DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
41596-8 |
Title of Case: |
State Of Washington, Respondent V. Kenneth Alan Graham, Appellant |
File Date: |
05/15/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-01803-6 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 12/17/2010 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Edmund Murphy |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | Lisa Worswick |
Concurring: | J. Robin Hunt |
| Christine Quinn-Brintnall |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Valerie Marushige |
| Attorney at Law |
| 23619 55th Pl S |
| Kent, WA, 98032-3307 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Thomas Charles Roberts |
| Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney |
| 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 41596-8-II
Respondent,
v.
KENNETH ALAN GRAHAM, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
Worswick, A.C.J. -- Kenneth Graham appeals his convictions of fourth degree assault,
felony harassment, intimidating a witness, tampering with a witness, and violating a no contact
order. He claims that trial counsel's failure to offer limiting instructions for impeachment
testimony, his prior bad acts, and a defense witness's prior bad acts, coupled with trial counsel's
failure to object when the State improperly used impeachment testimony as substantive evidence,
denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Facts
On February 13, 2010, Jason Sullenger was in his yard talking with his brother, Tyson
Bower, when he heard his brother-in-law, Kenneth Graham, talking with Graham's friend, Joseph
McGurran, at Graham's next door home.1 According to Jason, Graham was angry, upset, and
1Because Jason and Edrea Sullenger share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
No. 41596-8-II
"ranting that his wife was cheating on him." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 51. Jason went over
to Graham's porch to see if he could do anything to calm Graham down. Graham told Jason to
leave. Jason followed Graham into Graham's house because Graham said he was going to hurt
himself. Graham walked to the sink, started swallowing pills, and said he was going to lie down
and never wake up.
Graham then told Jason to get out of his house. Both men went out the door and Graham
headed toward a shop that was adjacent to both of their homes. Jason told Graham not to go in
the shop. At that point, Graham grabbed Jason by the throat and walked Jason toward Jason's
house. Jason started getting dizzy from not being able to breathe and Bower came over and
jumped on Graham's back. Graham let go of Jason.
After Jason and Bower retreated to Jason's house, Jason explained that Graham came in
and said that "he would kick my butt if I called the cops." RP at 60-61. Jason and Bower then
drove to the Thunderbird Bar. While enroute, Jason called his wife, Edrea, and told her about the
events. Edrea called 911 and 911 in turn called Jason.
Pierce County Sheriff's Deputy James Cowan went to the Thunderbird Bar and obtained
statements from Jason and Bower. Deputy Cowan also took photographs of the red markings on
Jason's neck. According to Deputy Cowan, Jason stated that when he tried to stop Graham from
going into the shop, Graham "put both hands around his neck and was strangling him" and said,
"[H]e was going to kill him." RP at 169, 175. He also reported that Graham told Jason and his
brother, "I'm going to kill both of [you and your] kids." RP at 170. Later, Cowan went to the
hospital but was unable to speak with Graham because Graham was intubated and unconscious.
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No. 41596-8-II
On April 27, 2010, the State charged Graham with one count of second degree assault and
two counts of felony harassment. On May 11, Jason obtained a no contact order against Graham.
On June 14, Graham came over to Jason's house, walked in uninvited, and started talking about
going to court. Graham called Jason a snitch and told him, "You better watch your fucking
mouth." RP at 70-71. Graham apparently wanted Jason to testify that he, Jason, had been
drinking before he gave his statement to the police, and, if he did, the prosecutor would drop the
charges. Jason also stated, though he did not remember it when he testified at trial, that Graham
pointed at Edrea's stomach and said that Jason should think about his family; Edrea was pregnant
at the time. Four or five days later, Jason was on his front porch and Graham came into his yard,
approached Jason, wagged his finger in Jason's face, and said, " You better watch your F -- ing
mouth, watch what you say." RP at 82. Graham suggested that he had people that could harm
Jason if Jason was not careful.
