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DO NOT CITE. SEE GR 14.1(a).
Court of Appeals Division III
State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
| Docket Number: |
30487-6 |
| Title of Case: |
State of Washington v. Jay Anderson |
| File Date: |
04/05/2012 |
SOURCE OF APPEAL
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| Appeal from Pierce County Superior Court |
| Docket No: | 09-1-04546-3 |
| Judgment or order under review |
| Date filed: | 10/08/2010 |
| Judge signing: | Honorable Katherine M Stolz |
JUDGES
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| Authored by | Dennis J. Sweeney |
| Concurring: | Kevin M. Korsmo |
| Laurel H. Siddoway |
COUNSEL OF RECORD
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Counsel for Appellant(s) |
| | Stephanie C Cunningham |
| | Attorney at Law |
| | 4616 25th Ave Ne # 552 |
| | Seattle, WA, 98105-4183 |
Counsel for Respondent(s) |
| | Kathleen Proctor |
| | Pierce County Prosecuting Atty Ofc |
| | 930 Tacoma Ave S Rm 946 |
| | Tacoma, WA, 98402-2171 |
FILED
APRIL 05, 2012
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 30487-6-III
)
Respondent, )
) Division Three
v. )
)
JAY KELLY ANDERSON, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. )
)
Sweeney, J. -- There are two essential principles either of which requires us to
affirm the conviction here for third degree assault while armed with a deadly weapon.
First, a defendant waives the right to assign error to the judge's pretrial rulings when he
pleads guilty to a crime. Second, we will not second guess a judge's assessment of a
witness's credibility, that is, whether a defendant has met his burden of persuasion. Here,
the trial judge found the testimony of the defendant's expert -- that he was insane at the
time of the relevant events -- unpersuasive. We therefore affirm the conviction.
FACTS
Jay Anderson felt moved one morning to try to find his childhood home. Mr.
No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
Anderson has had mental health challenges. He traveled by bus in the general direction
of the home before getting off at a convenience store. He then entered an unlocked car
parked outside the store. The owner of the car returned and confronted Mr. Anderson.
Mr. Anderson brandished a box cutter, said "I'm sorry," and fled with the owner's cell
phone. The owner and several witnesses caught Mr. Anderson and held him until the
police arrived.
The State charged Mr. Anderson with one count of first degree robbery while
armed with a deadly weapon. Mr. Anderson successfully moved for an order directing a
competency evaluation. The court considered the assessment and concluded that Mr.
Anderson was competent to stand trial. Mr. Anderson entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity and moved for acquittal. He then underwent a second mental health
evaluation. And the trial court held a hearing to take evidence and consider his motion to
acquit.
Psychologist Phyllis Knopp testified. She concluded that Mr. Anderson suffered
from a psychotic disorder and schizophrenia. She believed he was in a delusional state
when he entered the parked car and took the phone. The court apparently was not
impressed, concluded that Mr. Anderson was sane at the time he committed his crime,
and refused to dismiss the charge:
FINDINGS OF FACT
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
I.
The court finds there were a number of blanks and/or gaps in the
information provided to Dr. Phyllis Knopp by the defendant. For example,
the defendant had a clear and detailed memory of the events that occurred
the morning of this incident, and then claimed he could not recall the details
of the incident.
II.
The defendant did not claim he was hearing voices or getting
commands to commit the crime. The defendant described getting a "nudge"
from his computer that morning, but the "nudge" directed him to go look at
some property from the defendant's past and not to commit the offense he
committed.
III.
The court does not find Dr. Knopp is credible when she states she
could reasonably reach her conclusion in this incident in 2009 based on an
isolated incident in 2002. There were records and/or mental health
evaluations between those dates that did not support a conclusion that the
defendant was acting under a compulsion to commit the crime he
committed in this case.
IV.
The court does not find Dr. Knopp is credible when she states she
can fill in the gaps in the defendant's memory of this incident with
conclusions that he was in fact acting under the direction of voices from
"Tech Omega" and/or "Mr. Rothstein."
V.
Dr. Knopp admits that it is very unusual that a person who is hearing
voices directing him to commit an act would not remember the details of
the act. Further, it does not make sense that the person who is hearing
voices directing him to commit an act would not remember that he was
hearing those voices when asked why he committed the act.
VI.
