US v. Saccoccia
Case Date: 06/28/1995
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 93-1618
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT _________________________ Nos. 93-1618 93-2208 94-1506 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. STEPHEN A. SACCOCCIA, Defendant, Appellant. _________________________ APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge] ___________________ _________________________ Before Selya, Cyr and Boudin, Circuit Judges. ______________ _________________________ Samuel Rosenthal, with whom Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & ________________ _______________________________ Mosle, Robert D. Luskin, and Comey Boyd & Luskin were on brief, _____ ________________ ___________________ for appellant. Nina Goodman, Attorney, Dep't of Justice, and Michael P. _____________ __________ Iannotti, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Sheldon ________ _______ Whitehouse, United States Attorney, James H. Leavey, Assistant __________ ________________ United States Attorney, and Michael E. Davitt, Assistant United __________________ States Attorney, were on brief, for the United States. _________________________ June 28, 1995 _________________________ SELYA, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant- SELYA, Circuit Judge. _____________ appellant Stephen A. Saccoccia on racketeering, money laundering, and related charges arising from his leadership of an organization that laundered well over $100,000,000 in drug money during the years 1986 through 1991. On appeal, Saccoccia challenges his extradition, the timing of his trial, his conviction, the forfeiture of certain assets, and the 660-year sentence that the district court imposed. Finding that his arguments do not wash, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND I. BACKGROUND We sketch the bareboned facts in the light most amiable to the government, see United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 710- ___ _____________ _____ 11 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1005 (1993), leaving _____ ______ much of the flesh and sinew for fuller articulation in connection with our discussion of particular issues. Appellant formerly controlled a network of precious metals businesses located in Rhode Island, New York, and California. He became enmeshed in money laundering through his involvement with a fellow metalman, Barry Slomovits. At a point in the mid-1980s, Slomovits was accepting millions of dollars in cash each week from Duvan Arboleda, who represented a group of Colombian drug lords (the Cali cartel). Slomovits used some of this cash to purchase gold from appellant. By special arrangement, the transactions were accomplished without documentation. In 1987, Arboleda and appellant agreed that they would 2 deal directly with each other. From that juncture forward, appellant used his various businesses to cleanse money funnelled to him by the Cali cartel and its emissaries (including Arboleda, Fernando Duenas, and Raoul Escobar). Typically, Arboleda would make large quantities of cash available to appellant; appellant would send some of it to Slomovits in New York; Slomovits would buy gold with the funds, resell the gold, and wire the proceeds to accounts that appellant controlled. Slomovits received apocryphal invoices from appellant's companies purporting to show sales of gold for sums corresponding to the amounts of the wire transfers. Ahron Sharir, a manufacturer of gold chain, also washed money for appellant. Appellant used Sharir's New York factory as a drop-off point for incoming shipments of currency, and Sharir laundered the cash by methods similar to those employed by Slomovits. The shipments to Sharir's factory continued until 1988. From then on, the two men forsook the New York factory, but continued to deal with each other. Appellant delivered cash totalling over $35,000,000 to Sharir at other locations between 1988 and 1990. By 1990, appellant's operations had expanded and had become largely independent of Slomovits. Appellant would bid for opportunities to launder money on behalf of the Cali cartel. When the cartel accepted a bid, he or his couriers would receive sacks of currency at prearranged delivery points. These shipments ordinarily ranged between $50,000 and $500,000 3 (although one delivery totalled $3,000,000). The bills were usually in small denominations. They would be counted, transported to one of appellant's offices in California or Rhode Island, then counted again, smurfed,1 and used to buy cashier's checks payable to one of appellant's companies. These purchases were made at various banks by underlings (e.g., David Izzi, ____ Anthony DeMarco, James Saccoccio, Kenneth Saccoccio) in accordance with instructions received from appellant or his wife, Donna Saccoccia. After the checks had been deposited in a company account, the money would then be wired to a foreign bank designated by Arboleda or Duenas. Along the way, appellant would deduct a commission that usually approximated ten percent of the laundered cash. This completed "la vuelta," the term used by the Cali cartel to describe a complete cycle of drug smuggling activities. The spring of 1991 marked the beginning of the end of appellant's career in high finance. During the early stages of his operation, the money received in New York was transported to Rhode Island by armored car and then deposited in an account standing in the name of a controlled corporation, Trend Precious Metals (Trend), at Citizens Bank. Between January 1, 1990 and ____________________ 1The conspirators sought to avoid the currency transaction reporting requirements applicable to large cash transactions, see, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5313 (1988); 31 C.F.R. 103.22(a)(1) ___ ____ (1994), by subdividing the cash into units of less than $10,000. The process of breaking down a large amount of cash into smaller, unreportable amounts a criminal act when done to avoid the reporting requirements, see 31 U.S.C.A. 5324 (West Supp. 1995) ___ is called "smurfing." 