On September 30, 2010, the State filed an amended information, additionally charging
Graham with two counts of violating a no contact order, one count of intimidating a witness, and
one count of tampering with a witness. The State also charged a domestic violence aggravating
factor on each count.
At trial, over a defense objection, the State played a recording of the 911 calls between
Edrea and the operator and Jason and the operator. In that recording, the operator asked Jason
who assaulted him. Jason replied, "F -- man, I don't even want to tell on him. He's going to kill
me." Ex. 5 (Track 2 at 1 min., 10 sec.). After he identified the assailant as his "neighbor,
Kenny," Jason said, "This is going to come back to me. He's going to f -- ing kill me. He's
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No. 41596-8-II
already pulled a gun out before on me." Ex. 5 (Track 2 at 1 min., 36 sec. -- 1 min., 57 sec.). He
explained, "Last time somebody told on him, they ended up dead. I'm not even kidding you.
Someone told on him ten years ago for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamines and they
ended up in a river." Ex. 5. (Track 2 at 2 min., 15 sec.). At trial, Jason said he did not literally
mean that Graham would kill him but that Graham would hurt him. He testified that these things
were not true but he said them because, "I must have just been pissed, emotional, drunk, because
honestly, I don't remember that conversation." RP at 131-32.
Again, over a defense objection, the State presented Pierce County Sheriff's Deputy Tara
Simmelink-Lovely as an impeachment witness. She had spoken with Jason in September 2010
when he told her that Graham had told him that "he better show up for court and not pull out his
snitch blade." RP at 147. Jason also told her that Graham wanted him to say that he was
drinking on the day of the incident so that the prosecutor's office would drop the charges. Finally,
Jason told her that Graham pointed to his pregnant wife and told him to think about his family,
which he took as a threat to his family. Graham did not ask for and the trial court did not give a
limiting instruction explaining to the jury that it could only consider this testimony for
impeachment purposes.
Bower's testimony corroborated Jason's in most ways. Bower added that when he
jumped on Graham's back, Jason was turning blue. He also testified that he was a reluctant
witness because he feared that Graham would retaliate for his testifying. Edrea testified that she
called 911 because Jason was hysterical when he called her and she did not know what was going
on. Deputy Cowan testified that Jason told him that when he, Jason, tried to stop Graham,
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No. 41596-8-II
Graham "put both hands around his neck and was strangling him" and said that "he was going to
kill him." RP at 169, 170. Jason also told him that Graham said, "I'm going to kill both of you
and your kids." RP at 170.
Joseph McGurran gave a different version of events. He explained that he was visiting
with Graham on February 13, 2010, when Jason came over. He said that Jason kept pressing
Graham to talk about his troubled marriage, but Graham did not want to talk and eventually asked
them both to leave. But instead of going home, McGurran went to a nearby orchard and sat
watching Graham's home. "He just thought [he] would stick around for a while." RP at 221. A
few minutes later, he saw Jason and Graham arguing; Graham had his hands on Jason's shoulders
and was trying to talk. Suddenly, Bower jumped on Graham's back. Graham turned to Bower
and said, "If you are going to hit me, hit me, but just leave me alone. I'm talking to my brother."
RP at 223. He said that Jason and Bower left in a car and Graham went back into his house.
Graham did not testify.
During deliberations, the jury asked to review exhibits 1, 5, 8, 9, and Bower's statement.
The trial court responded that other than exhibit 5, these exhibits had not been offered or admitted
during trial and therefore the jury could not review them. The jury found Graham guilty of the
lesser included offense of fourth degree assault, and guilty of two counts of harassment, one count
of intimidating a witness, one count of tampering with a witness, and two counts of violating a no
contact order. It also found by special verdicts that these offenses involved domestic violence.
Graham appeals.
