State Of Washington, Respondent V. Dylan H. Palmer, Appellant

Case Date: 05/07/2012

 
DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).


Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 66647-9
Title of Case: State Of Washington, Respondent V. Dylan H. Palmer, Appellant
File Date: 05/07/2012

SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Lewis County Superior Court
Docket No: 09-1-00399-2
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 12/09/2009
Judge signing: Honorable Nelson E Hunt

JUDGES
------
Authored byMichael S. Spearman
Concurring:Linda Lau
Stephen J. Dwyer

COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------

Counsel for Appellant(s)
 Eric J. Nielsen  
 Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC
 1908 E Madison St
 Seattle, WA, 98122-2842

Counsel for Respondent(s)
 Sara I Beigh  
 Lewis County Prosecutors Office
 345 W Main St Fl 2
 Chehalis, WA, 98532-4802
			

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        )
                                            )       No. 66647-9-I
                      Respondent,           )
                                            )       DIVISION ONE
       v.                                   )
                                            ) 
DYLAN HARRIS PALMER,                        )       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                            ) 
                      Appellant.            )       FILED: May 7, 2012

       Spearman, A.C.J.  --  Dylan Palmer appeals his two convictions for 

possession of a controlled substance, arguing that evidence found in the search 
of his car was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.1 The search was 

justified by the trial court as a search incident to arrest for evidence pertaining to 

the crime of arrest. We stayed Palmer's appeal pending our supreme court's 

1 The facts of this case are as follows: On July 6, 2009, state trooper Jason Hicks stopped 
Palmer for speeding and discovered through a routine check that Palmer's driving status was 
suspended in the third degree, there was an outstanding non-extraditable warrant for his arrest 
on that offense, and he had seven priors for the same offense. Hicks placed Palmer under 
arrest, handcuffed him, put him in the back of the patrol car, and read him his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Palmer said he 
understood his rights. Because Palmer appeared nervous, Hicks asked whether there was 
anything in the car that Hicks needed to be concerned with. Palmer stated that he had spoons in 
his backpack that he used to ingest heroin. Hicks believed he would find heroin residue on the 
spoons and advised Palmer that he was also under arrest for possession of heroin. In Palmer's 
car Hicks found spoons with residue, a knife with residue, several needles loaded with brown 
liquid, and scales with residue. Some items field-tested positive for heroin and 
methamphetamine. The State charged Palmer with two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance and one count of driving while license suspended in the third degree. The trial court 
denied his motion to suppress the evidence found in the search of his car. After a bench trial on 
stipulated facts, Palmer was found guilty on all counts. He was sentenced, within the applicable 
standard range.  

No. 66647-9-I/2

decision in State v. Snapp, Nos. 84223-0, 84568-7, 2012 WL 1134130 (April 5, 

2012). Snapp has now been decided. The court stated, in pertinent part:
       We hold that the Thornton[2] exception does not apply under article 
       I, section 7 [of the Washington State Constitution]. We also reject 
       the proposed modified version of this exception that is based upon 
       probable cause to believe evidence of the crime of arrest might be 
       found in the vehicle.

Snapp, 2012 WL 1134130 at *9.

       The State concedes in supplemental briefing that under Snapp, the 

search of Palmer's vehicle was unlawful and the evidence must be suppressed. 

The concession is well taken. Where the evidence formed the basis for the two 

convictions for possession of a controlled substance, we reverse those 

convictions and remand for further proceedings.

       Reversed and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

2 The Thornton exception was identified in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343, 129 S.Ct. 1710 
(2009) (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d (2004)
as permitting a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
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