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 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

ROBIN PARROTT-HORJES,                       )
Individually and as Personal                )       No. 65549-3-I
Representative of the Estate of             )
Michele L. Parrott, deceased and            )       DIVISION ONE
LAURIE L. DELMA, individually,              )
                                            )       PUBLISHED OPINION
                      Appellants,           )
                                            )    
              v.                            )
                                            )   
MARNI G. RICE, a single individual,         ) 
                                            )
                      Respondent,           )
                                            )
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE                 )
COMPANY, a New York corporation;            )
and KING COUNTY, a local government)
entity,                                     )       FILED: May 21, 2012
              Third Party Defendants.       )

       Grosse, J.   --      One who acts in self-defense          is not precluded from 

inheriting under the slayer rule.        Here, the jury found that the defendant 

committed battery against the victim, but that she did so in self-defense.  Intent 

to commit battery does not necessarily equate to intent to kill.  The slayer rule 

requires a willful and unlawful killing.  Here, the jury's verdict of self-defense 

negates the unlawfulness of the killing.  Further, a victim of domestic violence 

can introduce evidence of an aggressor's prior bad acts of domestic violence in 

order to show the victim's state of mind, an element of self-defense.  The trial 

court is affirmed.

                                        FACTS

       Marni Rice and Michele Parrott were in a committed relationship.  The two  

No. 65549-3-I / 2

resided together with Parrott's then 16-year-old son, Andrew, and then 20-year-

old daughter, Alexandria.  Parrott died as a result of a subdural hematoma 

incurred on November 5 or 6, 2007.

       Rice and Parrott were planning to move to Idaho at the end of the month 

and were engaged in purchasing a bar.  On November 5, Parrott returned from 

work with a half gallon of vodka; after checking her e-mail on the computer in the 

bedroom, she discovered that more money was required to complete the real 

estate transaction in Idaho.    Rice testified that Parrott was upset and drinking.  

Rice saw Parrott pour two drinks before Parrott called her grandfather to ask to 

borrow additional funds.  The grandfather refused and Parrott became upset.  

Parrott also discovered that Rice had been looking at a gay singles web site in 

Idaho and angrily demanded to know why Rice was viewing the site.  Parrott

became abusive and slapped Rice across the face.  Parrott                   also acted 

aggressively toward her dog.  When Parrott left the bedroom, Rice locked the 

double doors to keep Parrott out.  Parrott became angry that Rice had locked the 

doors and broke open both doors.  Parrott then pulled a gun out of the closet

and waived it around.  Rice yelled at Parrott  to put the gun down and then 

Parrott left the room.  Rice put the gun in a box in another room, returned to the 

bedroom, repaired the doors, and closed and locked them again.  Angered that 

Rice had again locked the bedroom doors, Parrott started counting and yelling at 

Rice to let her in or she would break down the doors again.  Rice jumped off the 

bed, and placed her hands on the doors in an effort to keep Parrott out.  The 

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No. 65549-3-I / 3

doors broke open and Rice testified that Parrott fell backwards. Rice saw Parrott

fall back into the wall, turn toward the living room, and then fall on her left side.  

       Alexandria testified that she saw Rice push her mom into the wall and it 

was after that that her mom became aggressive toward her and Andrew.  

Alexandria testified that her mother was drinking, but not drunk.        At some point 

Alexandria called the police who came and suggested that Alexandria leave the 

house.  Alexandria left at approximately 1:00 a.m. and did not return until 7:00 

a.m. Shortly after Alexandria left, the police came by the house a second time to 

check on the situation.  Rice answered the door and the police asked to speak 

with Parrott.  Rice testified that Parrott had a drink in her hand.  The police were 

there for only a few minutes and Rice went to bed.

       Andrew testified that his mother seemed a little bit drunk and saw her 

lying in the hallway.  He assumed she had just passed out and got a pillow and 

blanket for her.  Then, he went to bed.  When Alexandria returned the next 

morning, she found her mother lying in the hallway with a blanket and pillow 

under her head.  Alexandria thought that Parrott had gotten drunk and passed 

out the night before.  About 1:00 p.m., Andrew woke up and found his mother 

was blue.  He told Rice who administered CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) 

while Alexandria called 911.  Parrott died a few days later.

       Angela Severance, Parrott's half sister, testified that she had observed 

holes in the walls of the house and that she had seen Rice with a black eye.

        Parrott and Rice maintained life insurance policies naming each other as 

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No. 65549-3-I / 4

beneficiary.1  Parrott also designated Rice as the beneficiary of a savings plan 

she maintained through her federal employer.   Robin Parrott-Horjes, Parrott's 

aunt, is the contingent beneficiary on the life insurance policy and the personal 

representative of Parrott's estate.  