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No. 41596-8-II
ANALYSIS
Graham claims on appeal that trial counsel's failings denied him his right to effective
assistance of counsel. Specifically, he claims that trial counsel should have (1) requested a
limiting instruction for Deputy Simmelink-Lovely's impeachment testimony, (2) objected during
closing argument when the State improperly used this impeachment testimony as substantive
evidence, (3) requested a limiting instruction for the jury's consideration of his prior bad acts, and
(4) requested a limiting instruction on the jury's consideration of McGurran's prior crimes.
Finally, he claims that an accumulation of counsel's errors denied him his right to a fair trial.
Standard of Review
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel has two parts. One, the defendant must show
that defense counsel's conduct was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Two, the defendant must show that such conduct caused actual prejudice, i.e.,
that there is a reasonable possibility that, but for the deficient conduct, the outcome of the
proceeding would have differed. State v. Thomas, 109 Wn.2d 222, 225-26, 743 P.2d 816 (1987)
(adopting test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674 (1984)). We begin with the presumption that counsel's assistance was effective. State v.
Sardinia, 42 Wn. App. 533, 539, 713 P.2d 122 (1986). This presumption continues until the
defendant shows in the record the absence of legitimate or tactical reasons supporting his
counsel's deficient conduct. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 336, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).
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No. 41596-8-II
Impeachment Evidence
The State called Deputy Simmelink-Lovely to impeach Jason's testimony. During his
testimony, Jason denied saying that Graham had called him a snitch or that Graham had asked him
to testify that he had been drinking so the State would drop the charges. Jason also denied saying
that Graham had pointed at Edrea's stomach, saying that he should think about his family. As we
noted above, Deputy Simmelink-Lovely testified that Jason had made these statements to her.
Graham now claims that trial counsel should have requested a limiting instruction so the
jury would consider the Deputy's testimony only for impeachment and not as substantive
evidence.
Impeachment evidence affects a witness' [sic] credibility and is not proof of the
substantive facts encompassed in such evidence. Where such evidence is admitted,
an instruction cautioning the jury to limit its consideration of the statement to its
intended purpose is both proper and necessary.
State v. Johnson, 40 Wn. App. 371, 377, 699 P.2d 221 (1985) (citations omitted).
Here, the State presented Deputy Simmelink-Lovely's testimony because, in its view,
Jason was minimizing what actually happened because he feared for his and his family's safety.
The State presented the Deputy's testimony to show that Jason had made these prior inconsistent
statements in the past and that the jury should consider that in evaluating his testimony.
We agree that the better practice would have been to ask for a limiting instruction but we
do not agree that this oversight, if it was one, denied Graham effective representation. Graham
fails to overcome the presumption that counsel's choice to forego such an instruction was an
intentional tactical choice or that his decision to do so caused actual prejudice. State v.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336-37. As we note below, the State did not use this testimony as
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No. 41596-8-II
substantive evidence but rather argued to the jury that the testimony demonstrated that Jason still
feared Graham and was minimizing and claiming he could not remember the conversations
because of this fear. Graham's argument fails.
Closing Argument
In a related argument, Graham claims that the State urged the jury to consider the
Deputy's testimony as substantive evidence. We disagree. In discussing Jason's testimony, the
State argued:
Ladies and gentlemen, you heard the 911 tape. Did it sound like Jason
Sullenger was coming up with this complicated story Why He didn't even want
to report this. Why would he be making up stuff about the defendant He didn't
even want to report it. If he comes in here at trial and minimizes, says he can't
remember stuff, stuff that would incriminate the defendant, it is because he doesn't
want to get his family hurt.
Then all the stuff he told Deputy Simmelink. Remember, Deputy
Simmelink She told all the details that Jason Sullenger had told her. Okay. Jason
Sullenger, he just couldn't remember those details when he was here at trial. He
talked to Deputy Simmelink in September. It is now November. That's two
months. Two months go by and you suddenly can't remember anything you said
to the deputy Is that reasonable? No. Okay.
What is reasonable is you have a man with a newborn baby who had got
strangled in February. You have a man with a family trying to look out for them.
