability is determined to be
"a direct result of a traumatic event occurring during and as a
result of . . . regular or assigned duties . . . ." N.J.S.A.
43:15A-43.
We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. We need
not retrace the doctrinal differences that have so recently
marked our efforts to find a formula of words that will
effectively convey the Legislature's intention to create a more
stringent test of medical causation for the granting of
accidental disability benefits. See the separate opinions of the
members of the Court in Maynard v. Board of Trustees,
113 N.J. 169 (1988), and Ciecwisz v. Board of Trustees,
113 N.J. 180
(1988).
[Kane v. Board of Trustees, supra,
The ALJ found that both factors one and two were met, but that
the third factor was not satisfied on the facts of the case.
Courts have only a limited role to play in reviewing the
actions of other branches of government. In light of the
executive function of administrative agencies, judicial capacity
to review administrative actions is severely limited. Gloucester
County Welfare Bd. v. New Jersey Civil Serv. Comm'n,
93 N.J. 384,
390 (1983). Courts can intervene only in those rare
circumstances in which an agency action is clearly inconsistent
with its statutory mission or with other State policy. Although
sometimes phrased in terms of a search for arbitrary or
unreasonable agency action, the judicial role is generally
restricted to three inquiries: (1) whether the agency's action
violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did
the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency
based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative
policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a
conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
of the relevant factors. Campbell v. Department of Civil Serv.,
39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963).
case was found not to be traumatic by the Pension Trustees
because it did not involve a great rush of force or
uncontrollable power. The ALJ and the Trustees tried to follow
the law and there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain
their conclusion. We cannot say that their application of the
facts to the law is so unreasonable as to constitute an arbitrary
and capricious abuse of discretion.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES POLLOCK, O'HERN and
GARIBALDI join in this PER CURIAM opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER filed
a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE STEIN joins.
JUSTICE COLEMAN did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DENNIS MAZZA
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND
Respondent-Respondent.
HANDLER, J., dissenting.
In this case, Dennis Mazza, a park patrolman for the Essex County Park Commission for over sixteen years, seeks accidental disability benefits for an injury that occurred while on mounted patrol in the South Mountain Reservation. As Mazza was attempting to get across a stream, the horse suddenly and unexpectedly reared up, spinning sharply around to the left, almost falling over. As the horse reared spinning around, "[Mazza's] body went the other direction," severely twisting his back at the waist. The accident rendered Mazza helpless. The horse took Mazza, slumped over in the saddle, back to the stable. The injury left him permanently disabled. Mazza, an experienced horseman of approximately fifteen to twenty years, had never
before suffered a serious fall or mishap, and had ridden through
this particular stream several times.
or matter that was the source of the harm; and third the source
of the injury was a great rush of force or uncontrollable power.
Kane, supra,
100 N.J. 663.
statute, this Court recognized that a "'traumatic event' would
ordinarily involve a mishap or accident involving the application
of some kind of external force to the body or the violent
exposure of the body to some external force." Cattani, supra, 69
N.J. at 586. However, the Court also acknowledged that there may
be exceptions to this common type of occurrence. Ibid. In Kane,
the Court developed a three-part test that did not expressly
incorporate impact as a precondition of the "violent exposure"
requirement in the standard for determining a "traumatic event."
100 N.J. at 663. Rather, Kane explained that "[t]he source of
the injury must have originated from a physical object or
external matter causing a great rush of force or uncontrollable
power." Ibid. (emphasis added). It did not posit the need for
an actual impact with the physical object constituting the
originating source for the force or power that causes the injury.
disability caused by twisting . . . automatically . . .
ineligible for accidental benefits;" hence, in a case such as
this, one must "analyze the circumstances bearing on the
proximate causation of the petitioner's disability."
of a police officer entail a risk of physical injury because of
the inherent danger in riding a horse. Nevertheless, the ongoing
risk of danger does not mean that if that risk materializes, its
occurrence can be deemed ordinary or expected. Thus, it may be
predictable that police officers will be shot while performing
their duty, but it is hardly predictable when, or if, an officer
will be shot. Cf. Gable, supra, 115 N.J. at 223-24 (quoting from
lower court decision,
224 N.J. Super. 417, 423 (App. Div. 1988),
and recognizing that "[a]lthough a corrections officer may
realize that there is a 'potential that he or she will be called
upon to subdue an inmate, an officer does not expect his or her
daily routine will normally involve being struck by an aggressive
or escaping inmate.'"). Mazza was an experienced horseman who
had ridden for approximately sixteen years in the performance of
his duties as a mounted patrolman and had taken this specific
path many times. He had never experienced an accident of this
nature and he had no reason to expect, on that clear October
morning, that he would suffer such an injury.
interpretation of the third element of the Kane test for
determining a traumatic event. However, there is no impact
requirement when considering whether an event was traumatic under
N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. A showing of violent impact is neither
dictated by the statute or the judicial interpretation of the
statute, nor is it likely to lead to the fair, just, and
consistent award of disability benefits. The instances of
involuntary encounters with great rushes of force of the
magnitude necessary to constitute a traumatic event without
physical impact will be relatively rare. Hence, the Court should
not be concerned that the absence of an impact requirement will
erode the stricter standard the Legislature meant to impose with
the substitution of "traumatic event" for "accident."
NO. A-21 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
DENNIS MAZZA,
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND
Respondent-Respondent.
DECIDED December 18, 1995
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