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Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

SEATTLE-TACOMA INTERNATIONAL                    )
TAXI ASSOCIATION, a Washington                  )   No. 66401-8-I
nonprofit association,                          )
                                                )   DIVISION ONE
                      Appellant,                )
                                                )   UNPUBLISHED OPINION
              v.                                )
                                                )
PORT OF SEATTLE, a municipal                    )
corporation; AIRPORT JOINT VENTURE              )
RESPONSE PARTNERSHIP, LLC,                      )
an unincorporated entity; CHECKER CAB           )
OF SEATAC CORPORATION, a                        )
Washington corporation; PUGET SOUND             )
DISPATCH, LLC, dba Yellow Taxi                  )
Association, a Washington limited liability     )
company; and RAINIER DISPATCH, LLC,             )
a Washington limited liability company,         )   FILED: June 11, 2012
                                                )
                      Respondents.              )

       Grosse, J.  --  Disbursement of the proceeds of a supersedeas bond 

obtained pending an appeal of an adverse judgment is appropriate when the 

judgment is affirmed on appeal and evidence supports the damages awarded to 

the party in whose favor the judgment originally lay.  Here, the Port of Seattle 

submitted sufficient proof of the damages it suffered as a result of the two-month 

delay in implementing an exclusive contract for the airport taxi concession.  

                                        FACTS

       Seattle-Tacoma International Taxi Association (STITA) brought suit 

against the Port of Seattle (Port) and other taxi companies for declaratory and 

injunctive relief, contending the request for proposal (RFP) under which the Port  

No. 66401-8-I / 2

awarded the contract was illegal.1      STITA sought an injunction to prevent the 

Port from entering into a five-year contract with Puget Sound Dispatch (Yellow 

Cab) to provide on-demand taxi service at the airport.  STITA had previously 

been the Port's on-demand taxi service provider, but lost the contract after a 

competitive public bidding process.

       The trial court denied the restraining order on the ground that STITA had 

waived any right to challenge the validity of the RFP when it submitted a 

proposal. STITA filed an emergency motion for a stay, which a commissioner of 

this court granted on February 22, 2010.      On March 29, 2010, the commissioner 

imposed a supersedeas bond on STITA in the amount of $144,000.00. In setting 

the amount of the bond, the commissioner reviewed the briefing submitted by the 

parties and assessed a potential loss of $4,800.00 per day as reasonable for a 

period of 30 days. The matter was set to be heard on April 27, 2010.  

       This court issued an unpublished opinion upholding the trial court's ruling 
denying STITA's preliminary injunction.2        This court lifted the stay 30 days 

following the filing of the opinion on June 7, 2010, unless STITA filed a petition 

for review in which case the stay would extend until the petition was rejected or 

further order of the Supreme Court.  On July 6, 2010, STITA  filed a cross-
petition for review, which was denied by the Supreme Court on August 5, 2010.3  

This court issued a mandate on September 24, 2010.

1 STITA filed its suit on January 29, 2010.  
2 Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Taxi Ass'n v. Port of Seattle (STITA 1), noted at 156 Wn. 
App. 1025, 2010 WL 2283621.
3 Seattle-Tacoma Int'l Taxi Ass'n v. Port of Seattle, 169 Wn.2d 1016, 236 P.3d 
895 (2010).

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No. 66401-8-I / 3

       Meanwhile, in July 2010, the Port extended STITA's contract which had 

been scheduled to expire on August 31, 2010.  Yellow Cab did not begin its 

service until November 1, 2010, two months after the parties had originally 

envisioned the start date.

       The court granted the Port's motion to disburse the bond on October 1, 

2010.   Once the bond was disbursed, the Port made a "notice of presentation" 

for judgment to be entered on October 5, 2010.  STITA opposed the proposed 

judgment and filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision to 

disburse the bond.  

       The trial court entered judgment for the Port on October 12, 2010, and 

denied STITA's motion for reconsideration on November 17, 2010.  STITA timely

appeals.

                                      ANALYSIS

       Under  RAP 8.1(d)(2), "[u]pon       the filing of a supersedeas bond         . . . 

enforcement of a trial court decision against a party furnishing the bond . . . is 

stayed."  A trial court's decision to grant an injunction and decision regarding the 
terms of the injunction are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.4         Similarly, the 

amount of bond is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.5                 It is therefore 

appropriate to apply an abuse of discretion standard to our review of the trial 
court's order disbursing those proceeds.6  

4 Kucera v. State, Dep't of Transp., 140 Wn.2d 200, 209, 995 P.2d 63 (2000).
5 Jensen v. Torr, 44 Wn. App. 207, 212, 721 P.2d 992 (1986) (trial court's denial 
of a request to raise a bond's amount is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
6 Contempt sanctions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Berty, 
136 Wn. App. 74, 83, 147 P.3d 1004 (2006) (fines and sanctions imposed for 

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No. 66401-8-I / 4

       The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to supersede judgment against a 

party.  Here, the trial court denied STITA's motion for injunctive relief.  STITA 

posted the bond pursuant to a ruling from a commissioner.  The bond had the 

effect of delaying the dismissal of STITA's claim,           while at the same time 

protecting the Port from any damages it might suffer as a result of its inability to 
sign the contract in a timely fashion.7