He's going to play down everything that he can. He's going to suddenly forget
details. He doesn't want that man to come after him. That's how scared Jason
Sullenger is.
RP at 310-311.
The State did not use Jason's testimony as substantive evidence. Rather, the State was
arguing that the jury should look carefully at the testimony because he was down playing what
happened out of self-interest. Because the State was not using this testimony for a substantive
reason but rather to impeach Jason, any objection would have been overruled. Counsel's failure
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No. 41596-8-II
to object was not objectively unreasonable. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336.
Graham's Prior Bad Acts
Graham next argues that counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction to the evidence
of prior bad acts elicited during the 911 call allowed the jury to consider this misconduct for
improper purposes. As we noted above, during the 911 call, Jason made statements that Graham
had pulled a gun on him before, that someone who had informed on Graham's involvement in a
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine ended up in a river, and that if he, Jason, identified
his assailant, the assailant would kill him.
In the ER 404(b) context, we presume that counsel's failure to request a limiting
instruction was a tactical decision because to request such an instruction would reemphasize the
damaging evidence. State v. Barragan, 102 Wn. App. 754, 762, 9 P.3d 942 (2000). It is
appellant's burden to show otherwise and here fails to do so.
The 911 recording showed that Jason was still upset and crying about what happened with
Graham. And Jason explained at trial that none of these claims about Graham was true; Graham
had never pulled a gun on him and he had never seen a body in the river. He explained that he
made these claims because he was "pissed, emotional, [and] drunk." RP at 132. It is more likely
that the jury considered this as evidence that Jason was afraid of what would happen to him rather
than using it as propensity evidence to conclude that Graham's prior misconduct made it more
likely that he committed the charged crimes. The lack of a limiting instruction had no discernible
effect on the trial.
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No. 41596-8-II
Defense Witness's Prior Crimes
Next, Graham argues that his trial counsel should have requested a limiting instruction
regarding McGurran's past crimes. During the State's cross examination of McGurran, he
admitted having a 2008 third degree theft conviction and a 2008 shoplifting conviction. The trial
court admitted these statements as crimes of dishonesty under ER 609(a) for impeachment.
During the colloquy on the jury instructions, the State noted that the court's instructions
did not include an instruction regarding convictions admitted under ER 609. Defense counsel
stated, "I thought about it, Your Honor. I didn't propose it based upon the fact we just had a
couple of theft thirds that we are talking about and an attempted burglary for one of the victims. I
didn't intend to propose one." RP at 285. The State then noted that it did not consider an
instruction was needed and that neither side would argue propensity from the convictions.
As this colloquy illustrates, the decision not to request such an instruction was a tactical
one and, as such, cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. McFarland,
127 Wn.2d at 334-38. Graham does not show why this decision was not a legitimate tactical one
and neither does he show that any prejudice resulted. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 334-38.
Cumulative Error
Finally, Graham argues that an accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair trial. He
argues that the combination of prejudicial evidence without limiting instructions created
reasonable doubt about whether Graham threatened to kill Jason and Bowers (thereby placing
them in reasonable fear), whether he used force to influence Jason's testimony, and whether he
attempted to induce Jason to testify falsely or withhold evidence. He argues that the jury's
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No. 41596-8-II
request to review evidence not admitted at trial shows that it had reasonable doubt.
The cumulative error doctrine applies only when several trial errors occurred, none of
which alone warrants reversal, but the combined errors effectively denied the defendant his right
to a fair trial. State v. Hodges, 118 Wn. App. 668, 673-74, 77 P.3d 375 (2003). Here, the only
potential error that Graham succeeds in demonstrating is that counsel should have requested a
limiting instruction on the use of impeachment testimony. But as we noted above, the State did
not use the impeachment testimony for substantive purposes and so Graham cannot show actual
prejudice. Graham simply fails to show that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable
and that such performance actually prejudiced him. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336-37.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it
is so ordered.
Worswick, A.C.J
We concur:
Hunt, J.
Quinn-Brintnall, J.
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