Norwood, Town Of v. N.E. Power Co.

Case Date: 02/08/2000
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 99-1047

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit




No. 99-1047

TOWN OF NORWOOD, MASSACHUSETTS,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

NEW ENGLAND POWER COMPANY, NEW ENGLAND ELECTRIC SYSTEM (NEES),
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and PG&E CORPORATION,

Defendants, Appellees.



APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]



Before

Boudin, Stahl and Lipez,

Circuit Judges.



Charles F. Wheatley, Jr. with whom Wheatley & Ranquist,
Kenneth M. Barna, Alan K. Posner and Rubin & Rudman were on brief
for plaintiff.
Edward Berlin with whom Robert V. Zener, Swidler Berlin
Shereff Friedman, LLP, John F. Sherman, III, Associate General
Counsel, The NEES Companies, David H. Erichsen, Peter A. Spaeth and
Hale and Dorr LLP were on brief for appellees New England Power
Company and New England Electric System (NEES).
Steven W. Phillips with whom Richard M. Brunell, Robert L.
Bocchino, Jr. and Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP were on brief for
appellees Pacific Gas & Electric Company and PG&E Corporation.




February 2, 2000





BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. The Town of Norwood,
Massachusetts ("Norwood") filed a complaint against New England
Power Company ("New England Power") and others alleging antitrust
violations and breach of contract. The district court dismissed
the complaint and Norwood now appeals. This decision assumes a
familiarity with our decision today in Nos. 98-1847 et al., Town of
Norwood v. FERC, resolving petitions filed by Norwood and another
challenging orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC") in related administrative proceedings.

