Find Legal Information

Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        )
                                            )       No. 65669-4-I
                      Respondent,           )
                                            )       DIVISION ONE
       v.                                   )
                                            ) 
MAURICE C. KUIT,                            )       UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                            ) 
                      Appellant.            )       FILED: January 30, 2012

       Spearman, J.  --  Maurice Kuit appeals his conviction for failing to register 

as a sex offender, arguing the trial court erred when it refused to give his

proposed substantial compliance jury instruction. For the reasons described 

herein, we reject his arguments and affirm the trial court.

                                         FACTS

       Kuit was convicted of voyeurism in 2003 and as a result, was required to 

register as a sex offender.  In September 2008, Kuit registered his address in 

Bellevue.  His landlord asked him to move out in May 2009.  In June 2009, Kuit 

was incarcerated for violating his community custody for failing to participate in 

sexual deviancy treatment.  He was released on June 27 and was required to 

register within 24 hours.  He did not do so.  Instead, on June 30, he told his  

No. 65669-4-I/2

corrections officer he was sleeping in his office.  Sometime later, he left a 

message informing her he was staying in a motel in North Bend.  On July 8, he 

told her he was staying with a friend in Redmond.  She verified this was true.  As 

of July 30, however, he still had not registered the address.  When contacted by 

his correction officer on July 30, he first told her he "thought" he had registered, 

but eventually admitted he had not done so.  His corrections officer instructed him 

to register as soon as possible, and Kuit registered that afternoon.  

       The State charged Kuit with failing to register as a sex offender between 

June 27 and July 30.  At trial, Kuit proposed a jury instruction that read, 

"[s]ubstantial compliance is a defense to the reporting requirements of a state 

agency." The trial court refused to give the instruction, noting, "I'm not going to 

instruct on substantial compliance because I'm convinced it's not an available 

defense under this statute." The jury convicted Kuit, and he appeals.

                                     DISCUSSION

       Kuit argues the trial court erred when it refused to give his proposed

substantial compliance jury instruction. A criminal defendant is entitled to have 

the jury fully instructed on his theory of the case.  State v. Fernandez-Medina, 

141 Wn.2d 448, 461, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). A defendant is not entitled to an 

instruction that misstates the law, however.  State v. Garbaccio, 151 Wn. App. 

716, 737, 214 P.3d 168 (2009), review denied, 168 Wn.2d 1027, 230 P.3d 1060 

(2010).

                                            2 

No. 65669-4-I/3

       We have held that substantial compliance is not a defense to failure to 

register as a sex offender. See State v. Prestegard, 108 Wn. App. 14, 20, 28 P.3d 

817 (2001); State v. Vanderpool, 99 Wn. App. 709, 711, 995 P.2d 104 (2000).  

Kuit contends that the holding in Vanderpool was dicta and that strict compliance 

with the statute is not necessary to carry out the legislative purpose. Although 

Kuit is correct that the defendant in Vanderpool raised substantial compliance for 

the first time on appeal and that the court held any error was not manifest 

constitutional error, the court nevertheless analyzed the applicability of the 

substantial compliance doctrine in the alternative, and held the doctrine does not 

apply under the facts of that case. For the reasons described herein, we adhere 

to Vanderpool and likewise hold substantial compliance does not apply.

       "Substantial compliance has been defined as actual compliance in respect 

to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.  It means 

a court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as 

to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted."  James v. Kitsap 

County, 154 Wn.2d 574, 588, 115 P.3d 286 (2005) quoting In re Habeas Corpus

of Santore, 28 Wn. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702 (1981)).  The substantial 

compliance doctrine developed as a result of the "judiciary's longstanding effort 

to give legislative commands a rational interpretation founded upon their design."

Williamson, Inc. v. Calibre Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 394, 401, 54 P.3d 1186 

(2002). To determine whether a statute is susceptible to substantial compliance, 

                                            3 

No. 65669-4-I/4

we must determine whether strict compliance is necessary to achieve the 

legislature's statutory goals. Johnston v. Von Houck, 150 Wn. App. 894, 898-99, 

209 P.3d 548 (2009).

       At issue here, as was the case in Vanderpool, are the purposes and 

objectives of the statute requiring sex offender registration.  These purposes 

include assisting law enforcement agencies in their efforts to protect the 

community from sex offenders; public notification of sex offender residences; and 

making sex offenders easy to locate.  State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 9, 154 P.3d 

909 (2007); Vanderpool, 99 Wn. App. at 712 (purpose of the statute "is to allow 

law enforcement agencies to protect their communities, conduct investigations 

and quickly apprehend sex offenders"); Prestegard, 108 Wn. App. at 20; State v. 

Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475, 480, 975 P.2d 584 (1999). To effectuate these 

purposes, the legislature specified the manner of registration: a sex offender

"shall register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence. . . ."  

RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a).  

       Kuit urges us to hold his "conduct in notifying his [correction officer] of his 

address" achieved the purposes of the statute.  According to Kuit, once a 

correction officer knows an address, law enforcement or the public "need only 

contact [the correction officer], a simple enough step, not significantly more 

difficult than checking the sex offender registrations."  But Kuit's proposal would

read the requirement to register out of the statute entirely, and would increase the

                                            4 

No. 65669-4-I/5

burden of the public and law enforcement in locating a sex offender.  This does

not amount to "actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every 

reasonable objective of the statute[,]" James, 154 Wn.2d at 588, nor does it 

further the Legislature's goals of protecting the community from sex offenders, 

public notification of sex offender residences, and making sex offenders easy to 

locate. We adhere to Vanderpool, and hold the trial court did not err by declining 

to give Kuit's proposed substantial compliance instruction. 

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                            5