DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
41826-6 |
Title of Case: |
State Of Washington, Respondent V. Clayton Doran Chapin, Appellant |
File Date: |
04/10/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Thurston Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-01449-1 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 02/17/2011 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Carol a Murphy |
JUDGES
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Authored by | David H. Armstrong |
Concurring: | Jill M Johanson |
| Christine Quinn-Brintnall |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Thomas Edward Doyle |
| Attorney at Law |
| Po Box 510 |
| Hansville, WA, 98340-0510 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Carol L. La Verne |
| Thurston County Prosecutor's Office |
| 2000 Lakeridge Dr Sw Bldg 2 |
| Olympia, WA, 98502-6045 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 41826-6-II
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
CLAYTON CHAPIN,
Appellant.
Armstrong, P.J. -- Clayton Chapin appeals his conviction for unlawful use of a building
for drug purposes, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him. The
State concedes he is correct. We reverse and remand to the trial court to dismiss that conviction.
Chapin also appeals from the imposition of a $450 jury demand fee, arguing that the amount
exceeded that permitted by statute. We agree and remand for correction of the amount of jury
demand fee.1
Within an hour after police used a confidential informant to make a controlled buy of
heroin from Chapin, they executed a search warrant at a one-bedroom apartment. In the
bedroom, they found methamphetamine, heroin, materials associated with delivery of heroin, and
records indicating that Chapin resided in the apartment.
The State charged Chapin with unlawful delivery of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school
bus route stop (count I), unlawful possession of heroin with intent to deliver (count II), unlawful
possession of methamphetamine (count III), and unlawful use of a building for drug purposes
1 A commissioner of this court initially considered Chapin's appeal as a motion on the merits
under RAP 18.14 and then transferred it to a panel of judges.
No. 41826-6-II
(count IV). A jury found him guilty as charged. As part of his judgment and sentence, the trial
court ordered Chapin to pay a jury demand fee of $450.
Chapin does not appeal from his convictions on counts I, II or III. He argues that
substantial evidence does not support his conviction on count IV, for unlawful use of a building
for drug purposes. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
To convict a defendant of unlawful use of a building for drug purposes, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee" of a
building, room, space, or enclosure, the defendant knowingly rented, leased, or made available for
use the building, room, space, or enclosure for drug purposes. RCW 69.53.010(1). Chapin
argues that because the State did not present evidence that he was an "owner, lessee, agent,
employee, or mortgagee" of the apartment, it did not present sufficient evidence to find him guilty
under RCW 69.53.010(1). The State concedes that while it did present evidence that Chapin
resided in the apartment, it did not present any evidence that he was an "owner, lessee, agent,
employee, or mortgagee" of the apartment. We accept the State's concession and reverse and
remand to the trial court to dismiss Chapin's conviction for unlawful use of a building for drug
purposes.
Chapin also argues that the trial court erred in imposing a $450 jury demand fee because
RCW 36.18.016(3)(b) limits that fee to $250 for a 12-person jury. The State responds that
Chapin should not be allowed to raise this issue for the first time on appeal, RAP 2.5(a), but
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No. 41826-6-II
agrees that the jury demand fee should have been $250. We elect to allow Chapin to raise this
issue for the first time on appeal, in the interests of justice. RAP 1.2(c); State v. Hathaway, 161
Wn. App. 634, 651-52, 251 P.3d 253, review denied, 172 Wn.2d 1021 (2011). We agree that the
$450 jury demand fee exceeds the limit imposed by RCW 36.18.016(3)(b) and remand for
correction of that fee. Hathaway, 161 Wn. App. at 652-53.2
We reverse and remand to the trial court to dismiss Chapin's conviction for unlawful use
of a building for drug purposes. We remand Chapin's judgment and sentence for correction of the
jury demand fee.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it
is so ordered.
Armstrong, P.J.
We concur:
Quinn-Brintnall, J.
Johanson, J.
2 Because we remand for correction of the jury demand fee, we need not address Chapin's
argument that his trial counsel's failure to object to the amount of that fee was ineffective
assistance of counsel.
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