I. THE HISTORY
To summarize the facts, New England Power is a major
wholesaler of electric power in New England, and Norwood owns and
operates a municipal utility that distributes retail electric power
to residents and businesses in the town. For some years Norwood
purchased its power at wholesale from Boston Edison Company, but in
the 1970s Norwood sought instead to purchase its power from New
England Power and have that power delivered over the intercity
transmission network of Boston Edison. Boston Edison and New
England Power resisted, but the matter was resolved by settlement
after Norwood brought an antitrust suit against them.
The settlements, arrived at in 1980 and 1983, included
the agreement of Boston Edison to "wheel" power for Norwood over
Boston Edison's transmission network and the agreement of New
England Power to furnish all of Norwood's requirements for
electricity through October 31, 1998, under New England Power's
FERC Tariff No. 1 "as [it] may be amended from time to time."
Under that tariff, New England Power then supplied power to its own
retail affiliates such as Massachusetts Electric Company ("Mass
Electric"). The decree in the antitrust case directed that the
annexed settlement agreement and power contract were "approved as
a settlement of this case and shall be carried out by both
parties."
The parties amended the power contract in 1989 to give
Norwood an option to extend the minimum term, and it then exercised
the option to extend the contract to at least October 31, 2008.
Each side could terminate on seven years' advance notice. New
England Power had somewhat similar requirements contracts with its
own affiliates and with other independent retailers embodying
similar lengthy periods of notice before termination. The function
of such lengthy notice periods is to permit stability for each
side; the wholesaler, for example, ordinarily makes investments or
other arrangements to assure a stable supply of power either by
generation, purchase contracts of its own, or both. See generally
Kentucky Utils. Co. v. FERC, 766 F.2d 239, 243 (6th Cir. 1985).
Beginning in December 1996, New England Power made a set
of regulatory filings to restructure itself and to revise its
existing tariffs for wholesale power sales in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island. These filings, described in more detail in our
companion decision, had several aims: approval by FERC of the sale
of New England Power's non-nuclear generating facilities to a west
coast utility; the release of New England Power affiliates like
Mass Electric from their long-term obligations to purchase their
power from New England Power; and the restructuring of New England
Power's wholesale rates to affiliates and interested purchasers to
facilitate customer choice and market-based pricing at both the
wholesale and retail level.
To accommodate policies of both the Massachusetts and
Rhode Island state utility commissions, New England Power also
proposed a temporary, non-cost-based wholesale offering called
"standard offer service." This temporary offering was to provide
power at predetermined rates, increasing rapidly over a multi-year
period, to those retailers required by the states to offer
counterpart retail standard offer rates to their own customers; the
states were introducing competition at the retail level and wanted
retail purchasers to have an initial low-rate offering as a backup
while competitive sources of supply developed for them, e.g., In re
Massachusetts Elec. Co., Mass. D.P.U. 96-25, at 23-25 (Feb. 26,
1997); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164,  1B(b); R.I. Gen. Laws 
39-1-27.3. Such retail sellers include Mass Electric and other
investor-owned retailers but not municipalities like Norwood, which
have no obligation to allow competitive access to their customers.
See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 164,  47A.
The prospective sale by New England Power of its low-cost
hydroelectric and fossil generating facilities posed a potential
problem for existing requirements-contract purchasers like Norwood,
since New England Power's existing tariff rates (filed with FERC
and incorporated by reference into power contracts) were normally
amended to provide for price increases as New England Power's costs
went up. To meet this objection, New England Power proposed to
implement a rate freeze that would prevent increases in wholesale
rates for its requirements-contract customers, including Norwood,
during the term of their agreements.
While the initial filings of various proposals were under
consideration by FERC, Norwood, on April 14, 1997, filed the
present suit in the district court; this complaint, as later
amended, named as defendants New England Power, its parent New
England Electric System, and two companies that were part of the
California-based parent utility system (collectively "PG&E") whose
subsidiary ("USGenNE") was to acquire New England Power's non-
nuclear generating facilities in New England. Between the original
filing of the complaint and its later substantial revision through
two amendments, additional events took place that are important to
the present action.
First, in the FERC proceedings, the Commission ultimately
approved a settlement agreement permitting (on payment of contract
termination charges) early termination of requirements contracts by
the affiliates of New England Power, New England Power Co., 81
F.E.R.C.  61,281 (1997), reh'g denied, 83 F.E.R.C.  61,265
(1998); approved the offering of the new backup wholesale standard
offer service, id.; approved the transfer of generating facilities
and associated contracts to USGenNE, New England Power Co., 82
F.E.R.C.  61,179 (1998), reh'g denied, 83 F.E.R.C.  61,275
(1998); and agreed to the FERC Tariff No. 1 rate freeze that would
prevent post-divestiture rate increases to purchasers who chose to
avoid the termination charge by continuing as wholesale customers
of New England Power under their existing contracts, id.
Second, regarding itself as disadvantaged by the
wholesale standard offer service made available to New England
Power's retail affiliates--whom Norwood regards as retail
competitors--Norwood notified New England Power on March 4, 1998,
that it was switching to a different wholesale supplier, Northeast
Utilities; a tariff and agreement to that effect were filed with
FERC and have gone into effect. Two weeks later, on March 18,
1998, New England Power filed a revised FERC Tariff No. 1
permitting its non-settling wholesale customers like Norwood to
terminate their contracts early, and on only 30 days' notice, with
the condition that the customers pay a large contract termination
charge. The charge was calculated based on the revenues that New
England Power would have expected to collect had a customer
continued to pay the now-frozen tariff rate through the contract
term, less the expected costs avoided by not providing service.
As finally amended in April 1998, Norwood's complaint
made a number of separate claims. In count 1, it charged that New
England Power had violated the prior 1983 antitrust decree and
power contract by divesting itself of its generating facilities,
shifting Norwood to a fixed rate based on pre-divestiture costs,
and proposing to serve its own affiliates on a quite different
basis than the fixed rate (namely, market-based rates subject to
the availability of the initially low-cost wholesale standard offer
service).
The remaining three counts in Norwood's second amended
complaint charged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C.  1-2, and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C.  14, 18. The company attacked the contract termination
charge imposed on Norwood under the revised FERC No. 1 Tariff as an
illegal restraint of trade, an unlawful tying arrangement, and, in
combination with the standard offer rates, an illegal price
squeeze; it alleged a conspiracy to fix prices in the wholesale
market; and it alleged a lessening of competition from the transfer
of New England Power's non-nuclear generating assets to USGenNE.
After a motion by Norwood for partial summary judgment
and motions to dismiss by the defendants, the district court on
September 28, 1998, entered a decision dismissing the complaint
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Town of Norwood v. New England
Power Co., 23 F. Supp.2d 109 (D. Mass. 1998). In doing so, the
court considered the allegations in the complaint, documents
attached to it, and matters of public record including FERC
decisions. In substance, the court rested its decision on FERC's
scrutiny of the same transactions, the so-called filed rate
doctrine, and the terms of the settlement agreement and power
contract between Norwood and New England Power.

