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Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
66416-6 |
Title of Case: |
State Of Washington, Respondent V. Christopher Shawn Rust, Appellant |
File Date: |
06/11/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from King County Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-03454-1 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 12/01/2010 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Ronald Kessler |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Marlin Appelwick |
Concurring: | Michael S. Spearman |
| Anne Ellington |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| Attorney at Law |
| 1511 Third Avenue |
| Suite 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101 |
|
| Gregory Charles Link |
| Washington Appellate Project |
| 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701 |
| Seattle, WA, 98101-3635 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Prosecuting Atty King County |
| King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor |
| W554 King County Courthouse |
| 516 Third Avenue |
| Seattle, WA, 98104 |
|
| Kristin Ann Relyea |
| King County Prosecutor's Office |
| W554 King County Courthouse |
| 516 3rd Ave |
| Seattle, WA, 98104-2385 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
) No. 66416-6-I
Respondent,
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTOPHER SHAWN RUST, )
)
Appellant, )
)
GERALD JAMES ADAMS, SHAELY )
DAWN ZIEGELGRUBER, and KEITH )
THOMAS BLAIR, and each of them,
)
Defendants. ) FILED: June 11, 2012
)
)
)
)
Appelwick, J. -- After receiving a valid grant of immunity, Rust refused to
comply with the trial court's order to answer questions during the trial of a
codefendant. The trial court found Rust in contempt and imposed a sanction of 10
days in jail. Because Rust's refusal to answer constituted a direct contempt, the trial
court properly imposed a summary punitive sanction under RCW 7.21.050. We
reject Rust's claim that he has a state constitutional right to a jury trial under these
circumstances and affirm the finding and order of contempt.
No. 66416-6-I/2
FACTS
Christopher Rust pleaded guilty to three counts of residential burglary and
one count of second degree identity theft. The court imposed a standard range
sentence totaling 75 months. On December 1, 2010, after Rust's sentencing, the
State called him as a witness in the trial of his codefendant, Keith Blair.
Following a lengthy discussion, the State offered Rust use and derivative use
immunity from prosecution in both King County and Snohomish County. Despite
repeated orders from the court, Rust refused to answer any questions about his
participation in the prior King County burglary. After the court warned Rust of the
potential sanctions for contempt, Rust reaffirmed his intention to refuse to answer
any further questions.
The court found Rust in contempt "for willful violation of a court order in the
presence of the Court." Rust declined an opportunity to speak in mitigation. The
court then imposed a sanction of 10 days in jail, to be served at the conclusion of
Rust's current sentence.
In its written order of contempt, filed the same day, the court found that Rust
had committed contempt "within the courtroom and in the presence of the
undersigned judge" and that sanctions were "necessary to preserve order in the
court and to protect the authority and dignity of the court." See RCW 7.21.050(1).
The court further determined that a remedial sanction would be "meaningless
[because] the trial must proceed and contemnor is already in prison, serving a
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No. 66416-6-I/3
lengthy sentence."
Based on Rust's failure to testify, the State moved to dismiss the residential
burglary and first degree trafficking in stolen property charges against Blair. Blair's
trial then proceeded on a charge of one count of second degree trafficking in stolen
property.
DISCUSSION
Rust contends that the trial court violated his right to due process and a jury
trial when it imposed a punitive contempt sanction without affording him a jury trial.
But under well established federal and state law, the trial court's imposition of a
summary punitive sanction for a direct contempt committed in the court's presence
does not entitle Rust to a jury trial.
The trial court's finding of contempt and imposition of a sanction was based
on RCW 7.21.050:
RCW 7.21.050 provides for summary imposition of sanctions for a
"direct contempt", one committed in the courtroom. Both punitive and
remedial sanctions are authorized for direct contempt. RCW 7.21.050.
Summary sanctions may only be imposed "if the judge certifies that he
or she saw or heard the contempt" and "only for the purpose of
preserving order in the court and protecting the authority and dignity of
the court."
State v. Hobble, 126 Wn.2d 283, 293, 892 P.2d 85 (1995) (footnote omitted)
(quoting RCW 7.21.050(1)). In accordance with RCW 7.21.050(1), the trial court
also provided Rust with the opportunity to speak in mitigation. A punitive sanction
may include "imprisonment for not more than thirty days." RCW 7.21.050(2).1
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No. 66416-6-I/4
Rust acknowledges that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies only
to offenses for which the punishment exceeds six months and that the same
limitation applies to contempt sanctions. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210, 88
S. Ct. 1477, 20 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1968) ("By deciding to treat criminal contempt like
other crimes insofar as the right to jury trial is concerned, we similarly place it under
the rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury."). He maintains, however, that
because article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution2 provides for a more
expansive jury trial right than does the federal constitution, a court may not impose
punitive contempt sanctions without affording the contemnor a jury trial. See
generally Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wn.2d 87, 99-100, 653 P.2d 618 (1982). But, our
Supreme Court has expressly rejected this claim in the context of the summary
imposition of punitive sanctions for a direct contempt under RCW 7.21.050.
In Hobble, a case that Rust does not address, the defendant pleaded guilty to
attempted second degree burglary. 126 Wn.2d at 285. Under the terms of the plea
agreement, the defendant was required to testify at his codefendant's trial. Id.
When the defendant repeatedly refused to answer certain questions, despite the
1 Despite the trial court's references to "inherent contempt," the court's oral
ruling and the written order of contempt clearly establish that the court's decision
was based on RCW 7.21.050. See State v. Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 48, 700 P.2d
1152 (1985) (court may use inherent contempt power only if reliance on statutory
basis would be inadequate).
2 Const. art. 1, § 21 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but
the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of
record." Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10) provides "[i]n criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right ... to ... trial by an impartial jury."
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No. 66416-6-I/5
court's order, the court found him in contempt and sanctioned him to 30 days in jail,
to be served consecutively to his current sentence. Id. at 289.
On appeal, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court's contempt order,
concluding that it satisfied the requirements for the summary imposition of punitive
sanctions under RCW 7.21.050. Id. at 303. The court noted that this section
provided an exception to the general statutory requirements governing remedial and
punitive sanctions "for a 'direct contempt', one committed in the courtroom." Id. at
293.
The Hobble court also flatly rejected the defendant's claim, echoed by Rust,
that the Washington Constitution requires a jury trial whenever the court imposes a
punitive sanction. Id. at 301. The court concluded that under common law existing
at the time the state constitution was adopted, "no absolute right to trial by jury was
afforded in the case of direct contempt." Id.; see Pasco, 98 Wn.2d at 96 (Const. art.
1, § 21 "preserves the right as it existed at common law in the territory at the time of
its adoption."). The court also distinguished the same cases that Rust relies on,
noting that they involved indirect contempt, not direct contempt, and did not address
the summary contempt procedures under RCW 7.21.050. Hobble, 126 Wn.2d at
298-303 (distinguishing Pasco, 98 Wn.2d at 99; State v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d
215, 691 P.2d 571 (1984); State v. Boatman, 104 Wn.2d 44, 700 P.2d 1152 (1985);
Bloom, 391 U.S. at 198 n.2)).
Rust had no state constitutional right to a jury trial. The trial court did not err
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No. 66416-6-I/6
in summarily imposing punitive sanctions under RCW 7.21.050.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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