4 April 2, 1991, appellant and his wife wired over $136,000,000 out of the Trend account to an assortment of foreign banks. Citizens became suspicious and closed the account. In approximately the same time frame, an employee of an armored car service warned Richard Gizarelli, an unindicted coconspirator, that appellant was under investigation. Gizarelli promptly informed appellant. Notwithstanding these omens, appellant persisted. He did, however, alter his modus operandi. Instead of using private _____ ________ couriers to transport cash from New York to Rhode Island, he sent any of four men Izzi, Carlo DeMarco, Anthony DeMarco, or Vincent Hurley, often (but not always) operating in pairs to haul the money to Rhode Island. And, although appellant's cohorts continued to purchase bank checks from various Rhode Island financial institutions, appellant began to send the checks to his offices in California by air courier, often in canisters labeled as containing gold (to which appellant's henchmen added slag or scrap metal to increase weight). Accomplices used the money to purchase gold, which was then sold on the open market. The proceeds were eventually wired back to one of appellant's remaining Rhode Island accounts. In August of 1991, appellant convened a meeting at his mother's home. He showed the conferees (who included Donna Saccoccia, Izzi, and the two DeMarcos) a videotape that had been discovered accidentally in a nearby building. The tape reflected an ongoing surveillance of the back entrance to appellant's 5 Cranston coin shop. He advised his colleagues to start using the store's front entrance. Soon thereafter, appellant departed for Switzerland. In short order, the authorities indicted and extradited him. After unsuccessfully seeking to postpone prosecution on health-related grounds,2 appellant went to trial on November 4, 1992, in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, along with several other indicted coconspirators (including his wife). Appellant's attorney became ill during trial, and the court declared a mistrial as to appellant.3 The new trial began on February 17, 1993, and resulted in his ____________________ 2The district court held a hearing regarding appellant's professed ailments. Appellant had undergone a laminectomy at age 14 and had been hospitalized repeatedly during the next 20 years. He suffered a relapse while he was incarcerated in Switzerland, necessitating bed rest and medication. After being returned to the United States, appellant claimed to have reinjured his back. He also claimed that, on the eve of trial, a prison guard assaulted him, aggravating his condition. The court heard testimony from three physicians and concluded that "there [were] no objective findings by any doctor that would confirm the existence of any physical problem that would account for [appellant's current] complaints of pain." Accordingly, the court refused to grant a continuance. 3The first trial proceeded as to the other defendants. The jury returned its verdict on December 18, 1992, convicting Donna Saccoccia, Vincent Hurley, James Saccoccio, Kenneth Saccoccio, Stanley Cirella and Anthony DeMarco on the RICO conspiracy count, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and finding each of them guilty on certain other counts. Donna Saccoccia was convicted of 47 counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1957 and 13 counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2); Hurley was convicted of one count of structuring transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements, see 31 U.S.C. 5324(3), and one count of ___ interstate travel in aid of racketeering, see 18 U.S.C. 1952; ___ the two Saccoccios and Cirella were likewise convicted of structuring violations under 31 U.S.C. 5324(3); and Anthony DeMarco was convicted of filing false currency transaction reports in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5324(2). 6 conviction. These appeals followed. Saccoccia's appeals were consolidated for oral argument with the appeals arising out of the first trial. See supra note ___ _____ 3. Notwithstanding the obvious differences in the trial records and in the posture of the prosecutions for example, appellant was the leader of the money laundering organization; unlike most of the others, he was not tried for currency transaction reporting (CTR) offenses; and he was convicted in a trial separate from that of his codefendants appellant seeks to incorporate by reference eight arguments advanced by other defendants. Because appellant's position is not substantially similar to that of the codefendants, and because he has failed to develop the idiosyncracies of his own situation, we deem five of those arguments to have been abandoned.4 See United States v. ___ _____________ David, 940 F.2d 722, 737 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Adoption by reference, _____ however, cannot occur in a vacuum; to be meaningful, the arguments adopted must be readily transferrable from the proponent's case to the adopter's case."), cert. denied, 504 U.S. _____ ______ 955 (1992). ____________________ 4The five waived asseverations comprise: (1) whether the CTR charges, and the evidence engendered thereby, violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) whether the district court's jury instructions overlooked the teachings of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993); (3) whether _____ _____________ the court erred in instructing the jury that coconspirators' knowledge could be established by evidence of willful blindness; (4) whether the court erred in determining the scope of the charged conspiracy; and (5) whether the value of the washed funds as calculated for sentencing purposes improperly included revenue that the government conceded was legitimate in origin. In all events, none of these contentions appears to have much bite. 7 Nevertheless, we are left with no shortage of food for thought. Appellant has served up a bouillabaisse of other offerings. We address his meatier propositions below, including the three "incorporated" contentions that arguably have been preserved. And although we do not deem detailed discussion desirable, the record should reflect that we have masticated appellant's remaining points and found them indigestible. II. EXTRADITION II. EXTRADITION As a threshold matter, appellant maintains that his trial and ensuing conviction violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland, and, in the bargain, transgressed the principles of dual criminality and specialty. We reject these importunings. A. Gaining Perspective. A. Gaining Perspective. ___________________ Further facts are needed to place appellant's extradition-related claims into a workable perspective. On November 18, 1991, a federal grand jury returned the indictment that inaugurated this prosecution. Count 1 charged appellant, his wife, and eleven associates with RICO conspiracy. See 18 ___ U.S.C. 1962(d) (1988). A RICO conspiracy, of course, requires the government to prove, inter alia, an illicit agreement to _____ ____ conduct a pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. ___ _____________ Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 503 (1st Cir. 1990); see also 18 U.S.C. ____ ___ ____ 1962(c) (1988). Proof of a pattern demands that the prosecution show "at least two acts of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) (1988). These acts, which must themselves comprise 8 violations of specified criminal statutes, see id. 1961(1)(B), ___ ___ are commonly referred to as "predicates" or "predicate acts." See, e.g., Ruiz, 905 F.2d at 503. ___ ____ ____ In the instant indictment, the alleged racketeering activity comprised, among other specified predicate acts, incidents of money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. 1956, 1957, CTR ___ violations, see 31 U.S.C. 5324(1)-(3), and using travel and ___ facilities in interstate commerce to promote these money laundering ventures, see 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3). The grand jury ___ also averred that the RICO conspiracy had been accomplished by means that included failing to file the necessary CTRs for cash transactions over $10,000. Counts 2-53 of the indictment charged appellant and others with failing to file CTRs in specific instances, see 31 U.S.C. 5324(1); counts 54-68 charged ___ appellant with illegally structuring monetary transactions in order to avoid the CTR reporting requirements, see id. 5324(3); ___ ___ counts 69-129 charged appellant and his wife with the use of property derived from unlawful activities while engaging in monetary transactions affecting interstate commerce, see 18 ___ U.S.C. 1956; counts 130-142 charged appellant and his wife with money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(2); and counts 143-150 charged appellant and others with Travel Act violations under 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3). The indictment also contained forfeiture allegations under the applicable RICO and money laundering statutes. See 18 U.S.C. 982, 1963. ___ Six days after the grand jury returned the indictment, 9 Swiss authorities arrested the Saccoccias in Geneva. They contested extradition on counts 1 through 68, and counts 143 through 150. On June 11, 1992, the Swiss Federal Tribunal (SFT) granted extradition on all charges except those contained in counts 2 through 68. The SFT reasoned that these 67 counts constituted nonextraditable offenses because Swiss law did not prohibit the underlying conduct. The SFT's discussion did not specifically mention the forfeiture allegations. The Swiss surrendered appellant to the United States. He was transported to Rhode Island and arraigned on July 15. One week later, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment.5 On July 30, the Justice Department, in the person of Michael O'Hare, wrote to Tania Cavassini, a Swiss official, enclosing a copy of the superseding indictment and inquiring whether it required a waiver of the rule of specialty. On December 1, 1992, apparently in response to an inquiry from Cavassini, O'Hare transmitted a written assurance that, although the court papers still formally listed appellant ____________________ 5The charges laid against appellant in the superseding indictment closely paralleled those contained in the original bill. Specifically, the grand jury accused appellant of RICO conspiracy (count 1), failure to file CTRs (counts 2-9), filing false CTRs (counts 10-22), unlawfully structuring monetary transactions to evade filing requirements (counts 23-37), engaging in monetary transactions using property derived from illegal activities (counts 38-98), money laundering (counts 121- 33), and interstate travel in aid of racketeering (counts 134- 41). Like the original indictment, the superseding indictment alleged violations of CTR requirements as predicate offenses for the RICO conspiracy and Travel Act counts, and reiterated the forfeiture allegations. However, the superseding indictment did include several counts not directed at appellant (counts 99-120). 10 as a defendant in respect to the CTR counts (for which extradition had been denied), the prosecution did not intend to press those counts. O'Hare explained that the prosecutor would offer no evidence of appellant's guilt on those charges, with the result that "American law [will require] the judge to direct the jury to find the defendant not guilty." The following day, Cavassini advised that, under a "final decision" dated November 20, 1992, the SFT had "granted extradition of [appellant] for the facts enclosed in the Count Nr. 1 of the Superseding Indictment." Cavassini also indicated that appellant's local counsel in Geneva agreed with the SFT's decision and had scotched any possibility of a further appeal. On February 2, 1993, before the start of the trial with which we are concerned, the government moved to dismiss those counts of the superseding indictment (counts 2-37) that charged appellant with CTR offenses. The district court complied. The matter resurfaced in a slightly different shape ten days later when appellant's Swiss lawyer, Paul Gully-Hart, wrote to Cavassini expressing concern that appellant's impending prosecution on charges in which CTR violations were embedded as predicates for other offenses would insult the rule of specialty. On March 2, Gully-Hart wrote again, this time enclosing a copy of the prosecution's opening statement to the petit jury. Cavassini forwarded both of these letters to O'Hare. On March 8, Cavassini spoke with O'Hare and voiced her concern that appellant might be convicted under count 1 solely on the basis of CTR offenses. 11 The next day, Assistant United States Attorney James Leavey, a member of the prosecution team, advised Judge Torres that he had spoken with O'Hare. Without conceding the legal validity of Gully-Hart's point, Leavey asked the court to instruct the jury that CTR violations could not serve as predicates for purposes of either the RICO or Travel Act counts. When the court acquiesced, the government submitted a redacted indictment that deleted all references to CTR offenses from the RICO and Travel Act counts. Appellant nonetheless moved for a mistrial, invoking the rules of dual criminality and specialty. The district court denied the motion, explaining that it had agreed to the government's proposal purely as an accommodation. In the judge's view, the precautions were not legally required because the SFT had been pellucid in authorizing prosecution on the RICO count even though the claimed CTR violations were prominently displayed therein as potential predicates. The judge noted, moreover, that evidence of appellant's CTR violations was in all events admissible in connection with the substantive money laundering counts (as to which extradition had been approved). Appellant resurrected the issue in his motion for a new trial following the adverse jury verdict. The court stood firm. B. Dual Criminality and Specialty. B. Dual Criminality and Specialty. ______________________________ Although the principles of dual criminality and specialty are closely allied, they are not coterminous. We elaborate below. 12 1. Dual Criminality. The principle of dual 1. Dual Criminality. _________________ criminality dictates that, as a general rule, an extraditable offense must be a serious crime (rather than a mere peccadillo) punishable under the criminal laws of both the surrendering and the requesting state. See Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 ___ ______ ______ (1st Cir. 1980). The current extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland embodies this concept. See Treaty ___ of Extradition, May 14, 1900, U.S.