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Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                 )         No. 66416-6-I
                      Respondent,
                                                 )         DIVISION ONE
              v.                                 )
                                                 )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN RUST,                          )
                                                 )
                      Appellant,                 )
                                                 )
GERALD JAMES ADAMS, SHAELY                       )
DAWN ZIEGELGRUBER, and KEITH                     )
THOMAS BLAIR, and each of them,
                                                 )
                      Defendants.                )         FILED: June 11, 2012
                                                 )
                                                 )
                                                 )
                                                 )

       Appelwick, J.  --  After receiving a valid grant of immunity, Rust refused to 

comply with the trial court's order to answer questions during the trial of a 

codefendant.  The trial court found Rust in contempt and imposed a sanction of 10 

days in jail.  Because Rust's refusal to answer constituted a direct contempt, the trial 

court properly imposed a summary punitive sanction under RCW 7.21.050.  We 

reject Rust's claim that he has a state constitutional right to a jury trial under these 

circumstances and affirm the finding and order of contempt. 

No. 66416-6-I/2

                                          FACTS

       Christopher Rust pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary and 

one count of second degree identity theft.  The court imposed a standard range 

sentence totaling 75 months.  On December 1, 2010, after Rust's sentencing, the 

State called him as a witness in the trial of his codefendant, Keith Blair.

       Following a lengthy discussion, the State offered Rust use and derivative use 

immunity from prosecution in both King County and Snohomish County.  Despite 

repeated orders from the court, Rust refused to answer any questions about his 

participation in the prior King County burglary.  After the court warned Rust of the 

potential sanctions for contempt, Rust reaffirmed his intention to refuse to answer 

any further questions.

       The court found Rust in contempt "for willful violation of a court order in the 

presence of the Court."     Rust declined an opportunity to speak in mitigation.  The 

court then imposed a sanction of 10 days in jail, to be served at the conclusion of 

Rust's current sentence.

       In its written order of contempt, filed the same day, the court found that Rust 

had committed contempt "within the courtroom and in the presence of the 

undersigned judge" and that sanctions were "necessary to preserve order in the 

court and to protect the authority and dignity of the court."  See RCW 7.21.050(1).  

The court further determined  that a remedial sanction would be "meaningless 

[because] the trial must proceed and contemnor is already in prison, serving a 

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No. 66416-6-I/3

lengthy sentence."

       Based on Rust's failure to testify, the State moved to dismiss the residential 

burglary and first degree trafficking in stolen property charges against Blair.  Blair's 

trial then proceeded on a charge of one count of second degree trafficking in stolen 

property.

                                       DISCUSSION

       Rust contends that the trial court violated his right to due process and a jury 

trial when it imposed a punitive contempt sanction without affording him a jury trial.  

But under well established federal and state law, the trial court's imposition of a 

summary punitive sanction for a direct contempt committed in the court's presence 

does not entitle Rust to a jury trial.

       The trial court's finding of contempt and imposition of a sanction was based 

on RCW 7.21.050:

       RCW 7.21.050 provides for summary imposition of sanctions for a 
       "direct contempt", one committed in the courtroom.         Both punitive and 
       remedial sanctions are authorized for direct contempt.        RCW 7.21.050.  
       Summary sanctions may only be imposed "if the judge certifies that he 
       or she saw or heard the contempt"           and  "only for the purpose of 
       preserving order in the court and protecting the authority and dignity of 
       the court."

State v. Hobble,  126  Wn.2d  283, 293, 892 P.2d 85             (1995)   (footnote omitted) 

(quoting RCW 7.21.050(1)).  In accordance with RCW 7.21.050(1), the trial court 

also provided Rust with the opportunity to speak in mitigation.  A punitive sanction 

may include "imprisonment for not more than thirty days." RCW 7.21.050(2).1

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No. 66416-6-I/4

       Rust acknowledges that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies only 

to offenses for which the punishment exceeds six months and that the same 

limitation applies to contempt sanctions.  See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210, 88 

S. Ct. 1477, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968) ("By deciding to treat criminal contempt like 

other crimes insofar as the right to jury trial is concerned, we similarly place it under 

the rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury.").    He maintains, however, that 

because article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution2 provides for a more 

expansive jury trial right than does the federal constitution, a court may not impose 

punitive  contempt sanctions without affording the contemnor a jury trial.  See 

generally Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d 87, 99-100, 653 P.2d 618 (1982).  But, our 

Supreme Court has expressly rejected this claim in the context of the summary 

imposition of punitive sanctions for a direct contempt under RCW 7.21.050.

       In Hobble, a case that Rust does not address, the defendant pleaded guilty to 

attempted second degree burglary.  126 Wn.2d at 285.  Under the terms of the plea 

agreement, the defendant was required to testify at his codefendant's trial.  Id.  

When the defendant repeatedly refused to answer certain questions, despite the 

    1 Despite the trial court's references to "inherent contempt," the court's oral 
ruling and the written order of contempt clearly establish that the court's decision 
was based on RCW 7.21.050.  See State v. Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d 
1152 (1985) (court may use inherent contempt power only if reliance on statutory 
basis would be inadequate).
    2 Const. art. 1, § 21 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but 
the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of 
record."  Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) provides "[i]n criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right ... to ... trial by an impartial jury."

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No. 66416-6-I/5

court's order, the court found him in contempt and sanctioned him to 30 days in jail, 

to be served consecutively to his current sentence.  Id. at 289.

       On appeal, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court's contempt order, 

concluding that it satisfied the requirements for the summary imposition of punitive 

sanctions under RCW 7.21.050.  Id. at 303.  The court noted that this section 

provided an exception to the general statutory requirements governing remedial and 

punitive sanctions "for a 'direct contempt', one committed in the courtroom."  Id. at 

293.

       The Hobble court also flatly rejected the defendant's claim, echoed by Rust, 

that the Washington Constitution requires a jury trial whenever the court imposes a 

punitive sanction.  Id. at 301.  The court concluded that under common law existing 

at the time the state constitution was adopted, "no absolute right to trial by jury was 

afforded in the case of direct contempt."  Id.; see Pasco, 98 Wn.2d at 96 (Const. art. 

1, § 21 "preserves the right as it existed at common law in the territory at the time of 

its adoption.").  The court also distinguished the same cases that Rust relies on, 

noting that they involved indirect contempt, not direct contempt, and did not address 

the summary contempt procedures under RCW 7.21.050.  Hobble, 126 Wn.2d at 

298-303 (distinguishing Pasco, 98 Wn.2d at 99; State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d 

215, 691 P.2d 571 (1984); State v. Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985); 

Bloom, 391 U.S. at 198 n.2)).

       Rust had no state constitutional right to a jury trial.  The trial court did not err 

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No. 66416-6-I/6

in summarily imposing punitive sanctions under RCW 7.21.050.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

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