II. DISCUSSION
1. At the threshold of this appeal is a substantial
claim by New England Power that a procedural error by Norwood
deprives us of jurisdiction to consider Norwood's main claims.
After the district court entered its decision and judgment, Norwood
filed a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend
the judgment; after this was denied, it filed a notice of appeal in
this court challenging the denial. Norwood then filed a motion
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from the judgment on grounds
of newly discovered evidence and, in the alternative, moved for a
second time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the
judgment.
The district court denied both of the new motions, and
Norwood then filed an amended notice of appeal challenging the
denial of its post-judgment motions; but Norwood did not mention in
either its original or amended notice of appeal the district
court's original decision and judgment. New England Power points
out that Norwood's brief is directed almost entirely to the
original decision and judgment from which it says that Norwood did
not appeal.
The law on this issue is less clear than the cases claim
it to be. On the one hand, courts often say that a notice of
appeal that names only a post-judgment order as the subject of the
appeal does not bring the original judgment before the appellate
court. E.g., Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 945 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1991). On the other hand, because in such cases the failure
to name the underlying judgment is usually a slip of the pen and
rarely causes any prejudice to the other side, courts then go
through endless contortions to rescue the technically defaulted
portion of the appeal. See 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure  2818, at 192-93 & n.11 (2d ed. 1995)
(collecting cases).
Sometimes this resurrection can be justified in common-
sense terms where, for example, the caption of the notice refers to
a post-judgment order but the body also refers to the underlying
judgment, see In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 45
F.3d 564, 567 (1st Cir. 1995), or where the appellant previously
filed a premature notice of appeal challenging the underlying
judgment, ineffective by itself but illustrating an intent to
attack the judgment, see Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 180-82
(1962); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 839-40 (1st Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994). The latter is what
occurred in Foman, relied upon by Norwood in this case. But
Norwood did not file a premature notice of appeal designating the
original judgment. Cf. Gottesman v. INS, 33 F.3d 383, 388 (4th
Cir. 1994).
However, Norwood's timely first motion to alter or amend
the judgment--from denial of which Norwood did file a timely
appeal--is not an ordinary Rule 59(e) motion limited to a narrow
criticism or new objection. Instead, the motion covers (in 59
pages) more or less the same points that Norwood had earlier made
to the district court and now repeats to us; indeed, the district
court tersely denied the motion relying on its original decision.
Under these circumstances, it seems to us that Norwood's appellate
arguments are within the scope of its Rule 59(e) motion and are
properly before us on appeal from the denial of that motion.
2. Turning to the merits, the first count in Norwood's
complaint--effectively, a contract claim--rests on its assertion
that New England Power breached its 1983 promises. According to
Norwood, New England Power was obligated to supply Norwood with
power during the contract term, on a cost-justified, FERC-regulated
basis, at the same rate level at which power was offered to
affiliates of New England Power. Norwood asserts that New England
Power breached these supposed promises by selling its low-cost
generation facilities, providing Norwood with a substitute fixed
rate based on pre-divestiture costs, and switching to market-based
and standard offer rates for sales to its own affiliates.
The explicit target of this count is the contract
termination charge imposed by the amended FERC Tariff No. 1 on non-
settling purchasers who choose to terminate their requirements
contracts without giving the requisite multi-year notice. Since
other Tariff No. 1 purchasers (including the affiliates) appear to
have settled, Norwood may be the only purchaser left in this
category--although the other purchasers will also pay contract
termination charges computed on a somewhat different basis.
Norwood says the alleged breach by New England Power excuses