       STITA argues that the Port was not entitled to the proceeds of the bond

because the Port failed to show actual damages.  But this is not true.  Because 

of the litigation, the Port extended its contract with STITA an additional two 

months -- September and October 2010.  Although the Supreme Court denied 

review in August 2010, Yellow Cab needed additional time to ramp up its fleet to 

take over the taxi cab concession from STITA.  Under the Yellow Cab 

agreement, the Port was entitled to a minimum annual guarantee of 

$3,670,778.00, which was payable in equal monthly installments.  Thus, had 

Yellow Cab started its contract on time, the Port would have received a minimum

of $611,796.33 from Yellow Cab for those two months. The contract provided for 

additional monies to be paid to the Port in the event the 13% percentage fee was

greater than the minimum annual guaranty paid to the Port.  Thus, the monthly 

installment payments were the absolute minimum the Port was guaranteed.  

Based on 2009 figures, STITA's anticipated revenue would have resulted in 

contempt are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 
36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995) (absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court 
will not disturb a trial court's contempt order).
7 Lampson Universal Rigging, Inc. v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 105 
Wn.2d 376, 378-79, 715 P.2d 1131 (1986).

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No. 66401-8-I / 5

payments to the Port of only $205,737.24, thus resulting in a loss of 
$406,059.09.8  

       STITA's argument that the Port could have reduced its damages had it 

immediately signed the contract with Yellow Cab is without merit.  STITA argues

that the Port knew in August that the Supreme Court refused review and then it 

could have required Yellow Cab to start servicing the airport in September as 

originally planned under the RFP.        However, this ignores one of the primary 

reasons the Port issued the RFP so early in the process -- to enable the winning 

bidder ample time (nine months) to ramp up its fleet to the Port's requirements.  

The Port had envisioned a nine-month leeway and in fact, because of STITAs 

litigation, was only able to grant a two-month leeway to Yellow Cab.            STITA's 

position is also weakened by the September 1, 2003 exclusive concession 

agreement signed by the Port and STITA before the Supreme Court's denial of 

the petition for review, which extended STITA's contract for a fixed two-month 

period.

       The trial court's disbursement of the bond proceeds is adequately 

supported by the record.  The damages are readily apparent and exceed the 

proceeds of the bond. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.

       STITA also argues that the trial court erred in not consolidating this matter 

with Rainier Dispatch, LLC's (Rainier) action and/or in not staying this matter 

until that action against the Port was resolved.  This court reviews the denial of a 

8  The 2010 figures for STITA were not available at the time the motion was filed, 
but in fact would have shown a figure lower than the $205,737.24, and thus, the 
Port's loss of revenue would be even greater had those 2010 figures applied.

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No. 66401-8-I / 6

motion to consolidate for an abuse of discretion.9       STITA asserts that the issue

in Rainier was whether or not the Port's contract with Yellow Cab was ultra vires.  

If it is found to be ultra vires, STITA contends that there can be no damages 

because  one cannot profit from a        void contract.  This argument, however, 

ignores the fact that the issue in this matter had come to a full and complete 

resolution with the Supreme Court's denial of the petition for review and our 

mandate to the trial court.

       STITA waived its claim against the illegality of the RFP by submitting a 

proposal.  In its unpublished opinion, this court noted that the basis of the trial 
court's refusal to issue the injunction was the waiver issue.1     This court held that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction.     STITA now 

argues that the underlying issues (which were waived) are somehow resurrected 

if the court will permit it to amend its complaint or consolidate with another 

action.   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 

consolidate.

       Lastly, STITA argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint 

because of the Port's use of a "notice of presentation" to dismiss the judgment.  

The trial court entered the order pursuant to CR 54.  CR 54(e) provides:

       Preparation of Order or Judgment.            The attorney of record for the 
       prevailing party shall prepare and present a proposed form of order or 
       judgment not later than 15 days after the entry of the verdict or decision, 
       or at any other time as the court may direct. Where the prevailing party is 
       represented by an attorney of record, no order or judgment may be 
       entered for the prevailing party unless presented or approved by the 

9 Washington Citizen Action v. Office of Ins. Comm'r, 94 Wn. App. 64, 72, 971 
P.2d 527 (1999).
1 STITA 1, 2010 WL 2283621, at *8.

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No. 66401-8-I / 7

       attorney of record. If both the prevailing party and his attorney of record 
       fail to prepare and present the form of order or judgment within the 
       prescribed time, any other party may do so, without the approval of the 
       attorney of record of the prevailing party upon notice of presentation as 
       provided in subsection (f)(2).

       Subsection (f)(2) provides that opposing counsel be "given 5 days' notice 

of presentation."  This the Port did.  STITA had notice of the presentation of the 

dismissal judgment; it was afforded the opportunity to submit replies and 

objections to the judgment, which it did.  Furthermore, this judgment was entered 

pursuant to a mandate from this court directing that the matter be dismissed in 

accordance with the opinion issued in STITA 1.   

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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