Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. (Dissent)

Case Date: 05/17/2012

 
Supreme Court of the State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 85794-6
Title of Case: Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.
File Date: 05/17/2012
Oral Argument Date: 09/15/2011

SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from King County Superior Court
 09-2-10684-3
 Honorable James D Cayce

JUSTICES
--------
Barbara A. MadsenSigned Majority
Charles W. JohnsonSigned Dissent
Tom ChambersSigned Dissent
Susan OwensSigned Dissent
Mary E. FairhurstSigned Majorityand signed concurrence of Alexander, J.
James M. JohnsonSigned Majority
Debra L. StephensDissent Author
Charles K. WigginsDid Not Participate
Steven C. GonzálezDid Not Participate
Kevin M. Korsmo,
Justice Pro Tem.
Majority Author
Gerry L. Alexander,
Justice Pro Tem.
Concurrence Authorand signed majority

COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------

Counsel for Petitioner(s)
 M. Colleen Barrett  
 Barrett & Worden PS
 2101 4th Ave Ste 700
 Seattle, WA, 98121-2393

 Kevin J Kay  
 Barrett & Worden PS
 2101 4th Ave Ste 700
 Seattle, WA, 98121-2393

Counsel for Respondent(s)
 John Paul Zahner  
 Foster Pepper PLLC
 1111 3rd Ave Ste 3400
 Seattle, WA, 98101-3299
			

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.

                                         No. 85794-6

       Stephens, J. (dissenting) -- Despite acknowledging the proper interpretation of 

"ensuing loss" set forth in our opinion in the companion case of Vision One LLC v. 

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., No. 85350-9 (Wash. May 17, 2012), the 

majority concludes there is no coverage for Max and Krista Sprague's collapsed 

deck.  I disagree.  This case is in all material respects the same as Vision One, and 

the distinctions the majority would draw rest upon a faulty application of the 

ensuing loss clause.  I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

       First, it must be remembered the Spragues had an all-risks policy with Safeco

Insurance Company.  As we explained in Vision One, such policies "'provide 

coverage for all risks unless the specific risk is excluded.'"  Vision One, slip op. at 

11 (quoting Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado & Joshua D. Rogers, Introductory 

Concepts of the Risk; Public Policy Insurability, and Causation, in 7 Couch on 

Insurance 3d § 101:7, at 101-17 (2006)); see also Findlay v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 

129 Wn.2d 368, 378, 917 P.2d 116 (1996) (noting that in an all-risk policy, "any 

peril that is not specifically excluded in the policy is an insured peril").  During the  

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

relevant time frame, the Spragues' policy contained no exclusion for the collapse of 
a structure.1

       The policy listed several excluded perils under a section entitled "Building 

Losses We Do Not Cover."          Clerk's Papers (CP) at 51.  Relevant to this case, the 

policy excluded losses "caused directly or indirectly" by "deterioration," "mold,"

and "wet or dry rot."      CP at 51, 74-75.  This exclusion was subject to a clause 

providing that "any ensuing loss not excluded is covered." CP at 51.  The policy 

also excluded losses "caused directly or indirectly" by  "faulty, inadequate[,] or 

defective . . . workmanship [or] construction." CP at 51-52, 74, 76.  Just as did the 

exclusion for deterioration, mold, and rot, the faulty workmanship and construction 

exclusion provided that "any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted in this policy is 

covered." CP at 52.  

       The Court of Appeals concluded that the ensuing loss clause covers the 

damage to the Spragues' deck.  The court explained that "the losses that are faulty 

construction and rot are not covered, but the 'ensuing losses,' those that result from 

such faulty construction or rot, are covered because such an ensuing loss is not 

excluded elsewhere in the policy."  Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co., 158 Wn. App. 336, 

341, 241 P.3d 1276 (2010).  I agree.  The ensuing loss clause in the Spragues'

       1 Beginning in 2003, Safeco added an endorsement to the Spragues' homeowners 
policy excluding "collapse" as a peril.  Clerk's  Papers (CP) at 98.  Under the new 
endorsement, the policy did not cover any losses "caused directly or indirectly" by 
"collapse."  Id.   The endorsement also contained a definition of the word "collapse,"
stating that only "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a 
building" qualified as a collapse.  Id. at 99.  Some limited coverage for collapse was 
provided under the policy's section for "Additional Property Coverages."  Id. at 98-99.