Norwood's own abandonment of the contract, thereby avoiding a
termination charge allegedly amounting to about $78 million over
the remainder of the ten-year period.
The district court rejected Norwood's contract claim on
two different grounds. It said that the claim was barred by the
filed rate doctrine which--in the aspect pertinent here--limits
attacks outside the regulatory process on tariffed rates filed with
federal regulatory agencies. E.g. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall,
453 U.S. 571 (1981). The district court also ruled, in the
alternative, that the agreements were not breached by New England
Power, because all it had promised to do was to provide FERC Tariff
No. 1 rates to Norwood, which New England Power continued to do
until Norwood itself renounced its requirements contract in March
1998. Town of Norwood, 23 F. Supp.2d at 119.
We agree with Norwood that the filed rate doctrine does
not bar Norwood's contract claim. It is true that, absent some
exception, Norwood could not use its contract claim as a vehicle to
attack the validity of the FERC tariff imposing the termination
charge; the filed rate doctrine protects the agency's authority
over tariffed rates and prefers a prevailing tariff (unless set
aside by the agency) over any separate contractual arrangements,
AT&T v. Central Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222-24 (1998).
While the termination charge is not a traditional "rate" for
continuing service, the filed rate doctrine sweeps more broadly and
governs ancillary conditions and terms included in the tariff. Id.
at 224-25.
Yet, under the amended tariff itself, whether a
termination charge applies depends on whether there is a
requirements contract in force. And FERC has at most approved only
the generic terms of the amended tariff; it has not determined
whether Norwood's prior obligation to buy from New England Power
was vitiated by a breach on the part of New England Power, New
England Power Co., 84 F.E.R.C.  61,175, at 61,920 (1998), or some
other means. See note 2, above. Perhaps it could have decided
such issues, but it often leaves contract breach issues to courts,
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 85 F.E.R.C.  61,023, at 61,069 (1998),
and it appears to have done so here. Thus, the tariff may be
protected by the filed rate doctrine but whether the tariff applies
to Norwood depends on the extent of Norwood's contractual
obligations.
This brings us to the district court's alternative
holding that New England Power did not breach the contract. The
facts claimed by Norwood to be such a breach are undisputed; they
are the sale of facilities, the new terms for other customers, and
the freezing of Norwood's rate. The question is whether those acts
comprised a breach of contractual terms, an issue of law to be
determined from the words of the contract, if they are unambiguous,
and otherwise by the words along with whatever extrinsic evidence
may cast light on the parties' intent. Bank v. IBM, 145 F.3d 420,
424 (1st Cir. 1998). Here, the district court found that the words
alone refuted Norwood's claim. Town of Norwood, 23 F. Supp.2d at
119.
The original 1983 power contract is pithy in its
pertinent language: New England Power promises to supply Norwood
its requirements pursuant to the former's FERC No. 1 Tariff, "filed
with FERC, as [it] may be amended from time to time." At the time,
New England Power's FERC Tariff No. 1 was its general cost-based
offering of power to wholesale customers. But nothing in the
contract explicitly required that the power be furnished from any
specific set of generating facilities, or that New England Power's
own affiliates continue to buy their power under this tariff, or
that the rates be based upon costs calculated under any specific
cost formula covering any specific period.
Norwood argued in the district court that the agreement's
terms were ambiguous and, specifically, that "FERC Tariff No. 1"
had a specialized meaning and reflected implicit conditions, i.e.,
that the rates be based on current costs and used equally for New
England Power's own affiliates. But while extrinsic evidence can
be admitted to show ambiguity and to resolve it, see Donoghue v.
IBC USA (Publications), Inc., 70 F.3d 206, 215 (1st Cir. 1995),
Norwood's affidavits show only that its aim was to achieve those
goals and that FERC Tariff No. 1 was at that time structured as a
traditional utility offering. Accordingly, we agree with the
district court that the contract did not contain a promise that
ownership of New England Power's facilities or equality of
treatment vis