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DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
| Docket Number: |
66204-0 |
| Title of Case: |
Grazyna Prouty, App vs. Tahoma School District, Resp. |
| File Date: |
05/29/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
| Appeal from King County Superior Court |
| Docket No: | 10-2-12633-3 |
| Judgment or order under review |
| Date filed: | 10/04/2010 |
| Judge signing: | Honorable Bruce Heller |
JUDGES
------
| Authored by | Ronald Cox |
| Concurring: | Michael S. Spearman |
| C. Kenneth Grosse |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| | Grazyna Prouty (Appearing Pro Se) |
| | 12609 Se 212th Place |
| | Kent, WA, 98031 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| | Lester. PorterJr. |
| | Dionne & Rorick LLP |
| | 601 Union St Ste 900 |
| | Seattle, WA, 98101-2360 |
|
| | Grant David Wiens |
| | Dionne & Rorick LLP |
| | 601 Union St Ste 900 |
| | Seattle, WA, 98101-2360 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
GRAZYNA PROUTY, ) No. 66204-0-I
) (Consolidated with
Respondent, ) No. 66206-6-I)
)
v. ) DIVISION ONE
)
TAHOMA SCHOOL BOARD, ) UNPUBLISHED
)
Appellant. ) FILED: May 29, 2012
)
)
Cox, J. -- Under RCW 28A.405.210, a teacher may obtain a hearing on
the determination that probable cause exists to not renew his or her employment
contract. But review of this determination is only available if a teacher files a
written request for a hearing within 10 days after service of notice of the school
district's decision on the employee.1 Failure to timely file such a request results
in a loss of the statutory right to such a hearing.2
Here, the Tahoma superintendent properly served Grazyna Prouty with
proper written notice of the probable cause determination, but Prouty failed to
timely request a hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary
judgment dismissal of this action.
1 RCW 28A.405.210.
2 Id., Robel v. Highline Public Schools, 65 Wn.2d 477, 485, 398 P.2d 1
(1965).
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/2
Prouty was employed as a teacher for English Language Learner
students in the Tahoma School District. The district placed her on probation
because of alleged teaching deficiencies. After a period of probation, the
superintendent of the Tahoma School District found probable cause existed not
to renew Prouty's employment contract. The letter informing Prouty of this
determination was personally delivered to her on March 5, 2010. The
superintendent also attached a copy of RCW 28A.405.210 to the letter,
informing Prouty that she had a right to a hearing if she filed a written request
within 10 days of the letter's receipt.
Thereafter, Prouty sent letters to the Board secretary and president
requesting a hearing before the Board. Prouty subsequently sent letters to the
same individuals, disclaiming any request for a hearing concerning the
nonrenewal of her contract. She then wrote additional letters to the same
individuals dated March 15 in which she requested an "open hearing" pursuant
to RCW 28A.405.210. Neither recipient received a letter until March 16.
On March 30, the Board voted not to renew Prouty's employment contract
for the coming school year. After receiving written notice of nonrenewal, Prouty
wrote another letter to the Board president dated April 7 requesting a hearing.
She also appealed the Board's decision to the King County Superior
Court under RCW 28A.405.320. The Tahoma School District moved to strike,
which the trial court converted into a motion for summary judgment. After a
hearing and consideration of further documentation by both parties, the court
2
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/3
granted summary judgment for the school district.
Prouty appeals.
UNTIMELY FILING OF THE REQUEST FOR A HEARING
Prouty argues that she timely filed a request for a hearing with the
president and secretary of the Board. Because she failed to timely file a written
request, we disagree.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.3 We review a summary judgment order de novo, viewing the facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.4
In interpreting a statute, a court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry
out the legislature's intent.5 We first look to the plain language of the statute.6
Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the legislative intent is
apparent and we will not construe the statute otherwise.7
Here, the plain meaning of the statute in question is clear. RCW
3 CR 56(c).
4 Khung Thi Lam v. Global Med. Svs., 127 Wn. App. 657, 661 n.4, 111
P.3d 1258 (2005).
5 Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass'n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d
1283 (2010).
6 State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).
7 State v. Landsiedel, 165 Wn. App. 886, 890, 269 P.3d 347 (2012)
(quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)).
3
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/4
28A.405.210, 28A.405.300, and 28A.405.310 outline the process by which a
school district may terminate the employment contract of a certificated school
employee. Under RCW 28A.405.100(4)(a), after an employee has been placed
on probation and if he or she fails to show "necessary improvement during the
established probationary period . . . ." Following a period of probation, the
superintendent may determine that there is probable cause for the nonrenewal
of the employee's contract.8 Under RCW 28A.405.210, if such a determination
is made, the superintendent must provide written notice to the certificated
employee:
Such notice shall be served upon the employee personally, or by
certified or registered mail . . . . Every such employee so notified,
at his or her request made in writing and filed with the
president, chair or secretary of the board of directors of the
district within ten days after receiving such notice, shall be
granted opportunity for hearing pursuant to RCW 28A.405.310 to
determine whether there is sufficient cause or causes for
nonrenewal of contract . . . .[9]
This statutory language is clear. An employee must file a written request
for a hearing regarding the probable cause determination within 10 days of
service of notice of the probable cause determination. If he or she fails to do so,
the employee cannot obtain a hearing or a review of the school board's
determination. This interpretation of the plain language of RCW 28A.405.210
has been confirmed by holdings of the supreme court and Division Three of this
court.
8 RCW 28A.405.100(4)(a).
9 RCW 28A.405.210.
4
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/5
In Robel v. Highline Public Schools, District No. 401,10 the superintendent
served Robel on three different occasions with a probable cause determination
notice.11 Robel admitted to receiving at least one of these notices.12 But she
failed to file a written request for a hearing with the school board until a month
after the last notice.13 The court held that the employee's non-compliance was
clear:
The requirements of RCW 28.67.070 . . . had been fully complied
with. Appellant had 10 days within which to file a written request
for a hearing before the school board following actual or
constructive receipt of the notice. She did not do so. Failing in
this, the ultimate decision of the school board not to renew the
contract became final and conclusive.[14]
In a more recent case addressing the application of RCW 28A.405.210,
Division Three of this court reinforced the plain language interpretation of this
statute's requirements. In Greene v. Pateros School District,15 the
superintendent served Greene with a nonrenewal probable cause notice on
March 27.16 Within 10 days of service, Greene sent a letter to the
10 65 Wn.2d 477, 398 P.2d 1 (1965).
11 Id. at 478-80.
12 Id. at 479-80.
13 Id. at 480.
14 Id. at 485 (RCW 28.67.070 was recodified as RCW 28A.405.210).
15 59 Wn. App. 522, 799 P.2d 276 (1990).
16 Id. at 526.
5
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/6
superintendent.17 But rather than requesting a hearing on the probable cause
finding, "the body of the letter was a specific response to the seniority list . . . ."18
Greene may also have made an oral request to the superintendent for a
hearing.19 The court held, however, that
[u]nder the plain language of former RCW 28A.67.070 there are
two steps to perfecting a request for a hearing: (1) prepare a
written request for a hearing and (2) file it with the president,
chairman or secretary of the board of directors of the district. Both
steps must be completed within 10 days after receiving the
notice of nonrenewal. Mr. Greene's letter dated April 3 does not
request any kind of hearing and was not filed with an officer of the
board of directors.[20]
Thus, the court held Greene's letter could not "reasonably be construed as a
request for a hearing within the meaning of former RCW 28A.67.070 [recodified
as RCW 28A.405.210]."21
Here, there is no dispute over the material facts. Prouty acknowledges
that she received written notice of the probable cause determination on March 5.
This notice included reference to her right to a hearing under RCW
28A.405.210. A copy of the statute was attached to the letter. There is no
evidence in the record that Prouty filed a written request for a hearing on the
17 Id. at 526-27.
18 Id. at 526.
19 Id. at 527.
20 Id. at 530-31.
21 Id. at 531.
6
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/7
probable cause determination by March 15, the 10th day following written notice
to her of the superintendent's letter.
Prouty did send two letters dated March 10, one to Michael Maryanski,
the superintendent of the school district and the Board secretary, and the other
to Didem Pierson, the Board president. In these letters, Prouty requested "the
hearing by the Tahoma School Board as soon as possible as the Tahoma
School District made the decision to non-renew my continuing contract based on
the input of the supervisors who evaluated me for two years and each area was
marked unsatisfactory."22 Maryanski sent a response to Prouty's initial letter on
March 11. Prouty then responded with a letter dated March 15 in which she
disclaimed any attempt in the March 10 letter to request a hearing. "Since I have
received your response to my request of March 10, 2010 I am sending another
request on March 15, 2010. I kindly inform you that my plan is not to talk
about the contract . . . ."23 In a letter to Pierson dated March 15, Prouty also
indicated that her March 10 letter was not a request for a hearing concerning the
probable cause determination. She wrote:
I am requesting the hearing by the Tahoma School Board
concerning the following:
(I will talk about)
- Vision
- Continuous Improvement
- Assessment
22 Clerk's Papers at 556, 606.
23 Id. at 560.
7
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/8
- Climate
- Collaborative partnership
- Accountability[24]
Thus, in both of these March 15 letters, Prouty disclaimed any request for
a hearing on the probable cause determination in the letter of March 10. This
exchange of communication is fatal to any claim that she timely filed any written
request for a hearing on the probable cause determination. Like the employee's
written request in Greene, Prouty's letters were not requests for a hearing
concerning the probable cause determination. Thus, as in Greene, these letters
do not constitute timely requests under the plain language of RCW 28A.405.210.
Prouty also sent several other letters, dated March 15, including one to
Maryanski and one to Pierson, "requesting an open hearing, as is my right, over
the Tahoma School District's decision -- a notice of probable cause to nonrenew
my contract."25 While Prouty, in these letters, clearly requested a public hearing
under RCW 28A.405.210, they were not "filed," as that term is generally
understood, within the 10-day time period that the statute requires.
Prouty claims that her letter dated April 7, sent within 10 days after she
was informed of the Board's nonrenewal of her employment contract, preserved
her right to a hearing. It did not.
Under RCW 28A.405.210, the key date is the service of the probable
cause letter, not the notification of nonrenewal. To preserve one's right to a
24 Id. at 559.
25 Id. at 610; Report of Proceedings (Sept. 17, 2010) at 10.
8
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/9
hearing, a written request must be "made in writing and filed with the president,
chair or secretary of the board of directors of the district within ten days after
receiving [the notice of nonrenewal] . . . ."26 Filing requires that the receipt of
such notice have been received within 10 days.27 Thus, it is not enough that the
school employee sent notice within this time period -- the notice must be
received within 10 days as well.28 Like the employee in Robel, Prouty did not
comply with the requirements of the statute because she did not timely file a
written request for a hearing. The receipt of notification of nonrenewal is
irrelevant for purposes of requesting a hearing.
OTHER MATTERS
In her briefing, Prouty makes several substantive arguments about the
district's decision not to renew her contract. Because she failed to timely
request a hearing on the probable cause determination, we decline to address
these arguments.
We affirm the order granting summary judgment.
WE CONCUR:
26 RCW 28A.405.210.
27 Id.; Robel, 65 Wn.2d at 485.
28 RCW 28A.405.210; Robel, 65 Wn.2d at 485.
9
No. 66204-0-I (Consolidated with No. 66206-6-I)/10
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