Wessmann v. Gittens

Case Date: 11/19/1998
Court: United States Court of Appeals
Docket No: 98-1657

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit


No. 98-1657

SARAH P. WESSMANN, p.p.a. HENRY ROBERT WESSMANN,

Plaintiff, Appellant,

v.

ROBERT P. GITTENS,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOSTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellees.



APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]




Before

Selya, Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.



Michael C. McLaughlin for appellant.
Chester Darling on brief for Citizens for the Preservation of
Constitutional Rights, amicus curiae.
Frances S. Cohen, with whom Janet A. Viggiani, Hill & Barlow,
Merita Hopkins, Corporation Counsel of the City of Boston, and
Diane DiIanni, Special Assistant Corporation Counsel (Boston School
Committee), were on brief, for appellees.
Elaine R. Jones, Theodore M. Shaw, Norman J. Chachkin, and
Kimberly West-Faulcon, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Ozell Hudson, Jr., Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of
the Boston Bar Association, E. Macey Russell, Peabody & Arnold,
Jonathan M. Albano, Denise J. Casper and Bingham Dana LLP on brief
for Boston Branch, NAACP, and various individuals, amici curiae.




November 19, 1998



SELYA, Circuit Judge. The City of Boston operates three
renowned "examination schools," the most prestigious of which is
Boston Latin School (BLS). The entrance points for admission to
BLS occur principally at the seventh- and ninth-grade levels. In
this litigation, plaintiff-appellant Henry Robert Wessmann, on
behalf of his minor child, Sarah P. Wessmann, challenges the
constitutionality of BLS's admissions policy (the Policy). The
district court rebuffed Wessmann's challenge. See Wessmann v.
Boston Sch. Comm., 996 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1988). On appeal, we
must decide whether the Policy, which makes race a determining
factor in the admission of a subset of each year's incoming
classes, offends the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.
We conclude that it does.
I. BACKGROUND
We essay a brief historical reconnaissance to set the
present dispute in perspective.
Over two decades ago, a federal district court adjudged
the City of Boston (through its School Committee) to have violated
the constitutional rights of African-American children by promoting
and maintaining a dual public school system. See Morgan v.
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 480-81 (D. Mass. 1974) (Morgan I).
Although the court found the school system as a whole guilty of dejure segregation, no specific evidence was produced to suggest that
BLS's examination-based admissions policy discriminated against
anyone or that those responsible for running BLS intended to
segregate the races. See id. at 467-68. Nonetheless, BLS
exhibited some of the symptoms of segregation: an anomalously low
number of African-American students attended the school, see id. at
466 (tabulating statistics for examination schools), and the school
had just changed its entrance testing methods pursuant to a consent
decree settling charges that the earlier methods were themselves
discriminatory, see id. at 467-68. These factors, combined with
the City's inability to demonstrate that existing racial imbalances
were not a result of discrimination, led the court to conclude that
the City's examination schools (BLS included) were complicit in
promoting and maintaining the dual system. See id. The
presumption established by the Supreme Court in Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973), to the effect that a finding
of intentional segregation in a "meaningful portion" of a school
system suggests that other segregated schooling in the system is
not accidental, played a pivotal role both in the district court's
holding and in our ensuing affirmance. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509
F.2d 580, 594 (1st Cir. 1974) (affirming Morgan I, 379 F. Supp. at
467).
The remedy adopted by the district court, among other
things, obligated BLS to ensure that at least 35% of each entering
class would be composed of African-American and Hispanic students.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 258 (D. Mass. 1975).
Relying on the Keyes presumption, we affirmed this set-aside as
part of a comprehensive plan to ameliorate pervasive and persistent
constitutional infirmities throughout the Boston public schools.
See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 425 (1st Cir. 1976).
The Boston school system began gradually to mend its
ways. By 1987, systemic progress permitted us to conclude that,
for all practical purposes, the School Committee had achieved
unitariness in the area of student assignments. See Morgan v.
Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 326 (1st Cir. 1987). We based our conclusion
not only on the distribution of students throughout the City's
schools, but also on the good faith demonstrated by school
administrators in conforming with the demands of meaningful change.
See id. at 319-26. Because comparable improvement had not been
accomplished in other areas, such as faculty and staff integration
and the renovation of facilities, we instructed that federal court
supervision of elements other than student assignment continue.
See id. at 327-32. The district court thereupon relinquished
control over student assignments, even while retaining active
supervision over other aspects of the school system.
After 1987, the City's three examination schools BLS,
Boston Latin Academy, and the O'Bryant School were no longer
under a federal court mandate to maintain a 35% set-aside.
Nevertheless, the School Committee remained committed to the policy