       No criminal charges have been filed against anyone for Parrott's death.  

Parrott-Horjes sought damages for wrongful death and to prevent Rice from 

taking money under the life insurance policy based on the federal common law 

"slayer rule."  Rice filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion requesting the trial court dismiss

Parrott-Horjes' claim for constructive trust on the life insurance proceeds for the 

benefit of Parrott's children on federal preemption grounds.  The trial court 

granted the motion and the remaining claims were tried before a jury.  The jury 

returned a verdict in Rice's favor and Parrott-Horjes appeals.

                                      ANALYSIS

Self-Defense and Prior Bad Acts

        "A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction only if he or she 
offers credible evidence tending to prove self-defense."2             "To establish self-

defense, a defendant must produce evidence showing that he or she had a good 

faith belief in the necessity of force and that that belief was objectively 

1 As a result of an agreed settlement of Rice's claim against Metropolitan Life 
Insurance, the insurance company placed the $405,200.00                   of insurance 
proceeds together with       $12,157.22 of prejudgment interest into the court 
registry.
2 State v. Dyson, 90 Wn. App. 433, 438, 952 P.2d 1097 (1997) (citing State v. 
McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 488, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983));  see                 also State v. 
Hendrickson, 81 Wn. App. 397, 401, 914 P.2d 1194 (1996).

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No. 65549-3-I / 5

reasonable."3  

       Parrott-Horjes argues that because Rice stated in an admission that she 

did not push Parrott, Rice is precluded from arguing self-defense.  Although Rice 

denied pushing, she did testify that she intentionally pushed             back  on the

bedroom doors to protect herself from Parrott's assault and that that force 

repelled Parrott backwards into the hallway wall.  Alexandria testified that she 

saw Rice push Parrott.  Rice had already been slapped by Parrott.  Parrot was 

intoxicated and the jury could conclude that Rice reasonably believed that she 

would be harmed if Parrott gained entrance to the bedroom.  Rice's claim of self-

defense was not precluded because she did not think she was the cause of 

Parrott's death.  She admitted she held the doors against Parrott's assault and 

that when the doors popped open, Parrott felt backwards into the hall.  This was 

sufficient for the court to permit a claim of self-defense.

       Parrott-Horjes also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion 

in limine to prohibit evidence of Parrott's prior acts of domestic violence under 
ER 404(b).4    Under ER 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

generally inadmissible to prove character or show action in conformity 
therewith.5  But such evidence is admissible for other purposes.  When the trial 

3 Dyson, 90 Wn. App. at 438-39.
4 ER 404(b) provides:
       Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
       character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
       may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
       opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
       mistake or accident. 
5 State v. Grant, 83 Wn. App. 98, 105, 920 P.2d 609 (1996).

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No. 65549-3-I / 6

court ruled that Rice was entitled to put forth evidence on self-defense, Rice's 

state of mind became an issue. Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to prove 

that someone reasonably feared injury, in effect establishing their state of mind 
at the time of the act.6

       Here, the evidence served a legitimate purpose, it was relevant to prove 

an element of Rice's affirmative defense, and its probative value outweighed any 

prejudicial effect.  A trial court's admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.7   Evidence about Parrott's prior acts of domestic violence was 

specifically addressed in the motions in limine.  After a hearing, the trial court 

made findings that the probative value of the evidence with regard to Rice's 

state of mind was not outweighed by the prejudicial nature of the evidence.  After 

finding that the incidents of domestic violence occurred, the court admitted 

evidence of three acts of Parrott's prior conduct,              including intoxication, 

confrontational attitude, and other incidents of domestic violence with other 

family members.  Further, when requested, the court offered a limiting instruction 
that such evidence was offered to prove Rice's state of mind.8             Evidence of 

Parrott's prior violent misconduct was relevant to the issue of whether Rice's

apprehension and fear of bodily injury was objectively reasonable, one of the 

6 State v. Magers, 164 Wn.2d 174, 181, 189 P.3d 126 (2008) (evidence of past 
domestic violence and fighting admissible to assist jury in judging recanting 
victim's credibility and state of mind).
7 Magers, 164 Wn.2d at 181.
8 State v Powell, 166 Wn.2d 73, 81, 206 P.3d 321 (2009); see also State v. 
Barragan, 102 Wn. App. 754, 759, 9 P.3d 942 (2000) (holding that a defendant's 
prior misconduct was admissible to show the victim's state of mind in 
prosecution for harassment).

