Pegasus v. NLRB

Case Date: 04/22/1996
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 95-1966







UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________

No. 95-1966

PEGASUS BROADCASTING OF SAN JUAN, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent.

____________________

UNION DE PERIODISTAS Y ARTES GRAFICAS Y RAMAS ANEXAS,
AFFILIATED TO THE NEWSPAPER GUILD, AFL-CIO,

Intervenor.
____________________

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATION
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF AN ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
____________________

Before

Stahl, Circuit Judge, _____________
Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________

____________________

Radames A. Torruella with whom McConnell Valdes was on brief for ____________________ _________________
petitioner.
David A. Fleischer, Senior Attorney, with whom Frederick L. ____________________ _____________
Feinstein, General Counsel, Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, _________ __________
Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, and National ____________________ ________
Labor Relations Board were on brief for respondent. _____________________
Ginoris Vizcarra De Lopez-Lay and Lopez-Lay Vizcarra & Porro on ______________________________ ___________________________
brief for intervenor.
____________________

April 22, 1996
____________________


















ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge. This is a petition ____________________

to review an order of the National Labor Relations Board

brought by Pegasus Broadcasting of San Juan, Inc., d/b/a

WAPA-TV (the Company), with the usual cross-application by

the Board for enforcement of its order. The Company was

charged with violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the

National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5)

and (1), by withholding granting wage increases. We enforce

the order.

The Unfair Practice ___________________

The Board found that for 18 years the Company had

granted annual merit-based salary increases to its reporters

based on individual evaluation, effective January of each

year. In January of 1990-92 the individual raises had varied

between 3% and 8%. In 1993 the Company, instead, granted a

flat 1%. The Board chose to regard this as a continuance of

the practice. In January of 1994, however, the Company had

begun negotiations for its first collective bargaining

agreement (CBA) with a newly certified union,1 and,

allegedly believing that to do otherwise would violate the

Act, it unilaterally discontinued all merit wage increases.

It did not notify the union, nor did it indicate it was

____________________

1. In February of 1993 the Union de Periodistas y Artes
Graficas y Ramas Anexas, Local 225, The Newspaper Guild, AFL-
CIO, CLC, was certified to represent all of the Company's
reporters and reporter-anchor persons employed at its
television facilities in Puerto Rico.

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merely temporarily suspending the program during bargaining.

In May, 1994, during bargaining, the union filed the present

charge.

If this were a novel matter we might have initial

sympathy with the Company's view that it was between the

devil and the deep blue. It claims to have suspended its

annual merit increases because awarding discretionary merit

pay increases during bargaining seemed to it to fall within

the prohibition on making changes with respect to mandatory

bargaining matters, in violation of section 8(a)(5). See ___

NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1962). Indeed, with ____ ____

unilateral discretion, there would seem room for improper

maneuvering. Id. at 746-47. However, Katz distinguished ___ ____

between merit increases that are part of an established

practice of granting annual merit reviews, and those that are

not, id. at 746, ruling that granting the latter is a __

violation of the Act. Id. Here, the Board found that even ___

though the amounts of the increases were discretionary, it

was abandonment of the practice itself that was forbidden

under the Act. Pegasus Broadcasting of San Juan, Inc., 317 _______________________________________

N.L.R.B. No. 165 (July 20, 1995).

The record adequately supports the Board's finding,

and we have no reason to disagree with it. Rather, we are in

full accord with the recent similar case of Daily News of Los _________________

Angeles v. NLRB, 73 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See 29 _______ ____ ___



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U.S.C. 158(a)(5) and (d); Katz, 369 U.S. at 743 (any ____

unilateral change to a mandatory subject of bargaining

violates the Act, despite good faith). We have previously

indicated that a perception of the law such as the Company

claims to have had is incorrect. See General Motors ___ _______________

Acceptance Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir. 1973). _________________ ____

The Company could have avoided its alleged conundrum by

freely offering January 1, 1994 merit increases at the

bargaining table, rather than taking unilateral action

without notice to the union. See generally Daily News, 73 ___ _________ __________

F.3d 406.2 See also Eastern Maine Medical Ctr. v. NLRB, 658 ___ ____ ___________________________ ____

F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1981) (withholding wage increase).

The Remedy __________

Pursuant to its authority under 29 U.S.C. 160(c),

the Board ordered a multi-faceted remedy directing the

Company to, inter alia, (1) cease and desist from ____________

unilaterally withholding the merit wage increases and

"interfering, restraining or coercing employees" in their

exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the National

Labor Relations Act, (2) make whole each employee "for any

loss of earnings suffered because of [the Company]'s having ____________________

2. We note that Daily News covers individual raises. 73 ___________ withheld such increase," with interest, to be computed during
F.3d at 413. For raises across the board, see NLRB v. ___ ____
Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981). ___________________ "the compliance stage of this proceeding,"3 and (3) post

3. Such a bifurcated procedure is common and has met with
approval. See, e.g., Holyoke Visiting Nurses Ass'n. v. NLRB, ___ ____ ______________________________ ____
11 F.3d 302, 308 (1st Cir. 1993). See also NLRB v. Rutter- ___ ____ ____ _______
Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 260 (1969); NLRB v. Deena ______________ ____ _____
Artware, 361 U.S. 398, 411 (1960). _______

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notice of the violation at its facilities. Pegasus _______

Broadcasting, 317 N.L.R.B. No. 165, slip op. at *1, 2-3. ____________

This is, presumptively, appropriate. The Supreme Court "has

repeatedly interpreted [ 160(c)] as vesting in the Board the

primary responsibility and broad discretion to devise

remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act, subject

only to limited judicial review," in which courts of appeal

"should not substitute their judgment for that of the Board

in determining how best to undo the effects of unfair labor

practices." Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 _______________ ____

(1984). A Board-ordered remedy "should stand unless it can

be shown that [it] is a patent attempt to achieve ends other

than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the

policies of the Act." Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, __________________________ ____

319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).

