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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Personal Restraint Petition       )       NO. 65130-7-I
                                            )
                  of                        )       DIVISION ONE
                                            )
BARON NADDER HAGHIGHI,[1]                   )       PUBLISHED OPINION
                                            )
                      Petitioner.           )       FILED: April 16, 2012
                                            )

       Lau, J.  --  Baron Haghighi's personal restraint petition (PRP) challenges his 

judgment and sentence for unlawful issuance of checks or drafts (UICD) and first 

degree theft.  The trial court admitted bank records under the inevitable discovery rule.  

We adhered to that rule on direct appeal in affirming Haghighi's convictions.  Haghighi 

claims that rejection of the inevitable discovery rule in State v. Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d 
620, 220 P.3d 1226 (2009),2 decided weeks after his appeal became final, applies 

retroactively to his case.  He also argues deficient performance by his appellate 

       1 In court documents, both "Baron Nadder Haghighi" and "Nadder Baron 
Haghighi" are used.  For consistency in this opinion, we use "Baron Nadder Haghighi."

       2 In Winterstein, our Supreme Court "reject[ed] the inevitable discovery doctrine 
because it is incompatible with the nearly categorical exclusionary rule under article I, 
section 7 [of the Washington Constitution]."  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 636.    

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counsel.  Because Winterstein does not apply retroactively on collateral review to 

convictions that were final when Winterstein was decided and the ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim is time barred, we dismiss Haghighi's petition.                   

                                            FACTS

       The facts of this case are fully discussed in Haghighi's direct appeal.  State v. 

Haghighi, noted at 151 Wn. App. 1047, 2009 WL 2515775.  We repeat only the facts 

necessary to resolve this PRP.  

       The State charged Haghighi with seven counts of unlawful issuance of checks or 

drafts and one count of first degree theft. The charges all related to bad checks 

Haghighi presented to six victims between November 15, 2005, and January 3, 2006.  

The checks were drawn on accounts Haghighi opened at Washington Mutual Bank and 

Allstate Bank.  The State sought an exceptional sentence based on Haghighi's history 

of passing bad checks.  

       Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress Haghighi's Allstate bank 

records. A superior court judge had previously approved a search warrant for those

records on February 27, 2006.  By that point, several victims had identified Haghighi by 

photomontage and provided copies of fraudulent checks to the police.  The search 

warrant affidavit identified account and check numbers involved.  Allstate provided the 

records after Kent Police Detective Robert Kaufmann faxed the search warrant to 

Allstate's Illinois office.  Defense counsel acknowledged probable cause existed to 

support the search warrant.  He argued that the "extraterritorial search and seizure 

lacked constitutional authority" and that "its fruits must be excluded."  Haghighi, 2009 

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WL 2515775, at *2.  The trial court rejected the constitutional violation claim but found 

the warrant unenforceable in Illinois premised on the State's failure to follow proper 

warrant enforcement procedures.  Relying on the inevitable discovery rule, the court 

denied suppression of the bank records.  The court also denied defense counsel's 

request for an inevitable discovery evidentiary hearing.

       The jury convicted Haghighi on all counts.  The court imposed exceptional 

sentences on all counts -- 96 months on the theft and 60 months on the UIDCs, all to 

run concurrently.  

       On appeal, Haghighi primarily claimed that the State failed to prove it would 

have inevitably discovered his Allstate bank records and that the trial court erred by not 

conducting an evidentiary hearing.  Haghighi, 2009 WL 2515775 at *7.  We adhered to 
the inevitable discovery rule3 and held that the trial court properly concluded the State 

would have discovered Haghighi's bank records despite the warrant's unenforceability.  

Haghighi, 2009 WL 2515775 at *8.

       Shortly after the finality of Haghighi's appeal, our Supreme Court held in 

Winterstein that the inevitable discovery rule violates article I, section 7 of the 

Washington Constitution.  Haghighi timely filed a PRP in March 2010, alleging 
Winterstein's retroactive application in his case.4

       3 Under this rule, evidence that would normally be suppressed is admissible "if 
the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the police did not act 
unreasonably or in an attempt to accelerate discovery, and the evidence would have 
been inevitably discovered under proper and predictable investigatory procedures."  
State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 17, 991 P.2d 720 (2000).

       4 Haghighi made several other arguments in his PRP, but we dismissed his 

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                                        DISCUSSION

       To obtain collateral relief by means of a PRP, the petitioner must show that there 

was a "constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to the 

petitioner or that there was a nonconstitutional error that resulted in a fundamental 

defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice."  In re Pers. 