Many of the defendant's actions during this incident, as described by
the witnesses, suggest the defendant recognized that he was engaging in an
act that was wrong.
VII.
Based on all of the information presented and from the totality of the
circumstances, the court finds Dr. Knopp's conclusion that the defendant
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
was not able to distinguish right from wrong during this incident is not
credible.
. . . .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I.
The defendant has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime charged in this case.
II.
The defendant's motion for acquittal by reason of insanity should be
denied.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 81-83.
The next day, Mr. Anderson pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of third degree
assault while armed with a deadly weapon.
DISCUSSION
Mr. Anderson contends that the court's findings are not supported by substantial
evidence and the court could not then conclude that he was sane when he committed his
crime. The State responds that Mr. Anderson's unqualified plea of guilty eliminates his
right to assign error to the court's refusal to conclude he was insane at the time of his
crime. State v. Bisson, 156 Wn.2d 507, 517, 130 P.3d 820 (2006). Our review is de
novo. Id.
A guilty plea generally waives the right to appeal pretrial motions. State v. Smith,
134 Wn.2d 849, 852, 953 P.2d 810 (1998); State v. Olson, 73 Wn. App. 348, 353, 869
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
P.2d 110 (1994); State v. Wiley, 26 Wn. App. 422, 425, 613 P.2d 549 (1980). A guilty
plea is "more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself
a conviction" and "nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). A
statement on plea of guilty that a defendant read, understood, and signed creates a strong
presumption that the plea is voluntary. Smith, 134 Wn.2d at 852.
And that is what we have here. Mr. Anderson signed a standard statement on plea
of guilty and agreed that he waived the "right to appeal a finding of guilt after trial as well
as other pretrial motions such as time for trial challenges and suppression issues." CP at
60-68. His lawyer confirmed all of this. He pleaded guilty without reservation. The
court confirmed that Mr. Anderson fully reviewed the plea and related documents with
his attorney. The court then properly accepted Mr. Anderson's guilty plea as being
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. He has waived his right to appeal.
Smith, 134 Wn.2d at 852-53.
But even if we were to review his assignment of error, we would be led to
conclude that the court's findings are supported by this record. The standard of review,
"substantial evidence," is modest. Nw. Pipeline Corp. v. Adams County, 132 Wn. App.
470, 475, 131 P.3d 958 (2006). Mr. Anderson challenges findings of fact III, IV, V, VI,
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
and VII.
Whether the evidence produced by Mr. Anderson met his burden of persuasion
was for the trial judge to decide. State v. Huff, 64 Wn. App. 641, 655, 826 P.2d 698
(1992). That judge started with a presumption that Mr. Anderson intended the natural
and probable consequences of his actions. State v. Caldwell, 94 Wn.2d 614, 617, 618
P.2d 508 (1980). He then bore the burden to prove that he was insane at the time of the
charged offense. RCW 10.77.080. We follow the M'Naghten rule, codified in RCW
9A.12.010. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843), cited in State v. Klein, 156 Wn.2d 103, 113, 124 P.3d 644 (2005). A defendant
must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) At the time of the commission of the offense, as a result of a
mental disease or defect, the mind of the actor was affected to such an
extent that:
(a) He was unable to perceive the nature and quality of the act with
which he is charged; or
(b) He was unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the
particular act charged.
Former RCW 9A.12.010 (1975).
Mr. Anderson's problem here is that the trial judge did not believe his expert. And
that judge (not this court) was privileged to do just that. State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d
60, 71, 794 P.2d 850 (1990). For example, the court found that "it does not make sense
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
that the person who is hearing voices directing him to commit an act would not remember
that he was hearing those voices when asked why he committed the act." CP at 82
(Finding of Fact (FF) V). And the court found that Mr. Anderson "recognized that he
was engaging in an act that was wrong." CP at 82 (FF VI). This finding is supported by
the Lakewood Police Report and the attached witness statement noting that "the subject
said he was sorry and dropped my items on the ground, and then he started to run off with
what appeared to be my other cell phone." Ex. 2 at 10.
The court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. Those findings justify
the conclusion that Mr. Anderson failed to meet his burden of persuasion.
We then affirm the conviction for third degree assault while armed with a deadly
weapon.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_______________________________
Sweeney, J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________________
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No. 30487-6-III
State v. Anderson
Korsmo, C.J.
________________________________
Siddoway, J.
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