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Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

policy provided that "any ensuing loss not excluded or excepted in this policy is 

covered."    CP at 52, 76.  While the policy excluded losses associated with the 

defective construction of the deck, the ensuing loss clause preserved coverage for 

any losses not otherwise excluded under the policy.  Because the policy did not 

exclude losses associated with collapse -- collapse damages being the losses that 

ensued from the rot or defective construction -- the policy covers the Spragues' loss.

       Safeco insists that, even if its policy covers collapse, coverage should apply 

only when a structure actually falls down.  The majority does not endorse this 

argument, and for good reason.  Absent a policy definition, courts have generally 

rejected the fall-down notion of collapse in favor of the more liberal standard, 

"'substantial impairment of structural integrity.'"  Mercer Place Condo. Ass'n v. 

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 104 Wn. App. 597, 602 n.1, 17 P.3d 626 (2000).  We 

implicitly adopted the more liberal definition of collapse in Panorama Village

Condominium Owners Ass'n Board of Directors v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 Wn.2d 

130, 134-35, 144-45, 26 P.3d 910 (2001).  And the federal district court for the 

Western District of Washington, applying Washington law, concluded that 

Washington would reject the fall-down definition of collapse in favor of the liberal 

standard. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Forest Lynn Homeowners Ass'n, 892 F. Supp. 1310, 

1314 (W.D. Wash. 1995),  opinion withdrawn, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Forest Lynn 

Homeowners Ass'n, 914 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Wash. 1996).  This formulation is 

consistent with the dictionary definition of collapse, which defines "collapse" to 

include not only a falling down, but also "a breakdown of vital energy, strength, or 

                                              -3- 

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

stamina."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary 443 (2002).  Moreover, 

"[r]equiring the insured to await an actual collapse would not only be economically 

wasteful, but would also conflict with the insured's contractual and common law 

duty to mitigate damages."  Beach v. Middlesex Mut. Assur. Co., 205 Conn. 246, 
253 n.2, 532 A.2d 1297 (1987) (citation omitted).2

       While the majority does not endorse Safeco's definition of collapse, it insists 

we need not decide if the deck collapsed because "[w]hether or not the deck had 

reached a state of collapse, its condition was the result of the excluded perils of 

defective workmanship and rot and did not constitute a separate loss apart from 

those perils." Majority at 5.  This analysis misses the mark.  The fact that the deck 

collapsed is key to a proper application of the ensuing loss clause.

       We explained in Vision One that the ensuing loss clause limits the scope of 

what is otherwise excluded under the policy.  Slip op. at 13.  This clause ensures 

"that if one of the specified uncovered events takes place, any ensuing loss which is 

otherwise covered by the policy will remain covered.  The uncovered event itself, 

however, is never covered."  McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 

724, 734, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).  In a sense, the ensuing loss clause creates an 

       2 Safeco asserts that its pre-2003 policies did in fact define collapse as requiring 
the structure to fall down because the personal property section clarifies that "[collapse] 
does not include settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion."          CP at 54, 79.  
Safeco reads this provision to exclude any form of collapse short of the actual falling 
down of the structure.  A majority of courts have rejected this argument, even where the 
policy defines collapse to not include settling and cracking.  Am. Concept Ins. Co. v. 
Jones, 935 F. Supp. 1220, 1227, (D. Utah 1996) (collecting cases).  As the court 
explained, a policy of this type may exclude "mere settling or cracking," but it does not 
exclude "settling or cracking that results in substantial impairment of a home's structural 
integrity."  Id.

                                              -4- 

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

exclusion within an exclusion.  Id.; see also Capelouto v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 98 

Wn. App. 7, 16, 990 P.2d 414 (1999).

       The majority wrongly requires that there be a "separate" cause of an ensuing 

loss, distinct from the excluded peril.  Majority at 7-8.  But, such a requirement 

would render the ensuing loss clause inoperative because the clause is implicated 

only when a covered loss results or ensues                from an excluded peril.  This 

presupposes causation.  What the majority appears to be searching for is a physical 

line of demarcation.  Thus, it seizes on the fact that, in Vision One, the shoring 

installation was physically separate from the floor slab and related concrete work 

damaged in the collapse.  Majority at 7.