Restraint Petition of Woods, 154 Wn .2d 400, 409, 114 P.3d 607 (2005).  The 

petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the error was prejudicial.  

In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Lord, 152 Wn.2d 182, 188, 94 P.3d 952 (2004).    

       Retroactivity

       In Haghighi's case, we affirmed the trial court's reliance on the inevitable 

discovery rule before Winterstein held the rule unconstitutional under Washington law.  

Haghighi contends that Winterstein constitutes a change in the law that applies 

retroactively to his case. He specifically argues that (1) Winterstein announces no new 

rule under our state Supreme Court jurisprudence and (2) even if retroactivity analysis 

applies, state and not federal retroactivity analysis applies to his case. The State 

counters that Winterstein lacks retroactive application to cases already final when it 

was decided.

       Washington courts attempt to maintain congruence with the United States 

petition as to all issues except Winterstein's retroactivity.  See Order of Partial 
Dismissal and Referral, No. 65130-7-I (Dec. 22, 2010).
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Supreme Court in analyzing retroactivity.  In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Markel, 154 

Wn.2d 262, 268, 111 P.3d 249 (2005); see also State v. Evans, 154 Wn.2d 438, 444, 

114 P.3d 627 (2005) ("Generally, we have followed the lead of the United States 

Supreme Court when deciding whether to give retroactive application to newly 

articulated principles of law.").  Under the federal common law retroactivity analysis,

              "1. A new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
       retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet 
       final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a clear break 
       from the past.
              "2. A new rule will not be given retroactive application to cases on 
       collateral review except where either:  (a) the new rule places certain kinds of 
       primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to proscribe, or 
       (b) the rule requires the observance of procedures implicit in the concept of 
       ordered liberty."

Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint Petition of St. 

Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 326, 823 P.2d 492 (1992)).  Our Supreme Court more recently 

applied federal retroactivity analysis in In re Per. Restraint Petition of Scott, No. 82951-
9, 2012 WL 663944, at *4 (Mar. 1, 2012) (quoting Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444).5

        Under retroactivity analysis, "[a] 'new rule' is one that 'breaks new ground' or 

'was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became 

final.'"  Markel, 154 Wn.2d at 270 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301, 109 S. 

Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion)).  "'If before the opinion is 

announced, reasonable jurists could disagree on the rule of law, the rule is new.'"  

       5 Scott held that State v. Recuenco, 163 Wn.2d 428, 180 P.3d 1276 (2008) 
(holding that trial judge lacked authority to impose a firearm enhancement based on a 
jury's deadly weapon special verdict) is not retroactive.  Scott, 2012 WL 663944 at *5.

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Scott, 2012 WL 663944, at *4 (quoting Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444).

       Haghighi acknowledges his convictions were final on direct appeal before 

Winterstein was decided.  He claims,

       Winterstein did not announce a new rule for purposes of Supreme Court 
       jurisprudence. It marked a departure from Court of Appeals precedent.  But the 
       State cites no cases that mandate a Teague[6] retroactivity analysis when the 
       Supreme Court disagrees with a Court of Appeals decision and addresses an 
       issue consistent with its own long-standing precedent.  

Appellant's Reply Br. at 1-2.  For this proposition, Haghighi relies on State v. O'Neill, 

148 Wn.2d 564, 62 P.3d 489 (2003).

       In O'Neill, the State argued that a drug pipe and a baggie of cocaine found 

during an illegal search of the defendant's car were admissible under the inevitable 

discovery rule.  O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 573, 591-92.  Our Supreme Court held:

       [T]he inevitable discovery rule cannot be applied in these circumstances, 
       because it would undermine our holding that a lawful custodial arrest must be 
       effected before a valid search incident to that arrest can occur.  If we apply the 
       inevitable discovery rule, there is no incentive for the State to comply with article 
       I, section 7's requirement that the arrest precede the search.

O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 592 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The court commented 

in a footnote, "We leave for another case the question whether the [inevitable discovery 

rule] might apply in another context under article I, section 7, a question we have not 

decided."  O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 592 n.11 (emphasis added).

       In Winterstein, the State argued that evidence obtained during a warrantless 

search was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 

631.  Our Supreme Court noted that in O'Neill, "we recognized that there is no 

       6 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 107 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).

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established inevitable discovery exception under article I, section 7."  Winterstein, 167 

Wn.2d at 635.  "We further noted our disapproval of the inevitable discovery doctrine 

under the circumstances of [O'Neill]."  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 635 (emphasis 

added).  The court concluded, "Consistent with this precedent, we reject the inevitable 

discovery doctrine because it is incompatible with the nearly categorical exclusionary 

rule under article I, section 7."  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 636.  In doing so, the court 

expressly overruled Court of Appeals decisions that applied the inevitable discovery 
rule.7  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 634-35.  The court explained, "The reasoning of these 

Court of Appeals cases is flawed . . . because it relies on the federal rationale for the 

inevitable discovery doctrine."  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 635.  The court found the 

federal inevitable discovery analysis "at odds with the plain language of article I, 

section 7, which we have emphasized guarantees privacy rights with no express 

limitations."  Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 635.  

       We are unpersuaded by Haghighi's "no new rule" claim.  We conclude 

Winterstein's inevitable discovery holding announced a new rule for retroactivity 

purposes because this holding was not "'dictated'" by prior precedent.  Markel, 154 

Wn.2d at 270 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).  As discussed above, Winterstein

referred to its precedent in O'Neill, in which the court expressly left undecided the 

question of whether the inevitable discovery rule could ever be compatible with article I, 

section 7.  O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 592 n.11.  O'Neill held that under the particular 

       7 These cases were State v. Avila-Avina, 99 Wn. App. 9, 17, 991 P.2d 720 
(2000); State v. Reyes, 98 Wn. App. 923, 930, 933, 993 P.2d 921 (2000); State v. 
Richman, 85 Wn. App. 568, 577, 933 P.2d 1088 (1997).
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circumstances before it, the inevitable discovery rule violates article I, section 7.  O'Neill, 

148 Wn.2d at 592.  Until Winterstein, no Washington Supreme Court opinion 

categorically rejected the inevitable discovery rule as incompatible with article I, section 

7.  Given O'Neill's limited holding and the Court of Appeals decisions applying the 

inevitable discovery rule, "'reasonable jurists could disagree on the rule of law . . .'"
before Winterstein was decided.8  Scott, 2012 WL 663944 at *4 (quoting Evans, 154 

Wn.2d at 444). If before the opinion is announced, reasonable jurists could disagree 

on the rule of law, the opinion is new.  Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 413, 124 S. Ct. 

2504, 159 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2004).  We conclude that Winterstein announced a new rule 

of law.

       We turn next to the retroactivity question.  There is no dispute that Winterstein

involves no "'primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the state to 
proscribe.'"9  Winterstein applies retroactively only if it "'requires the observance of 

procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"  Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444 

(quoting St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d at 326.  This exception is reserved for only a "'small set 

of watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and 

accuracy of the criminal proceeding.'"  Markel, 154 Wn.2d at 269 (internal quotation 

       8 Haghighi also argues that in State v. Gaines, 154 Wn.2d 711, 116 P.3d 993
(2005), our Supreme Court signaled that the inevitable discovery rule did not apply 
under our state constitution.  But in Gaines, despite granting review in a case involving 
application of the rule, the court resolved the case on other grounds and did not reach 
the inevitable discovery issue.  Gaines, 154 Wn.2d at 716 n.5.

       9 I.e., Winterstein did not decriminalize the conduct for which Haghighi was 
punished.  See Rhome, 172 Wn.2d at 666.

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marks omitted) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. 

Ed. 2d 442 (2004)).  The United States Supreme Court has noted, "'This class of rules

is extremely narrow, and it is unlikely that any . . . ha[s] yet to emerge.'"  Markel, 154 

Wn.2d at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352); see also In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Rhome, 172 

Wn.2d 654, 666, 260 P.3d 874 (2011).

"'That a new procedural rule is fundamental in some abstract sense is not enough; the 

rule must be one without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously

diminished.'"  Rhome, 172 Wn.2d at 667 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352).  Such a rule must "'alter our understanding of the bedrock 

procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.'"  Rhome, 172 Wn.2d at 

667 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 

U.S. 227, 242, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990)).

       We conclude Winterstein does not meet the requirements for a watershed rule 

of criminal procedure.  The exclusion of relevant evidence is not a rule "'without which 

the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.'"  Rhome, 172 Wn.2d at 

667 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352).  The 

Winterstein court held the inevitable discovery rule unconstitutional premised on 

Washington Constitution, article I, section 7's guarantee of privacy and personal rights

with no express limitations.  See Winterstein, 167 Wn.2d at 631-36.  Nor does

Winterstein "'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to

the fairness of a proceeding.'"  Rhome, 172 Wn.2d at 667 (emphasis omitted) (internal 

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quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242).  As discussed above, 

Winterstein specifically addresses privacy under Washington's Constitution.  That the 
United States Supreme Court10 adheres to the inevitable discovery exception to the 

exclusionary rule supports our conclusion that no bedrock rule of fundamental fairness 

is implicated here.