until 1995, when a disappointed applicant challenged the set-
aside's constitutionality. The district court granted injunctive
relief directing the complainant's admission to BLS. SeeMcLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1018 (D. Mass.
1996). The School Committee then discontinued the 35% set-aside.
Concerned that the number of African-American and
Hispanic students admitted to the examination schools might drop
precipitously without a predetermined set-aside, school officials
began researching alternative admissions policies in hopes of
finding one that might prevent that result without offending the
Constitution. The effort started in mid-1996 under the hegemony of
Thomas Payzant, superintendent of the Boston public schools.
Payzant commissioned Bain & Co. (Bain), a consulting firm, to
review an array of admissions options ranging from lotteries to
strict merit-selection plans and to report on how each option might
affect the racial and ethnic composition of the examination
schools' entering classes.
After Payzant informed the School Committee of Bain's
preliminary findings, Robert P. Gittens, the School Committee
chairman, appointed a task force to study the matter. The task
force held meetings, hosted public hearings, and ultimately
recommended the adoption of Bain's "Option N50." Bain's study
showed that a major difference between Option N50 and some other
possible alternatives (such as a strict merit-selection option) was
that the former would minimize the diminution of black and Hispanic
student admissions expected to result from abandonment of the 35%
set-aside. Three members dissented from this recommendation. The
School Committee nonetheless accepted Option N50, effective for the
1997-98 school year. Option N50 thereupon became the core of the
Policy.
We recount the Policy's most salient features, leaving
aside complexities not relevant to the case at hand. To gain
admission to one of Boston's three examination schools, a student
must take a standardized test. Based on a mathematical formula
that purports to predict academic performance, school hierarchs
combine each applicant's test score with his or her grade point
average, derive a composite score, rank all applicants accordingly,
and proceed to assign individuals to the applicant pool for the
examination school(s) in which they have indicated an interest. To
be eligible for admission to any of the examination schools, an
applicant must be in the qualified applicant pool (QAP), a group
composed of those who rank in the top 50% of the overall applicant
pool for that particular school.
Half of the available seats for an examination school's
entering class are allocated in strict accordance with composite
score rank order. The other half are allocated on the basis of
"flexible racial/ethnic guidelines" promulgated as part of the
Policy. To apply these guidelines, school officials first
determine the relative proportions of five different racial/ethnic
categories white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American
in the remaining pool of qualified applicants (RQAP), that is, the
QAP for the particular school minus those persons already admitted
on the basis of composite score rank order alone. They then fill
the open seats in rank order, but the number of students taken from
each racial/ethnic category must match the proportion of that
category in the RQAP. Because the racial/ethnic distribution of
the second group of successful applicants must mirror that of the
RQAP, a member of a designated racial/ethnic group may be passed
over in favor of a lower-ranking applicant from another group if
the seats allotted for the former's racial/ethnic group have been
filled.
Sarah Wessmann encountered such a fate. BLS had 90
available seats for the 1997 ninth-grade entering class. Based on
her composite score, Sarah ranked 91st (out of 705) in the QAP. To
fill the first 45 seats, the school exhausted the top 47 persons on
the list (two aspirants declined in order to accept invitations
from another examination school). Had composite scores alone
dictated the selection of the remainder of the ninth-grade entering
class, Sarah would have been admitted. But the racial/ethnic
composition of the RQAP was 27.83% black, 40.41% white, 19.21%
Asian, 11.64% Hispanic, and 0.31% Native American. Consequently,
the Policy required school officials to allocate the final 45 seats
to 13 blacks, 18 whites, 9 Asians, and 5 Hispanics. As a result,
black and Hispanic students whose composite score rankings ranged
from 95th to 150th displaced Sarah and ten other white students who
had higher composite scores and ranks.
Acting to Sarah's behoof, her father sued a coterie of
defendants (collectively, the School Committee), alleging that the
the Policy had defeated her candidacy and challenging its
constitutionality. Following a 13-day bench trial, the district
court held that the School Committee's interests in promoting a
diverse student body and remedying vestiges of past discrimination
were compelling, and that the means crafted by the School Committee
to further these interests were not so expansive as to raise
constitutional concerns. See Wessmann, 996 F. Supp. at 127-32.
This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
We divide our analysis into four segments, beginning with
the standards that govern our review, then addressing the general
idea of "compelling governmental interests," and, finally,
proceeding to consider seriatim the two justifications asserted by
the School Committee in defense of the Policy.
A. Standards of Review.
The Supreme Court consistently employs sweeping language
to identify the species of racial classifications that require
strict scrutiny, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe