US v. Scantleberry-Frank
Case Date: 10/26/1998
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 97-2392
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For the First Circuit ____________________ No. 97-2392 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. GUILLERMO SCANTLEBERRY-FRANK, A/K/A GILLERMO SCANTLEBRURY, A/K/A GUILLERMO SCANTLEBURY, A/K/A GUILLERMO SCANTLEBERRY, Defendant, Appellant. ____________________ APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge] ____________________ Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Wellford, Senior Circuit Judge, and Lynch, Circuit Judge. _____________________ Tina Schneider, by appointment of the Court, on brief, for appellant. Antoinette E.M. Leoney, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee. ____________________ October 23, 1998 ____________________ TORRUELLA, Chief Judge. Defendant-appellant, Guillermo Scantleberry-Frank ("Scantleberry"), appeals his conviction of illegal reentry into the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. On appeal, Scantleberry argues: (1) that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, were violated; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm. BACKGROUND In November 1979, Scantleberry, a citizen of Panama, illegally entered the United States at New York City. On June 4, 1987, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") found Scantleberry at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord where he was serving a state sentence on unrelated charges. On November 2, 1992, Scantleberry was deported to Panama after completing his sentence in the Massachusetts prison system. Before Scantleberry boarded the plane to Panama, an INS Deportation Officer fingerprinted his right thumb. On January 7, 1997, INS Deportation Officers and Massachusetts State Police Officers found Scantleberry in Worcester, and placed him under arrest for illegally re-entering the country after deportation. After he was taken into custody, the INS took Scantleberry's fingerprints, for comparison with the right thumbprint taken prior to Scantleberry's deportation to Panama. Expert testimony submitted at trial determined that the thumbprints were identical. On January 15, 1997, Scantleberry was indicted for illegal re-entry into the United States after deportation. On January 17, 1997, he appeared in court for his initial appearance and was arraigned on the indictment. On January 21, 1997, the magistrate judge issued an order of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act commencing on January 17, 1997 -- the date of the defendant's initial appearance and arraignment -- and concluding on February 21, 1997 -- the date by which the government was directed to file its responses to any pretrial discovery motions. Additionally, the magistrate judge issued a preliminary status report to the district court, stating that, assuming no further allowances for excludable time, this case had to be tried on or before May 2, 1997. On April 3, 1997, the district court held a pretrial/status conference at which the possibility of a negotiated plea was discussed. In response to the court's attempt to set a trial date, the government stated that it was unavailable between April 13 and April 27, and on April 29. Defendant's counsel stated that she was unavailable between April 29 and May 12. Based on these representations, the district court set the trial date for May 12, 1997. On May 8, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his trial had not commenced within the time required under the Speedy Trial Act, and on May 19, 1997, the government filed a motion in opposition. On May 9, 1997, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a continuance of the May 12 trial date on the ground that she was engaged in trial on another unrelated matter. On May 22, 1997, the district court issued written findings pursuant to a Speedy Trial Order, and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment without a hearing. In its May 22, 1997 Speedy Trial Order the district court reset the trial for June 16, 1997, and excluded the period from April 3, 1997 until May 22, 1997. On June 16, 1997, the day Scantleberry's trial commenced, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss and a second motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The district court orally denied both motions, and entered a further order excluding the time from May 12, 1997, until June 16, 1997. ANALYSIS I. Speedy Trial Act Claim The Speedy Trial Act ("STA"), 18 U.S.C. 3161, is designed "to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy . . . trial, and to serve the public interest in bringing prompt criminal proceedings." United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993)). The STA provides that the government must bring a criminal defendant to trial no more than seventy days after the later of the filing date of the information or indictment, or the date on which the criminal defendant first appears before a judicial officer of a court in which the charge is pending. See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 3161(c)(1)). In calculating the seventy days, the STA excludes certain time periods. See 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(1)-(9); see also Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 15. If a criminal indictment is not brought to trial within the seventy-day time limit imposed by 3161(c)(1), as extended by operation of 3161(h)(1)-(9), the penalty provisions of the STA mandate that "the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). Scantleberry argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment. He contends that the period between April 3 (the date of the pretrial conference) and May 8 (the date the motion to dismiss was filed) was improperly excluded from the speedy trial calculus. As a result, the delay in his being brought to trial added up to more than the number of statutorily allowable days. In response, the government asserts that, at worst, only sixty-five non-excludable days passed before Scantleberry was brought to trial. We find no error in the district court's refusal to dismiss the superseding indictment. This Court reviews the disposition of a STA issue for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to legal rulings. See Santiago-Becerril, 130 F.3d at 15; United States v. Rodr |