Put briefly, it is the Board -- and union --

position that, the Company having committed an unfair labor

practice by unilaterally cancelling the merit wage increase

program in January 1994, it is now for the Board to determine

the consequences, if any. The Company objects, first, on the

ground that the backpay order transgressed the Board's

authority, because the raises were always discretionary as to

amount and, as such, not amenable to Board determination.

This thought has been sufficiently answered by the Daily News __________





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court. 73 F.3d at 415. More interesting is the Company's

next suggestion, that the wage question is now moot.

The Company and the union completed bargaining and

entered into a CBA, effective September 22, 1995, that sets

wages retroactive to January 1, 1994. The Company asserts

that the CBA contains a so-called zipper clause providing

that it comprises "the complete agreement among the

parties."4 In this circumstance the Company would have us

say that the Board's ordered remedy, insofar as it relates to

lost wages from January 1994 plus interest, has been taken

care of by the CBA, rendering the order moot or, at the very

least, obviating the need for further backpay proceedings.

Further proceedings would necessarily involve the Board in

impermissibly interfering with the bargaining process, and

altering the terms of the CBA. See NLRB v. American Ins. ___ ____ ______________

Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 ___ ____ ________________

U.S. 477, 487 (1960) (section 8(d) "prevent[s] the Board from

controlling the settling of the terms of collective

bargaining agreements"). See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, ___ ____ _______________ ____

397 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1970). The Board's short answer is that

____________________

4. The clause, submitted after oral argument upon request of
the panel, reads, in full:

A. This agreement includes the complete
agreement among the parties. This
agreement cannot be modified, expanded or
amended except by a written stipulation
properly signed by the authorized
representative of the parties.

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the issue of whether or not the CBA moots the order is one of

fact, concerning events subsequent to the Board's order, and

is not presently before us.

We agree with the Board. The CBA succeeded the

order, and was not, and never has been, presented to it. The

terms are not of record. Board counsel's courteous

affirmative answer to our question about the zipper clause

was accompanied by a statement that his answer could not bind

the Board. Nor can we take, of our own accord, the Company's

submission of the CBA. We, particularly, know that we lack

the same broad right or supervisory power over the Board that

we might have over a district court on new matter. Cf. NLRB ___ ____

v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318, 322 (1962). The Act ______________________

unequivocally requires that new matter go through the Board:

If either party shall apply to the court
for leave to adduce additional evidence
. . . the court may order such additional
evidence to be taken before the Board,
its member, agent, or agency, and to be
made a part of the record. The Board may
modify its findings as to the facts, or
make new findings by reason of additional
evidence so taken and filed, and it shall
file such modified or new findings, which
findings with respect to questions of
fact if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole shall
be conclusive, and shall file its
recommendations, if any, for the
modification or setting aside of its
original order.

29 U.S.C 160(e). See also Ochoa, 368 U.S. at 322. ___ ____ _____





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Amicable adjustment by parties is of course

permissible, and encouraged. See 29 C.F.R. 101.9(a) and ___

101.16. However, "parties" include representatives of the

Board, and formal settlement is contingent upon the General

Counsel's approval. Id. 101.9, 101.13, 101.16, 102.52 et ___ __

seq. See NLRB v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., 390 F.2d 787, 788 ____ ___ ____ ________________________

(6th Cir. 1968) (collecting cases). Here, neither the union

nor the Board agrees with the Company that the issue of

compliance with the backpay order has been settled by the

CBA. This court is without jurisdiction to entertain

arguments not previously presented to the Board. See Woelke ___ ______

& Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-66 (1982) ______________________ ____

(court of appeals without jurisdiction to consider question

that could have been presented in petition for

reconsideration or rehearing before the Board). If there is

any question the proper course is for the Company to present

its proofs regarding amounts in further proceedings before

the Board. 29 U.S.C. 160(e). See, e.g., Holyoke Visiting ___ ____ ________________

Nurses, 11 F.3d at 308; Fox Painting Co. v. NLRB, 16 F.3d ______ ________________ ____

115, 116 (6th Cir. 1994). 29 C.F.R. 102.52 et seq. _______

The Company nonetheless presses that the Act bars

the Board in this particular case from conducting compliance

proceedings, or otherwise implementing the order, because it

has now fully bargained to agreement with the union over the

very amounts the Board would address. In other words, as a



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matter of law, any compliance order would operate to alter or

impermissibly supplement the terms of the CBA, in violation

of 8(d) of the Act. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 103-04. This ___________

is simply not so. The Board, in effect, found the bargaining

had not been on the now universally-demanded level playing

field. More exactly, having unfairly lacked the expected

benefits of the unilaterally cancelled merit increase

program, the union was required to start behind the line of

scrimmage. As observed in John Zink Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 942 _____________

(1972), 1972 WL 12497 at *1, the employer is "enjoying the

fruits of his unfair labor practices and gaining undue

advantage at the bargaining table when he bargains about the

benefits which he has already [illegally] discontinued."

The Board's order means that the bargaining was not

free, a matter of public, as well as private, concern. Cf. ___

Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 192-95 (1941). ___________________ ____

What were the consequences of the order? Did the Company

change its behavior, admit, for example, merit increases for

January 1, 1994? We, of course, make no suggestion, but it

is for the Board, not the Company, to say whether the

ultimate bargaining in fact accomplished the entirety of the

Board's purpose.

The Company's petition is denied, and the Board's ______

application for enforcement is granted. _______





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