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Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

			

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                       DIVISION  II

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                             No. 41619-1-II

                             Respondent,

       v.

STACIA NOEL STROOP,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                             Appellant.

       Johanson, J.    --    Stacia Stroop appeals her conviction for        first degree criminal 

impersonation, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to convict her.  We affirm.1

                                            FACTS

       In the evening of February 22, 2010, Camas Police Officers Jason Langman and Rob 

Skeens responded to a call of suspicious circumstances at a residential address.  Officer Langman 

observed that the property was overgrown with vegetation and that there was a padlock on the 

front door.  He followed a trail to the back of the house, where he saw a makeshift stepstool 

beneath a broken window.  He looked into the house and saw a man within arm's reach.  He 

ordered the man to come out of the residence, and the man complied.  The man said that there 

was a woman by the name of "Jennifer" still inside the house.  1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 

57.  Officer Langman looked inside the building and found Stroop curled up in a ball, covered 

with a jacket and other clothes.  He called out to her several times, but she failed to respond.  

Eventually, she complied with his orders to exit the building.

1 A commissioner of this court initially considered Stroop's appeal as a motion on the merits 
under RAP 18.14 and then transferred it to a panel of judges. 

No. 41619-1-II

       After Officer Langman arrested her, Stroop explained to him that she was in the house 

searching for her lost dog.  Asked to identify herself, Stroop gave Officer Langman the name 

"Dawn King," Stroop's sister's name.  1 RP at 63.  She said, however, that the male subject knew 

her by the name "Start."   1  RP at 64.  She told Officer Langman she did not have any 

identification with her.  

       Having doubts about her identity, Officer Langman transported Stroop to the Camas 

Police Department before taking her to the Clark County jail.  At the police department, Officer 

Langman printed out a booking photo associated with the name "Dawn King."  1 RP at 65.  He 

showed Stroop the photo, which did not appear to be of her.  Stroop did not comment.  When he 

transported Stroop to the Clark County jail, he told the custody officers there that he was still 

unsure of her identity.  

       Within a couple of days of arriving at the jail, Timothy Sterns, a probation officer, 

interviewed Stroop regarding her financial situation, mental health history, criminal history, and 

employment.  Sterns also gathered information such as her phone number and address.  The 

information she provided was to be used for formulating a recommendation as to whether she 

would be released from custody pending her trial and what conditions should be imposed, and 

determining whether  she qualified for court-appointed counsel.  Stroop again provided "Dawn 

King" as her name.  1 RP at 134.  She signed the interview document and the financial affidavit, 

attesting to the truth of the information.  The information included that she was an unemployed 

union electrician.  At Stroop's first court appearance, on February 23, 2010, she identified herself 

as "Dawn Cheri King," and gave her date of birth as August 31, 1972.  2 RP at 158.

       Two days after Stroop was taken into custody, Dawn King called the jail records unit 

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No. 41619-1-II

informing them that although her name appeared on the jail register, she was not in custody.  On 

February 24, Nancy Druckenmiller, an identification specialist with the Clark County Sheriff's 

Office, compared the fingerprints Stroop provided when booked with a fingerprint database.  The 

fingerprints matched with a state identification number belonging to Stacia Stroop.  A warrant 

was also outstanding for a Stacia Stroop.  At Stroop's February 26 arraignment, she admitted her 

name was Stacia Noel Stroop, and that her date of birth was January 3, 1975.

       The State charged Stroop by amended information with first degree criminal trespass and 

first degree criminal impersonation.  At trial, Officer Skeens explained that using a false name 

would cause the arrest incident to permanently be attached to Dawn King's record.     The State 

played a video of a previous hearing in which Stroop identified herself as Dawn King.  A 

prosecutor who handled the case at its early hearings testified that at a defendant's first 

appearance, the judge decides whether to release the defendant or not, based on the information 

provided during the defendant's interview with the probation officer.  Stroop testified that she 

was employed as a caregiver, and was not an unemployed union electrician.  She acknowledged 

that she had used her sister's name upon her arrest, at court, and during her interview with the 

probation officer.

       The jury found Stroop guilty as charged.  Stroop appeals her conviction for first degree 

criminal impersonation.

                                          ANALYSIS

       Stroop argues that substantial evidence does not support her conviction for first degree 

criminal impersonation because she did not commit an act other than assuming King's identity.  

Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

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No. 41619-1-II

State, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.  State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).  "A claim of 

insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be 

drawn therefrom."  Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201.  Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are 

equally reliable.  State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).  We defer to the 

trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of 

the evidence.  State v. Walton, 64 Wn. App. 410, 415-16, 824 P.2d 533, review denied, 119 

Wn.2d 1011 (1992).

       The elements of criminal impersonation in the first degree that the State must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt are:  (1) the defendant "[a]ssumes a false identity"; (2) "does an act in 

his or her assumed character" (3)  "with intent to defraud another or for any other unlawful 

purpose." RCW 9A.60.040(1)(a).  "Defraud" means "[t]o cause injury or loss to . . . by deceit."  

State v. Simmons, 113 Wn. App. 29, 32, 51 P.3d 828 (2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary

434 (7th ed. 1999)).  "Whenever an intent to defraud shall be made an element of an offense, it 

shall be sufficient if an intent appears to defraud any person, association or body politic or 

corporate whatsoever." RCW 10.58.040.

       Stroop contends only that the State put forth insufficient evidence of her having done an 

act while assuming the character of Dawn King.  But Stroop went beyond merely claiming that 

she was Dawn King.  Notably, she conducted an interview with the probation officer under her 

assumed persona.  She misled the probation officer by informing him that she was an unemployed 

union electrician, rather than an employed caregiver.  The criminal history she led the probation 

officer to consider was that of King's.  Following the interview, she signed a "supervised release"

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No. 41619-1-II

form and a financial affidavit, attesting to the truth of the information she provided.  2 RP at 196.  

That information was used to determine whether she would be recommended for pretrial release 

and whether she qualified for court-appointed counsel.  And she avoided execution of the 

outstanding warrant for her arrest by impersonating King.  The jury could have determined that 

Stroop committed an act under her assumed character by providing information to the probation 

officer to be used in setting bail and appointing counsel.  Substantial evidence supports her 

conviction.

       Having determined that the jury could have found that an act occurred, we need not 

address Stroop's argument that State v. Williams, 171 Wn.2d 474, 251 P.3d 877 (2011), requires 

reversal of her conviction.  

       We affirm.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it 

is so ordered.

                                                                   Johanson, J.
We concur:

               Armstrong, P.J.

                Quinn-Brintnall, J.

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