       I acknowledge that the nature of the ensuing loss is easier to see in Vision 

One, but the same principles are at play here.  The engineers who examined the 

Spragues' deck concluded that the "decayed wood framing in the deck piers" was 

caused by a combination of (1) "[i]nadequate flashing between the deck beams and 

the deck piers," (2) "[p]ossible inadequate flashing between the deck guardrails and 

the deck piers," and (3) "[i]nadequate ventilation of the deck piers."             CP at 109.  

They determined that the deck had been in a state of imminent collapse since before 

2003.  CP at 106.  The engineering report described the likely process that 

undermined the structural integrity of the piers: 

       Water drained through the gaps between the spaced decking boards and 
       onto the deck beams below.  The water then seeped through the cracks 
       along the sides of the deck beams and under the small metal flashings over 
       the deck beams into the pier assembly.  Once inside the pier assembly, the 
       water came in contact with the wood framing. The absence of ventilation in 
       the deck piers prevented the framing from drying.  The moist conditions 

                                              -5- 

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

       were conducive to the growth of fungi in the wood that causes decay and, 
       over time, resulted in the gradual deterioration of the wood framing.

CP at 227.

       While the majority reduces the circumstances here to the "natural process of 

decay," majority at 8, in fact it is possible to identify the progression of events from 

faulty workmanship and wood rot to the imminent collapse.  Just as in Vision One, 

the covered loss ensued from excluded perils.  To the extent the ensuing loss is 

harder to visualize in this case, perhaps that is because it developed inside the deck 

fin walls rather than out in the open, as in Vision One.

       Finally, the majority insists that the ensuing loss clause applies only to 

personal injury or property damage that results from a collapse, noting that here, 

"[t]he only loss was to the deck system itself."  Majority at 8.  We rejected a 

similar, separate property argument in Vision One.  Slip op. at 17.  While the 

majority agrees with our observation there that an event can often be characterized 

as either a loss or a peril, it fails to see how the collapse at issue here is a loss.  

Majority at 6.  Why?  The ensuing loss of collapse is strikingly similar to the 

textbook example of ensuing loss, i.e., the fire that results from faulty wiring.  In 

either case, the only property loss may be to the very structure affected by the 

excluded peril of poor workmanship.  For example, a fire caused by faulty wiring 

may burn only the wall in which the wiring is contained.  On the other hand, the fire 

may cause additional damage to the contents of the structure, to a neighboring 

structure, or to a person.  Either way, the covered ensuing loss is the fire.  It is the 

same with collapse.  The ensuing loss is properly understood as the collapse, 

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Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

regardless of whether only the deck is damaged or whether it falls on someone or 

something.  Significantly, the coverage expert in Vision One acknowledged at trial 

that there is no meaningful difference between a fire loss and a collapse loss under 

an ensuing loss clause.  Slip op. at 17.  And, Safeco's adjuster noted that "if 

collapse occurred as an ensuing loss to the faulty construction exclusion, coverage 
would have been triggered." CP at 168.3

       In sum, the Spragues'          all-risk policy contemplated losses caused by 

collapse -- including substantial impairment of structural integrity.  The ensuing loss 

clause provides coverage because the deck collapse ensued from the defective 

construction of the deck, and the policy did not exclude coverage for collapse.  I 

would affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that there is coverage.  Because the 

Spragues have demonstrated coverage under the policy, I would also hold they are 

entitled to fees under Olympic Steamship v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wn.2d 

37, 51-54, 811 P.2d 673 (1991).

       3 The amount of coverage presents a different question.  The majority seems 
bothered that recognizing coverage for collapse would seem to provide coverage for the 
very peril Safeco's policy excludes, namely wood rot and defective construction.  But, 
there is a difference between recognizing coverage and calculating the loss.  The extent to 
which damages from excluded perils may be subtracted from ensuing loss coverage is not 
before us.

                                              -7- 

Sprague, et ux. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 85794-6 (Stephens, J. Dissent)

AUTHOR:
       Justice Debra L. Stephens

WE CONCUR:

       Justice Charles W. Johnson

       Justice Tom Chambers

       Justice Susan Owens

                                              -8-