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Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No. 41896-7-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

KEVIN RONNIE BRANHAM,                                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Hunt, J. -- Kevin Ronnie Branham appeals his bail jumping conviction.  He argues that the 

information omitted an essential element of the offense, knowledge of a subsequent court 

appearance.  We affirm.

                                            FACTS

       The State charged Branham with bail jumping as follows:

       COUNT VIII -- BAIL JUMPING, RCW 9A.76.170(1) -- CLASS B FELONY
       In that the defendant, KEVIN RONNIE BRANHAM, in the State of Washington, 
       on or about August 4, 2010, having been charged with a Class A felony and having 
       been released by court order or admitted to bail with knowledge of the 
       requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state, did 
       fail to appear as required.

Clerk's Papers (CP) at 10.  Branham did not object to the sufficiency of this language or the 

charging document below.  The jury found him guilty as charged.  For the first time on appeal, 

Branham argues that the information was constitutionally deficient because it did not state the  

No.  41896-7-II

specific date on which he had been required to appear in court or how he had been given notice of 

that requirement.

                                            analysis

       Branham argues that the information omitted an essential element of bail jumping, 

knowledge of a subsequent court appearance.  His argument fails.

                                     I.  Standard of Review

       The law requires the State to allege "all essential elements of a crime . . . in a charging 

document" in order to provide sufficient notice to an accused so that he can adequately prepare a 

defense.  State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991).  The information must contain 

both the elements of the crime charged and the "facts supporting every element of the offense."  

State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 689, 782 P.2d 552 (1989).

       When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of a charging document, the  standard of 

review depends on the timing of the challenge.  State v. Ralph, 85 Wn. App. 82, 84, 930 P.2d 

1235 (1997).  If, like Brahnam, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of a charging document 

after the State has rested its case, we construe the information liberally in favor of its validity.1  

State v. Phillips, 98 Wn. App. 936, 940, 991 P.2d 1195 (2000).  In liberally construing the 

language, we applying the following two-pronged test: (1) whether "the necessary facts appear in 

any form, or by fair construction can they be found, in the charging document"; and (2) if so,

1 In contrast, we apply the strict construction standard only if a defendant challenges the 
sufficiency of the information before the State rests and the information omits an essential element 
of the crime.  Under this strict construction standard, the trial court must dismiss the case 
"without prejudice to the State's ability to refile the charges."  State v. Phillips, 98 Wn. App. 936, 
940, 991 P.2d 1195 (2000).  Because Branham did not object to the sufficiency of the charging 
information at trial, we do not apply this strict construction standard here.
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No.  41896-7-II

whether the defendant can "show that he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inartful 

language which caused a lack of notice."  Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 105-06.  Branham fails to carry 

his heavy burden to challenge the sufficiency of a charging document for the first time on appeal.

       The first prong of the test focuses solely on the charging document's language.  Kjorsvik, 

117 Wn.2d at 106.  We read the charging document "as a whole, according to common sense and 

including facts that are implied."  State v. Nonog, 169 Wn.2d 220, 227, 237 P.3d 250 (2010).  We 

hold that the charging document was sufficient to give Branham notice of the elements of his bail 

jumping charge and, thus, meets the first prong of the test. We do not reach the second prong of 

the test because Branham alleges no prejudice.2 See Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106.

                            II.  Failure To Meet First Prong of Test

       The State charged Branham with bail jumping under RCW 9A.76.170(1), which provides: 

       Any person having been released by court order or admitted to bail with 
       knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any 
       court of this state, or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for 
       service of sentence, and who fails to appear or who fails to surrender for service of 
       sentence as required is guilty of bail jumping.

Thus, the essential elements of bail jumping are:  (1) that the defendant was charged with a certain 

crime; (2) that he had knowledge of the requirement to appear at a subsequent court date; and (3) 

that he failed to appear as required.  State v. Downing, 122 Wn. App. 185, 192, 93 P.3d 900 

(2004).

       Branham argues that the information  failed to allege that he  had  "knowledge of the 

2 If, however, we were to determine under the first prong of the test that the charging document 
language was vague, we could then consider whether there was actual prejudice to the defendant 
and whether he had received actual notice of the charged crime.  Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 106.

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No.  41896-7-II

requirement" to appear at a subsequent court date because the information did not specify that he 

had notice to appear for his August 4, 2010 hearing, at which he failed to appear.  Br. of 

Appellant at 5.  Contrary to Branham's argument, however, "knowledge o[f] the specific date of 

the hearing is not an element of the crime" of bail jumping.  State v. Carver, 122 Wn. App. 300, 

305, 93 P.3d 947 (2004) (citing State v. Ball, 97 Wn. App. 534, 536-37, 987 P.2d 632 (1999)).

Instead, RCW 9A.76.170(1) requires only that defendant "was aware of his obligation to appear."  

Ball, 97 Wn. App. at 537. 3

       Here, the second amended information charged that Branham,

       having been released by court order or admitted to bail with knowledge of the 
       requirement of a subsequent personal appearance before any court of this state, 
       did fail to appear as required. 

CP at 10 (emphasis added).  The above-italicized clause apprised Branham of the essential 

element that he must have "knowledge of the requirement of a subsequent personal appearance 

before any court of this state, or of the requirement to report to a correctional facility for service 

of sentence," as required by RCW 9A.76.170(1).  Construing the information liberally and reading 

it in a common sense manner, we hold that Branham received constitutionally sufficient 

3 The particulars of type and manner of notice are not essential elements of bail jumping.  Rather, 
the essential element is that the defendant had knowledge of the required subsequent court 
appearance.  See Downing, 122 Wn. App. at 192.
                                               4 

No.  41896-7-II

notice of the charge of bail jumping.  We affirm.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it 

is so ordered.

                                                 Hunt, J.
We concur:

Penoyar, C.J.

Worswick, J.

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