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No. 65549-3-I / 7

required elements of her affirmative defense.        The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting such evidence.

       The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of self-defense.  

An appellate court will overturn a jury verdict "only when it is clearly unsupported 
by substantial evidence."9        Substantial  evidence is "sufficient evidence to 

persuade a rational, fair-minded person of the truth of the premise."10

       The presence of conflicting evidence, without more, does not undermine a 

jury's verdict.  When reviewing the evidence, an appellate court does not 

"reweigh the evidence, draw its own inferences, or substitute its judgment for the 
jury."11 Parrott-Horjes' appeal essentially requests this court to reassess the 

credibility of the testimony and other evidence.  It is the jury, not the court, that is 

charged with assessing the facts.  Here, the evidence was legally sufficient to 

support the jury's verdict.

Jury Verdict

       Parrott-Horjes  argues that the jury verdict was internally inconsistent.  

She contends that for the jury to find that Rice committed a battery, which was 

the proximate cause of Parrott's death, it had to find that Rice intentionally 

caused the death      of Parrott.     She is incorrect. The jury's verdict is not 

inconsistent.  A review of special verdicts necessarily requires the court to 
reconcile the jury's answers when possible.12

9 Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 123 Wn.2d 93, 108, 864 P.2d 937 (1994).
10 Westmark Dev. Corp. v. City of Burien, 140 Wn. App. 540, 557, 166 P.3d 813 
(2007).
11 Westmark, 140 Wn. App. at 557.
12 Alvarez v. Keyes, 76 Wn. App. 741, 743, 887 P.2d 496 (1995).

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No. 65549-3-I / 8

   Here, the jury returned the following special verdicts:

       QUESTION 1:         Did the defendant Marni Rice commit battery upon 
       Michele Parrott, deceased?

       ANSWER: (Write "yes" or "no") Yes

       (INSTRUCTION: If you answered "yes" to Question 1, answer Question 2. 
       If you answered "no" to Question 1, answer Question 5.)

       QUESTION       2:  Was battery     committed by defendant Marni Rice a 
       proximate cause of Michele Parrott's death?

       ANSWER: (Write "yes" or "no") Yes

       (INSTRUCTION: If you answered "yes" to Question 2, answer Question 3. 
       If you answered "no" to Question 2, answer Question 5.)

       QUESTION 3: Was the defendant Marni Rice acting in self-defense when 
       she committed battery?

       ANSWER: (Write "yes" or "no") Yes

       (INSTRUCTION: If you answered "yes" to Question 3, answer Question 5. 
       If you answered "no" to Question 3, answer Question 4.)

       QUESTION 5: Did the defendant Marni Rice intentionally or recklessly 
       cause the death of Michele Parrott?

       ANSWER: (Write "yes" or "no") No

       (INSTRUCTION: If you answered "yes" to Question 5, answer Question 6. 
       If you answered "no" to Question 5, sign this verdict.)

The verdict form asked the jury to separately determine whether Rice committed 

battery, a proximate cause of Parrott's death, and then to determine whether the 

act was done in self-defense.  The jury was then asked to rule on the second 

claim -- whether Rice intentionally or recklessly caused the death which would

preclude her enrichment under the common law slayer rule.               These are not 

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No. 65549-3-I / 9

inconsistent. 

       Jury instruction 2 outlined the claims set forth.  Jury instruction 14 

informed the jury that it "should decide each claim [of] the plaintiff separately as 

if it were a separate lawsuit.  The instructions apply to all claims unless a 

specific instruction states that it applies only to a specific claim."

       Battery was defined in jury instruction 9 as "the intentional infliction of 

harmful bodily contact upon another."  The jury found that Rice acted to protect 

herself when it found she acted in self-defense.  The jury's finding that Parrott 

intended to inflict bodily harm does not necessarily mean that Parrott intended 

the result of such harm, i.e., Parrott's death.  She did not intend to cause the 

death and, because the jury found she acted in self-defense, her action did not 

recklessly cause Parrott's death.

       Courts   have long held that the slayer rule prevents              a  killer from 

recovering the victim's life insurance benefits.  See Mutual Life Insurance Co. of 
New York v. Armstrong13 ("It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the 

country if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of the party 

whose life he had feloniously taken.").     The principle is also well established in 

Washington law, where a person who participates in the "willful and unlawful"

killing of a person is prohibited from receiving any benefit resulting from his 
act.14  But a death as a result of self-defense is neither felonious nor unlawful.  

See In re Estate of Kissinger, wherein our Supreme Court distinguished insanity 

13 117 U.S. 591, 6 S. Ct. 877, 29 L. Ed. 997 (1886).
14 Chapter 11.84 RCW.

