DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division II
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: |
42015-5 |
Title of Case: |
State Of Washington, Respondent V. Timothy Baugh, Appellant |
File Date: |
04/24/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court |
Docket No: | 10-1-01757-9 |
Judgment or order under review |
Date filed: | 03/25/2011 |
Judge signing: | Honorable Susan K Serko |
JUDGES
------
Authored by | David H. Armstrong |
Concurring: | Marywave Van Deren |
| Joel Penoyar |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| Stephanie C Cunningham |
| Attorney at Law |
| 4616 25th Ave Ne # 552 |
| Seattle, WA, 98105-4183 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| Stephen D Trinen |
| Pierce County Prosecutors Ofc |
| 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| Tacoma, WA, 98402-2102 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 42015-5-II
Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
TIMOTHY R. BAUGH,
Appellant.
Armstrong, J. -- Timothy Baugh appeals his conviction of one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. He contends that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove actual or constructive possession of the controlled substance, cocaine. Because
sufficient evidence supported the conviction, we affirm.
FACTS
On April 21, 2010, Fife Police Department officers responded to a report of domestic
violence at the Sherwood Apartments complex in Fife, Washington. The caller reported that a
man involved in the dispute was associated with a red Cadillac. When the officers arrived, they
approached a man standing next to a red Cadillac. When the man saw the officers approaching,
he immediately turned and walked away. The officers identified themselves and directed the man
to stop, but he continued walking across the parking lot. According to the officers' testimony,
the man walked between two parked cars, stopped, looked around and down, then turned and
walked back toward the officers. The officers then placed the man, Baugh, into custody.
When the officers went to the area between the cars where Baugh had stopped, they found
a wadded up napkin lying on the ground. Inside the napkin was a small amount of cocaine.
No. 42015-5-II
Neither officer saw Baugh drop the napkin on the ground or could state how the napkin or drugs
got there.
During a search incident to arrest, the officers found several "wadded up" napkins in
Baugh's pockets similar to the napkin containing the cocaine. Report of Proceedings at 108, 152-
53. The officers did not find any other drugs or contraband when they searched Baugh incident to
arrest.
The State charged Baugh with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance.1 Baugh moved to dismiss the charges after the State rested its case-in-chief, arguing
that the State failed to prove that he possessed drugs. The trial court denied the motion.
The jury found Baugh guilty as charged. Baugh appeals.
ANALYSIS
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewed in the light most favorable to the
State, it permits any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). A claim of
insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences that a trier of
fact can draw from that evidence. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial evidence and direct
evidence are equally reliable. State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
Under RCW 69.50.4013(1),2 to prove that Baugh committed the crime of unlawful
1 Contrary to RCW 69.50.4013(1).
2 RCW 69.50.4013(1) states:
It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless the substance
was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a
practitioner while acting in the course of his or her professional practice, or except
as otherwise authorized by this chapter.
2
No. 42015-5-II
possession of a controlled substance, the State was required to prove that Baugh possessed a
controlled substance3 without a valid prescription or other authorization.
Possession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession of contraband means that the
goods are in the personal custody of the person charged with possession; whereas, constructive
possession4 means that the person charged with possession has dominion and control over the
goods. State v. Callahan, 77 Wn.2d 27, 29, 459 P.2d 400 (1969).
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom, the State produced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier
of fact could find actual possession of the cocaine. Baugh walked to the location where the
cocaine was found, away from the location of his car. He ignored police commands to stop and
return to their location. The type of napkin in which the cocaine was contained matched the
napkins found in his pocket during the search incident to arrest. The circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to allow a juror to infer that Baugh actually possessed the cocaine at the time the
officers arrived.
3 Cocaine is a controlled substance. RCW 69.50.101(d) ("Controlled substance" means "a drug,
substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or
state laws, or federal or board rules."); RCW 69.50.206(b)(4) (cocaine found under Schedule II).
4 To determine whether there is constructive possession, courts examine the "totality of the
situation" to ascertain if substantial evidence exists that tends to establish circumstances from
which the trier of fact can reasonably infer the defendant had dominion and control over the
contraband. State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977) (emphasis omitted).
Constructive possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Sanders, 7 Wn. App.
891, 893, 503 P.2d 467 (1972). Proof of the defendant's exclusive control is not necessary to
establish constructive possession; the defendant's mere proximity to the contraband is insufficient.
State v. Davis, 117 Wn. App. 702, 708-09, 72 P.3d 1134 (2003).
3
No. 42015-5-II
Because there was sufficient evidence to show actual possession, we do not address
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to show constructive possession.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it
is so ordered.
Armstrong, J.
We concur:
Van Deren, J.
Penoyar, C.J.
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