State Of Washington, Respondent V. Kathryn Loran, Appellant

Case Date: 05/10/2012

 
DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).


Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 41705-7
Title of Case: State Of Washington, Respondent V. Kathryn Loran, Appellant
File Date: 05/10/2012

SOURCE OF APPEAL
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Appeal from Clallam Superior Court
Docket No: 10-1-00214-5
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 01/19/2011
Judge signing: Honorable Kenneth Day Williams

JUDGES
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Authored byJill M Johanson
Concurring:J. Robin Hunt
Joel Penoyar

COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s)
 Jordan Broome Mccabe  
 McCabe Law Office
 Po Box 46668
 Seattle, WA, 98146-0668

Counsel for Respondent(s)
 Brian Patrick Wendt  
 Clallam County Prosecuting Attorney's Of
 223 E 4th St Ste 11
 Port Angeles, WA, 98362-3015
			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No.  41705-7-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

KATHRYN A. LORAN,                                          UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Johanson, J.  --  Kathryn  A.  Loran appeals her unlawful  possession of a controlled 

substance conviction, arguing that (1) the probationer warrant exception is inapplicable to her 

deferred disposition status and (2) the State lacked probable cause to search her home.      We 

reverse Loran's conviction because the deferred disposition order failed to comply with RCW 

13.40.127 by omitting to place her on community supervision and thus the probationer warrant 

exception did not apply to her.

                                            FACTS

       In December 2009, the Clallam County juvenile court granted a deferred disposition to 

Kathryn Loran.    Notably, the deferred disposition order failed to place her on "community 

supervision" or under any other form of supervision by a probation officer.  The disposition order 

did, however, provide several standard conditions including that she refrain from committing new 

offenses, regularly and timely report to her probation counselor, inform her probation counselor 

of her telephone number and current address, notify her probation counselor before moving to a  

No. 41705-7-II

different address, participate in a drug and alcohol dependency evaluation, comply with drug and 

alcohol treatment, refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol, and be subject to random urinalysis 

and other drug testing.  Joleen Goodrich, a juvenile probation counselor, was assigned to monitor 

Loran's deferred disposition.  In May 2010, based on alleged violations of the disposition order's 

conditions, the juvenile court issued a warrant for Loran's arrest.  

       Goodrich asked the police to accompany her to serve Loran's arrest warrant.  After doing 

a protective sweep of the residence, Officer Andrew Heuett arrested Loran, read her her Miranda

rights,1 handcuffed  her, and walked her to his patrol car, where he put her in the back seat. 

Goodrich told Loran that she had been worried about her and asked Loran if she could give a 

clean urinalysis sample.  Loran replied, "No.  I just did heroin within the last couple of days."  

Transcript of Proceedings (TP) at 33.  Goodrich decided that she should try to find the drugs 

Loran had just admitted to taking because "it was part of [her] job."  TP at 44.  Goodrich went

into Loran's room, noticed the dresser with "girl . . . things" on top, and opened the first drawer,

finding a little box.  TP at 43.  Goodrich opened the box and saw pills inside.  RP at 44. Officer 

Benedict radioed news of Goodrich's discovery to Officer Heuett, who asked Loran about the 

pills.  Loran stated they were Vicodin and Percocet.

       The State charged Loran with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance 

(oxycodone and methadone), contrary to RCW 69.50.4013(1).  Loran moved to suppress the 

pills, arguing that Goodrich's warrantless search was unlawful because the probation/parolee 

warrant exception did not apply to her  deferred disposition without conviction.  Loran also 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

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No. 41705-7-II

argued that Goodrich lacked reasonable suspicion.  After asking for supplemental briefing, the 

trial court denied Loran's suppression motion.  The trial court concluded that the warrantless 

search exception for probationers applies to a deferred disposition in juvenile court.  

       The State dismissed one of Loran's controlled substance possession counts (oxycodone).

Based on stipulated facts, the trial court convicted Loran of one count of unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance (methadone). Loran appeals.

                                          ANALYSIS

       The Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 -- deferred disposition statute -- provides:

              The adjudicatory hearing shall be limited to a reading of the court's record.
              (4) Following the stipulation, acknowledgment, waiver, and entry of a 
       finding or plea of guilt, the court shall defer entry of an order of disposition of the 
       juvenile.
              (5) Any juvenile granted a deferral of disposition under this section shall 
       be placed under community supervision.  The court may impose any conditions of 
       supervision that it deems appropriate including posting a probation bond.

RCW 13.40.127 (emphasis added).

       Loran appeals her unlawful possession of a controlled substance conviction, arguing that 

(1) the probationer warrant exception is inapplicable to her deferred disposition status and (2) the 

State lacked probable cause to search her home.  The State's claim is that the warrantless search 

was valid because Loran's deferred disposition status confers a diminished privacy expectation 

while on community supervision.  We find it fatal to the State's claim, however, that the order

here  failed to place  Loran on  "community supervision" or  any  other form of supervision as 

required by RCW 13.40.127(5)   Thus, we do not reach the question of whether Loran had a

diminished privacy right in her home as a result of the deferred disposition. 

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No. 41705-7-II

       Reversed.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it 

is so ordered.

                                                                   Johanson, J.
We concur:

                   Hunt, J.

                  Penoyar, C.J.

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