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No. 65549-3-I / 10

from self-defense, noting that self-defense "is a lawful act despite the fact it may 
have lethal consequences."15 Here, too, Rice's actions were lawful.

15 166 Wn.2d 120, 130, 206 P.3d 665 (2009); see also RCW 9A.16.020 (defining 
lawful use of force).

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No. 65549-3-I / 11

Constructive Trust

       Parrott designated Rice as the beneficiary under a life insurance policy 

through her employment with the United States Postal Service, a group policy 

issued   by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company pursuant to the Federal 
Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA).16  Parrott-Horjes argues that a 

constructive trust should be established in favor of the children because of 

Rice's statements in her deposition and in a letter she wrote to the police.  

       The trial court granted Rice's motion to dismiss Alexandria and Andrew as 

parties to the action.  The motion expressly stated that "to the extent Alexandria 

Parrott or Andrew Duncan have any type of right to the interpleaded funds, such 

a right is hereby expressly disclaimed."    In its oral ruling on the motion, the court 

specifically stated that this would "resolv[e] the issue of any claims to the life 

insurance policy that would be adjudicate[d] here."         Clearly this removed any 

legal or equitable right the children would have to the life insurance proceeds.

       Further,  FEGLIA     is a federal insurance program administered under 

federal law. Anticipating potential state conflicts, Congress specifically provided 

that the provisions of any contract under FEGLIA,

       which relate to the nature or extent of coverage or benefits . . .  shall 
       supersede and preempt any law of any State . . . to the extent that 
       the law or regulation         is inconsistent with the contractual 
       provisions.[17]

       In  Estate of Hanley v. Andresen,18 this court held that even though a

16 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716.
17 5 U.S.C. § 8709(d)(1).
18 39 Wn. App. 377, 380-81, 693 P.2d 198 (1984).

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No. 65549-3-I / 12

dissolution decree purported to divest the named beneficiary of rights under 

FEGLIA, the failure to properly execute any designation change entitled the 

named beneficiary to proceeds as against competing claimants.             Since a legal 

claim  cannot divert the monies from a named beneficiary, neither can a 

constructive claim.

       Nevertheless, Parrott-Horjes argues that Rice is entitled to receive the 

benefits under the life insurance policy, but that she holds those benefits in a 

constructive trust for the children.    This argument is made even though those 

same children denied any right to those life insurance proceeds.  Parrott-Horjes 
cites a Missouri case, Kidd v. Pritzel,19 which held that state claims in equity 

were not preempted by FEGLIA.  But the federal authorities, as well as this 

court, reach the unavoidable conclusion that FEGLIA preempts state laws, 
including equitable remedies.      In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Zaldivar,20

the court held that FEGLIA precludes the awarding of a constructive trust 

because it "would require that the proceeds of the policy be distributed to 

someone other than the beneficiary," thus conflicting with FEGLIA's express 

wording.  The Zaldivar court noted:

       Numerous federal courts have held that, where state laws conflict 
       with FEGLIA's provisions, FEGLIA preempts state law. Prudential 
       Ins. Co. v. Hinke, 121 F.3d 364, 367 (8th Cir.1997) ("It has been 
       consistently held in regard to FEGLIA that a divorce decree cannot 
       operate as a waiver or restriction of an insured's right to change 
       the beneficiary when federal regulations conflict.");  Metropolitan 
       Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 96 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1996) ("To the 
       extent that New York law allows for a change of beneficiaries by 
       third parties, it conflicts with FEGLIA and is preempted."); 

19 821 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
20 337 F. Supp. 2d 343, 347 (D.Mass. 2004).

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No. 65549-3-I / 13

       Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir.
       1992) ( ". . . FEGLIA preempts the divorce decree and constructive 
       trust remedy . . . ."); Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948, 949 (10th Cir.
       1989) ("The state domestic relations court order ostensibly restricts 
       the federal insured's right to designate a beneficiary and thus 
       cannot be valid under FEGLIA."); O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 
       1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988) (". . . Congress intended to establish . . 
       . an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in accordance 
       with the statute would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of 
       other documents or the equities in a particular case.").           These 
       federal authorities, particularly the Seventh Circuit's             Christ
       decision, powerfully underline the unavoidable conclusion that 
       FEGLIA completely preempts state laws, including equitable 
       remedies, with the effect, in this case, that Beverly Zaldivar's 
       motion must be allowed.[21]

Rice is the designated beneficiary and federal law preempts a state action.

       Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

21 337 F. Supp. 2d at 346 (footnote omitted).

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