-Switz., Art. II, 31 Stat. 1928, 1929-30 (Treaty). The principle of dual criminality does not demand that the laws of the surrendering and requesting states be carbon copies of one another. Thus, dual criminality will not be defeated by differences in the instrumentalities or in the stated purposes of the two nations' laws. See Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d ___ ______ _____ 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1989). By the same token, the counterpart crimes need not have identical elements. See Matter of ___ __________ Extradition of Russell, 789 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1986). ________________________ Instead, dual criminality is deemed to be satisfied when the two countries' laws are substantially analogous. See Peters, 888 ___ ______ F.2d at 719; Brauch, 618 F.2d at 851. Moreover, in mulling dual ______ criminality concerns, courts are duty bound to defer to a surrendering sovereign's reasonable determination that the offense in question is extraditable. See Casey v. Department of ___ _____ _____________ State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (observing that an _____ American court must give great deference to a foreign court's determination in extradition proceedings); United States v. Van ______________ ___ 13 Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1987) (similar), cert. ____________ _____ denied, 484 U.S. 1042 (1988). ______ Mechanically, then, the inquiry into dual criminality requires courts to compare the law of the surrendering state that purports to criminalize the charged conduct with the law of the requesting state that purports to accomplish the same result. If the same conduct is subject to criminal sanctions in both jurisdictions, no more is exigible. See United States v. Levy, ___ _____________ ____ 905 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049 _____ ______ (1991); see also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922) ("It ___ ____ _______ ______ is enough [to satisfy the requirement of dual criminality] if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions."). 2. Specialty. The principle of specialty a 2. Specialty. _________ corollary to the principle of dual criminality, see United States ___ _____________ v. Herbage, 850 F.2d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, _______ _____ ______ 489 U.S. 1027 (1989) generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted, and none other. See Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d at 428; ___ ________________ Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 783 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, _____ ________ _____ ______ 479 U.S. 882 (1986). The extradition treaty in force between the United States and Switzerland embodies this concept, providing that an individual may not be "prosecuted or punished for any offense committed before the demand for extradition, other than that for which the extradition is granted . . . ." Treaty, Art. IX. Enforcement of the principle of specialty is founded 14 primarily on international comity. See United States v. Thirion, ___ _____________ _______ 813 F.2d 146, 151 (8th Cir. 1987). The requesting state must "live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition" because preservation of the institution of extradition requires the continuing cooperation of the surrendering state. United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 _____________ ______ (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986). _____ ______ Since the doctrine is grounded in international comity rather than in some right of the defendant, the principle of specialty may be waived by the asylum state. See id. ___ ___ Specialty, like dual criminality, is not a hidebound dogma, but must be applied in a practical, commonsense fashion. Thus, obeisance to the principle of specialty does not require that a defendant be prosecuted only under the precise indictment that prompted his extradition, see United States v. Andonian, 29 ___ _____________ ________ F.3d 1432, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 _____ ______ (1995), or that the prosecution always be limited to specific offenses enumerated in the surrendering state's extradition order, see Levy, 905 F.2d at 329 (concluding that a Hong Kong ___ ____ court intended to extradite defendant to face a continuing criminal enterprise charge despite the court's failure specifically to mention that charge in the deportation order). In the same vein, the principle of specialty does not impose any limitation on the particulars of the charges lodged by the requesting nation, nor does it demand departure from the forum's existing rules of practice (such as rules of pleading, evidence, 15 or procedure). See United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d ___ _____________ ______________ 1402, 1414 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1032 (1990); _____ ______ Thirion, 813 F.2d at 153; Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, _______ _________ _________ 583 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). _____ ______ In the last analysis, then, the inquiry into specialty boils down to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the court in the requesting state reasonably believes that prosecuting the defendant on particular charges contradicts the surrendering state's manifested intentions, or, phrased another way, whether the surrendering state would deem the conduct for which the requesting state actually prosecutes the defendant as interconnected with (as opposed to independent from) the acts for which he was