       Haghighi contends in the alternative that an independent state law retroactivity 

analysis applies under RAP 16.4(c)(4) and RCW 10.73.100(6).  RAP 16.4 is a 

procedural rule that provides grounds for a petitioner to challenge his or her restraint

and states in relevant part:

              (c)  Unlawful Nature of Restraint.  The restraint must be unlawful for one 
       or more of the following reasons:
              . . . . 
              (4) There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive 
       or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order 
       entered in a criminal proceeding or civil proceeding instituted by the state or 
       local government, and sufficient reasons exist to require retroactive application 
       of the changed legal standard; or
              . . . .
              (d) Restrictions.  The appellate court will only grant relief by a personal 
       restraint petition if other remedies which may be available to petitioner are 
       inadequate under the circumstances and if such relief may be granted under 
       RCW 10.73.090, .100, and .130.  No more than one petition for similar relief on 
       behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown.

RAP 16.4 (emphasis added) (boldface omitted).  RCW 10.73.100(6) mirrors the

language in RAP 16.4(c)(4), providing an exception to the one-year time limit for 

collateral attack when there has been a significant change in the law and either the 
legislature or a court has provided the change be retroactive.11

       10 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).
       11 As Haghighi's PRP was timely as to the retroactivity issue, RCW 10.73.100(6) 

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         Citing dictum in Evans, Haghighi argues for retroactive application of 

Winterstein based on state law.  In Evans, our Supreme Court noted, "There may be a 

case where [RCW 10.73.100(6)] would authorize or require retroactive application of a 

new rule of law when Teague would not."  Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 448.  But the court 

declined to reach that issue.  It concluded, "[P]etitioners do not make a compelling case 

that there are reasons for retroactive application that are sufficient under state law."  

Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 449.  The court reasoned, "Generally, we have followed the lead 

of the United States Supreme Court when deciding whether to give retroactive 

application to newly articulated principles of law."  Evans, 154 Wn.2d at 444.  In State 

v. Abrams, 163 Wn.2d 277, 291, 178 P.3d 1021 (2008), our Supreme Court cited 

Evans for the proposition that "[w]e have interpreted [RCW 10.73.100(6)] consistent 

with [the Teague federal retroactivity analysis]." Moreover, RAP 16.4(d) provides that 

the appellate court "will only grant relief . . . if such relief may be granted under RCW 

10.73.090, .100, and .130." Because the Abrams court interpreted the statutory 

language of RCW 10.73.100(6) consistent with Teague, the Teague federal 

retroactivity analysis also applies to RAP 16.4(c)(4). We conclude that RAP 16.4(c)(4) 

does not establish an independent state retroactivity analysis.  

         Haghighi cites to no Washington case applying a rule retroactively on 
collateral attack based on a retroactivity analysis other than Teague.12  See State v. 

does not apply to him.  "It does, however, give some guidance to the legislature's 
assessment of the proper scope of retroactive application of new rules."  Evans, 154 
Wn.2d at 448 n.5.

       12 Haghighi cites to cases from other states that have developed state law to 

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Logan, 102 Wn. App. 907, 911 n.1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000) ("'Where no authorities are 

cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but 

may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.'") (quoting DeHeer v. 

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)).  Our Supreme 

Court has consistently applied federal retroactivity analysis to state constitutional 

questions.  See, e.g., St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321 (applying federal retroactivity analysis 

to state constitutional claim); Scott, 2012 WL 663944, at *3-4 (same).  We decline to 

depart from binding Supreme Court precedent.  

       Based on the reasons discussed above, we hold that Winterstein does not apply 

retroactively on collateral review to convictions that were final when Winterstein was 

decided and no independent state retroactivity standard exists.

       Ineffective Assistance     

       Haghighi also argues that his appellate counsel failed to advise him to petition 

for review regarding the inevitable discovery rule's validity under the state constitution

before his case became final.  The State contends that Haghighi's ineffective 

assistance claim is time barred under RCW 10.73.090 and, alternatively, that Haghighi 

fails to establish that counsel was ineffective.

       RCW 10.73.090(1) bars review of an untimely collateral attack of a judgment and 

sentence.  "No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a 

criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the 

govern retroactivity in state collateral attack cases.  See Appellant's Reply Br. at 3-4.  
But he cites to no such case in Washington.
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judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent 

jurisdiction." RCW 10.73.090(1).13 Collateral attack includes the filing of a PRP.  

