Rhode Island Dist v. State of R.I.
Case Date: 06/05/1998
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 97-1946
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For the First Circuit No. 97-1946 RHODE ISLAND LABORERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL, LOCAL UNION 808, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. No. 97-1987 DAVID E. PERRY, ET AL., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees. ____________________ APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge] Before Selya, Circuit Judge, Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge, and Boudin, Circuit Judge. Richard A. Fairbrothers, Regional Attorney, with whom Darren F. Corrente, Regional Attorney, was on brief for appellants Rhode Island Laborers' District Council, Local Union 808, et al. Miriam Weizenbaum with whom Amato A. DeLuca and DeLuca & Weizenbaum, Ltd. were on consolidated brief for appellants David E. Perry, et al. Thomas A. Palombo, Special Assistant Attorney General, State of Rhode Island, Department of Attorney General, and Harris K. Weiner, Deputy Executive Counsel to the Governor, on consolidated brief for appellees State of Rhode Island, Governor Lincoln C. Almond, General Treasurer Nancy J. Mayer, Attorney General Jeffrey B. Pine, Director of Administration Robert L. Carl, Jr., and Supreme Court Administrator Robert C. Harrall. May 27, 1998 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. In 1976, Rhode Island adopted a statute, entitled Court Clerks' Incentive Pay, providing salary bonuses for state court clerks who obtained certain degrees. 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 205, 1, codified as amended at R.I. Gen. Laws 8-4.1-1 to 8-4.1-5 (1997). A 10 percent salary increase was provided for a court clerk who obtained an Associate's Degree in fields relating to law enforcement or administration of justice; a Bachelor's Degree in such a field or any field suitable for admission to an accredited law school was worth a 16 percent increase. After almost 20 years, Rhode Island in 1994 amended the statute to replace percentage bonuses with flat rate amounts: clerks receiving the 10 percent increase would instead receive $2,000 yearly, and clerks receiving the 16 percent increase would receive $3,200. 1994 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 125, 1, codified atR.I. Gen. Laws 8-4.1-3 (1997). Clerks hired after July 5, 1994, received no incentive pay. Id., codified at R.I. Gen. Laws 8- 4.1-1. The amendment provided that it would not take effect as to clerks already receiving incentive pay until the expiry of collective bargaining agreements then in force. Id. 2, codified at R.I. Gen. Laws 8-4.1-7. The amendment effectively reduced the salaries of the clerks, in some cases by over $7,000 per year. A group of clerks sued Rhode Island and its officials in the district court, claiming that the amendment was unconstitutional. A similar claim was made by the Rhode Island Laborers' District Council, Local Union 808 ("the union") which represented a number but not all of the court clerks. The union's complaint also charged that the amendment abrogated its collective bargaining agreement with Rhode Island. The cases were consolidated before the district court, which heard cross-motions for summary judgment on an agreed statement of facts. On July 24, 1997, the district court granted judgment in favor of the state, rejecting the constitutional attacks on the amendment. The district court explicitly declined to address a claim advanced by the union based on state collective- bargaining law because it had not been briefed or argued by the union. The clerks and the union now appeal, and we affirm, primarily on the basis of the district court's decision. No detailed discussion of principles is needed because the pertinent law relating to the Contracts Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, 10, the main pivot of the appellants' argument in this court, has been set forth in Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 5, 1998) (No. 97-1181), and McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board, 88 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1996). As Parker and McGrath explain, the first requisite for a Contracts Clause argument is showing the existence of a contract governing the subject in dispute. Although federal rather than state standards govern this issue, General Motors Corp v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992), there is nothing recherch |