extradited. See Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1435; United ___ ________ ______ States v. Cuevas, 847 F.2d 1417, 1427-28 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. ______ ______ _____ denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989); United States v. Paroutian, 299 ______ _____________ _________ F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1962). C. Applying the Principles. C. Applying the Principles. _______________________ A district court's interpretation of the principles of dual criminality and specialty traditionally involves a question of law and is, therefore, subject to plenary review in the court of appeals. See Andonian, 29 F.3d at 1434; United States v. ___ ________ ______________ Khan, 993 F.2d 1368, 1372 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. ____ ______________ Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ____________ _____ ______ 113 S. Ct. 107 (1992). Marching beneath this banner, appellant 16 urges that his conviction must be set aside for three related reasons.6 None has merit. 1. Predicate Acts. Appellant's flagship contention 1. Predicate Acts. _______________ rests on the postulate that an offense which is itself nonextraditable cannot serve as a predicate act in connection with other, extraditable offenses; and that, therefore, the government's use of nonextraditable CTR offenses as predicate acts for purposes of the RICO and Travel Act counts crossed the line into forbidden territory. Even if we assume, however, that in some situations reliance on nonextraditable offenses as predicates for other, extraditable offenses might run afoul of dual criminality or specialty principles, the circumstances of this case present no such problem. ____________________ 6There is some dispute whether alleged violations of the principle of specialty can be raised by a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 583-84 (questioning whether the ___ ____ _________ person being extradited "has standing to assert the principle of specialty"); Kaiser v. Rutherford, 827 F. Supp. 832, 835 (D.D.C. ______ __________ 1993) (asserting that "[t]he rule of specialty is not a right of the accused but is a privilege of the asylum state and therefore [the defendant] has no standing to raise this issue") (internal quotation marks omitted). We need not probe the matter of standing for three reasons. First, while we take no view of the issue, we realize that there are two sides to the story, and the side that favors individual standing has much to commend it. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 422-24 (1886) ___ ____ _____________ ________ (referring to specialty as a "right conferred upon persons brought from a foreign country" via extradition proceedings); Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151 & n.5 (to like effect); see also United _______ ___ ____ ______ States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1992) ______ _______________ (suggesting the continuing vitality of the Rauscher decision). ________ Second, the government has advised us that, for policy reasons, it does not challenge appellant's standing in this instance. Third, appellant's asseverations are more easily dismissed on the merits. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976) ___ ______ _______ (explaining that jurisdictional questions may be bypassed when a ruling on the merits will achieve the same result). 17 In general, we do not believe that there can be a violation of the principle of specialty where the requesting nation prosecutes the returned fugitive for the exact crimes on which the surrendering nation granted extradition. So it is here: the SFT twice approved appellant's extradition on counts that prominently featured CTR offenses as predicates. This approval to which we must pay the substantial deference that is due to a surrendering court's resolution of questions pertaining to extraditability, see, e.g., Casey, 980 F.2d at 1477 strongly ___ ____ _____ suggests that the RICO and Travel Act counts, despite their mention of predicates which, standing alone, would not support extradition, are compatible with the criminal laws of both jurisdictions. Though a Swiss official may informally have fretted about the prospect of a RICO or Travel Act conviction based on nonextraditable predicates, we are reluctant to conclude on this gossamer showing that the SFT did not know and appreciate the clearly expressed contents of the indictment when it sanctioned extradition. To clinch matters, the prosecution avoided any potential intrusion on the principles of either dual criminality or specialty by taking a series of prophylactic actions at trial. The fourth redacted indictment removed all references to CTR offenses from the compendium of charges pressed against the appellant. The judge then reinforced this fumigation of the indictment by advising the jurors that they should not concern 18 themselves with whether appellant had committed any CTR offenses.7 These precautions purged any taint, and knocked the legs out from under the line of reasoning that appellant seeks to pursue. 2. Keeping Faith. Next, appellant asserts that the 2. Keeping Faith. _____________ government infringed on the principle of specialty by breaking its promise to the Swiss government and introducing evidence of CTR violations at appellant's trial. Abstractly, we agree with the core element of appellant's premise: the principle of specialty requires the requesting state to abide by the promises it makes to the surrendering state in the process of procuring extradition. See Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422. But, concretely, we ___ ______ are unable to discern any breach of faith in this instance. Thus, we resist the conclusion that appellant would foist upon us. ____________________ 7The judge instructed the jury: You have heard references during this trial to currency transaction reporting requirements and I should make it clear that you are not being called upon to determine whether the defendant violated or conspired to violate any of those requirements. Therefore, you may consider evidence regarding the nature of currency transactions with banks to the extent that such evidence, in your view, may bear on the source of the money involved and/or the purposes for which the money may have been transferred or transported. But in reaching your verdict, you may not consider whether any such transactions were or were not consistent with transaction reporting requirements because, . . . as I have just said, that is not an issue in this case. . . . 19 To buttress the claim that the United States did not keep its word, appellant avers that O'Hare's facsimile transmission, sent on December 1, 1992, was the functional equivalent of an assurance that the prosecutor would not present any evidence to the jury regarding Saccoccia's noncompliance with CTR requirements. Fairly read, the document despite its iteration that the prosecutor "would present no evidence regarding [Saccoccia's] guilt . . . on the charges for which extradition was not granted" does not support appellant's construction. O'Hare sent the transmittal in response to Cavassini's expression of concern that appellant might be convicted of charges for which extradition had been denied. His reply, taken in context, see supra pp. 10-11, amounted to no more ___ _____ than an assurance against that possibility. To read a promise _________________________ not to introduce any evidence relevant to CTR violations into O'Hare's statement would necessitate wresting it from its contextual moorings and unreasonably stretching its literal meaning. We decline appellant's invitation to indulge in such phantasmagoric wordplay.8 3. The Claimed "Prosecution." Appellant's third 3. The Claimed "Prosecution." ____________________________ contention is that the government violated the principle of ____________________ 8Of course, appellant had already been extradited and the Swiss authorities had already approved the superseding indictment before this supposed promise was made. This places a further obstacle in appellant's path: it strikes us as problematic whether the breach of a promise made after the defendant has been _____ extradited, without more, furnishes a basis for reversing an ensuing conviction. In such circumstances, the surrendering state, by definition, has not relied on the requesting state's promise in deciding to return the defendant. 20 specialty because it prosecuted him for CTR offenses. Since the nonextraditable CTR counts, as they pertained to appellant, were dismissed before the second trial began, his claim is founded on no more than the fact that his name appeared on the indictment during the first trial. While this may literally be "prosecution," it is prosecution in name only and we will not carry hollow formalism to a point at which it engulfs common sense. Consequently, we hold that the mere existence of an unredacted indictment, under the circumstances of this case, is no reason to invalidate Saccoccia's conviction. Cf. Tacket v. ___ ______ Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 937 F.2d 1201, 1202 (7th _____________________________________ Cir. 1991) (Bauer, C.J.) (quoting doggerel to the effect that "[s]ticks and stones may break your bones, but names can never hurt you"). This leaves appellant's argument that he was illegally "prosecuted" because CTR offenses were included as predicate acts for purposes of the RICO and Travel Act counts until the fourth redacted indictment surfaced. As we have already observed, however, it would have been perfectly proper for the government to seek convictions on those counts based on CTR predicates. Hence, appellant's argument is without merit.9 For these reasons, we find appellant's conviction free from taint under the applicable extradition laws. ____________________ 9If more is needed and we do not believe that it is the evidence of CTR violations, by and large, was independently admissible to support various aspects of the money laundering charges and other substantive counts for which extradition was explicitly approved. 21 III. THE COVETED CONTINUANCE III. THE COVETED CONTINUANCE Appellant contends that the district court arbitrarily refused him a lengthy continuance prior to the start of the second trial,10 leaving him with insufficient preparation time. Our analysis of the record indicates that the court acted within its discretion in scotching appellant's request. A. Setting the Stage. A. Setting the Stage. _________________ At arraignment, two attorneys, Jack Hill and Brian Adae, entered appearances as appellant's counsel. Soon thereafter, Austrian authorities arrested Hill for money laundering. Hill languished in prison from August through November of 1992. During that interval, he could not communicate with, or effectively assist, Saccoccia. Adae, who had originally been enlisted as local counsel, stepped into the breach and acted as lead counsel. Shortly after the first trial began, Adae became ill. The court granted appellant's motion for a mistrial and ordered a severance. The case proceeded to verdict vis-a-vis the other defendants. See supra note 3. ___ _____ Naturally, the severance required a separate trial for appellant. The district court proposed to start in early February of 1993. Within a matter of days after the court announced the schedule, Hill, recently released from an Austrian prison, and Kenneth O'Donnell, a prominent Rhode Island defense lawyer, entered appearances as appellant's counsel. On December ____________________ 10Appellant does not assign error to the denial of the continuances that he sought before the first (aborted) trial. See supra note 2. ___ _____ 22 10, 1992, appellant signed an extensive waiver of the potential conflict of interest posed by Hill's representation of him at a time when Hill himself faced charges of money laundering arising out of activities undertaken in conjunction with appellant. On the same day, the court held a hearing anent the waiver. Among other things, appellant requested that his trial be rescheduled to April of 1993 so that his defense team could have more time to prepare. He claimed this extra time was necessary to review financial documents, study surveillance tapes, glean exculpatory evidence, and analyze inconsistencies in the statements of government witnesses. The court granted only a two-week extension, from February 3 to February 17, noting that the original indictment had been returned in 1991 and that counsel already had enjoyed a considerable period for preparation. Subsequent requests for continuances were also denied. B. Applicable Legal Principles. B. Applicable Legal Principles. ___________________________ Trial management is peculiarly within the ken of the district court.11 That court has great latitude in managing ____________________ 11As we wrote on an earlier occasion: There is an important public interest in the efficient operation of the judicial system and in the orderly management of crowded dockets. . . . The district judge is at the helm, sensitive to the tides that ebb and flow during a prolonged trial and knowledgeable about systemic demands. He is, therefore, the person best equipped to balance the competing considerations. United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291 (1st Cir. 1990). _____________ _____ 23 its docket, including broad discretion to grant or withhold continuances. Only "an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay" constitutes an abuse of that discretion. Morris v. Slappy, 461 ______ ______ U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ___ ____ United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 291 (1st Cir. 1990) ______________ _____ (explaining that an appellate court "must show great deference" to district court decisions of this nature, and should overturn such decisions "only for a manifest abuse of discretion"). For present purposes, this means that the decision below must endure unless the party who moved for the continuance can demonstrate that, in withholding relief, the trial court indulged a serious error of law or suffered a meaningful lapse of judgment, resulting in substantial prejudice to the movant.12 See, e.g., ___ ____ United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 708 (11th Cir.), cert. ______________ _____ _____ denied, 114 S. Ct. 396 (1993); United States v. Dennis, 843 F.2d ______ _____________ ______ 652, 653 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988). For the purpose of determining whether a denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion, each case is sui ___ generis. See United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 440 (1st _______ ___ _____________ ______ ____________________ 12The Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to term trial court decisions denying continuances "virtually unreviewable." United ______ States v. Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1265 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal ______ _________ quotation marks omitted). We think this description heads in the right direction but goes too far. See, e.g., United States v. ___ ____ _____________ Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 490 (1st Cir. 1994) (reversing _______________ district court's refusal to grant a continuance on the ground that newly emergent evidence justified more time); Delaney v. _______ United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115 (1st Cir. 1952) (finding that ______________ nationwide publicity had created a hostile atmosphere, and that, therefore, the district court should have granted a continuance). 24 Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). A reviewing court must _____ ______ look first at the reasons contemporaneously presented in support of the request for the continuance. See United States v. |