RCW 10.73.090(2).  The time bar runs from [t]he date that an appellate court issues its 

mandate disposing of a timely direct appeal from the conviction" if that is the last

triggering event.  RCW 10.73.090(3)(b).  "RCW 10.73.090 is a mandatory rule that acts 

as a bar to appellate court consideration of PRPs filed after the limitation period has 

passed, unless the petitioner demonstrates that the petition is based on one of the 
exemptions enumerated in RCW 10.73.100."14  In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Bonds, 

165 Wn.2d 135, 140, 196 P.3d 672 (2008).  RCW 10.73.090's one-year time limit is not 

jurisdictional; rather it is a statute of limitations issue.  Bonds, 165 Wn.2d at 140.

       13 RAP 16.4 incorporates the requirements of RCW 10.73.090(1).

       14 RCW 10.73.100 provides:  "The time limit specified in RCW 10.73.090 does 
not apply to a petition or motion that is based solely on one or more of the following 
grounds:
       "(1) Newly discovered evidence, if the defendant acted with reasonable diligence 
in discovering the evidence and filing the petition or motion;
       "(2) The statute that the defendant was convicted of violating was 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to the defendant's conduct;
       "(3) The conviction was barred by double jeopardy under Amendment V of the 
United States Constitution or Article I, section 9 of the state Constitution;
       "(4) The defendant pled not guilty and the evidence introduced at trial was 
insufficient to support the conviction;
       "(5) The sentence imposed was in excess of the court's jurisdiction; or
       "(6) There has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or 
procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a 
criminal or civil proceeding instituted by the state or local government, and either the 
legislature has expressly provided that the change in the law is to be applied 
retroactively, or a court, in interpreting a change in the law that lacks express 
legislative intent regarding retroactive application, determines that sufficient reasons 
exist to require retroactive application of the changed legal standard."

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       In Bonds, our Supreme Court held that the principles of timely filing and finality 

of judgments preclude consideration of arguments made in an untimely amended PRP.  

Bonds, 165 Wn.2d at 143-44.  The court reasoned, "Though the appellate rules do not 

expressly authorize or prohibit amendment to PRPs, we have accepted amendments to 

a PRP made within the statutory time limit."  Bonds, 165 Wn.2d at 140.  Even if a 

petitioner does not move to amend his PRP, his opening brief serves as an amended 

PRP if it adds a claim not raised in his PRP.  In re Pers. Restraint Petition of Davis, 151 

Wn. App. 331, 335 n.6, 211 P.3d 1055 (2009).  

       We issued a mandate on Haghighi's direct appeal on September 25, 2009.  He 

timely filed his initial PRP on March 16, 2010.  He failed to raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in his initial PRP.  His brief, which raises that claim for the first 

time, was filed on May 13, 2011 -- nearly 20 months after we issued our mandate on his 

appeal.  Haghighi raised no potential exceptions or exemptions to RCW 10.73.090's 

time bar.  Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim is time barred.

       Haghighi argues that the ineffective assistance claim he raised in his brief 

should "relate back" to his original PRP because the arguments in his brief and the 

original petition "rest on the same core legal issue, involving the application of 

Winterstein and the inevitable discovery analysis used as the basis to admit illegally 

seized evidence." Appellant's Reply Br. at 8.  He cites to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 15, which governs amended and supplemental pleadings.  That rule 

provides, "An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 

when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 

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transaction, or occurrence set out -- or attempted to be set out -- in the original 

pleading." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).

       Washington's civil rules contain a similar provision.  See CR 15(c).  But in In re 

Personal Restraint Petition of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 938-39, 952 P.2d 116 (1998), our 

Supreme Court noted, "There is no provision in the rules of appellate procedure similar 

to CR 15(c) . . . indeed, there is no provision at all regarding amendments to personal 

restraint petitions." The court emphasized that "postconviction challenges must be 

brought within one year after a conviction becomes final" and that RCW 10.73.100 

allows only "limited exceptions" to RCW 10.73.090's statute of limitation.  Benn, 134 

Wn.2d at 938.  Haghighi cites to no Washington case in which a PRP petitioner was 

permitted to "relate back" an untimely argument based on the civil rules.  His ineffective 
assistance claim is time barred.15  

                                        CONCLUSION

       Winterstein does not apply retroactively in Haghighi's case and his ineffective 

assistance claim is time barred.  Accordingly, we dismiss his PRP. 

WE CONCUR:

       15 Because we do not reach the merits of Haghighi's ineffective assistance claim, 
the cases Haghighi cites in his statement of additional authorities, filed after oral 
argument, are inapplicable. 
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