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Intel interrogation may-1987

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Field Manual *FM 34-52
NO 34-52 HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Washington. DC. 8 May 1987

INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
Table of Contents
Page
Preface ................................................................................iii

Chapter 1 Interrogation and the Interrogator .......................................... 1-0

Principles of Interrogation ................................................. 1-0

Sources of Information ......................................................1-1

Personal Qualities ......................................................... 1-2

Specialized Skills and Knowledge .......................................... 1-4


Chapter 2 Role of the Interrogator ..................................................... 2-0

Commander's Mission Under Air-Land Battle .............................. 2-0

Military Intelligence and Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield ............................................. 2-0

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations ............................. 2-2


Counterintelligence ........................................................ 2-4

Electronic Warfare ......................................................... 2-6



Capabilities and Limitations of Interrogators ............................... 2-6

Chapter 3 Interrogation Process ...................................................... 3-0

Screening Sources ..........................................................3-0

Interrogating Procedures ...................................................3-3




Chapter 4 Processing Captured Enemy Documents .................................... 4-0

Document Handling .......................................................4-0

Document Exploitation .................................................... 4-4

Evacuation Procedures ..................................................... 4-8

Documents Captured with a Source ........................................ 4-11



Chapter 5 Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations .............................. 5-0


Advice and Assistance ..................................................... 5-0

Prepare and Move to the Deployment Site .................................. 5-0

Establish a Site for Interrogation Operations ............................... 5-1


Supervise the Interrogation Process ........................................ 5-1

Supervise the CED Processing Cycle ....................................... 5-2

Supervise Administrative Tasks ............................................5-2


/ Approved for public release; distrib tion is unlimited .i

"This publication supersedes d30.15. 29 September 1978 .
Chapter 6 Operational Environment .................................................. 6-0'

Command Relationships ................................................... 6-0

Tasking Relationships ..................................................... 6-3

Support Relationships ..................................................... 6-4

Interrogator Training ...................................................... 6-7



/Chapter 7 Strategic Debriefing ........................................................ 7-0

Duties and Responsibilities ................................................7-0

Notification ............................................................... 7-0

Planning and Preparation ................................................. 7-0

Contact and Interview ..................................................... 7-0



Components of Strategic Intelligence ....................................... 7-1

Intelligence Cycle .......................................................... 7-3

Chapter 8 Joint Interrogation Facilities ............................................... 8-0

Formation .................................................................8-0

Use .......................................................................8-1



Chapter 9 Low-Intensity Conflict .....................................................9-1

Terminology ...............................................................9-1

Operational Concept for Low-Intensity Conflict ............................. 9-1

Interrogation Support to Low-Intensity Conflict ............................ 9-3


The Source ................................................................ 9-6

Interrogation Operations ................................................... 9-9



Appendix A STANAG Extracts .......................................................A-1

Appendix B Sample Detainee Personnel Record .......................................B-0
Glossary .......................................................................Glossary-0
References ...................................................................References-1


Appendix C Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Identity Card ............................. C-0

Appendix D Sample Enemy Prisoner of War Captive Tag ..............................D-1

Appendix E Sample JINTACCS Salute Report Format and Report ..................... E-0

Appendix F Sample Screening Report Format and Report ..............................F-0

Appendix G Sample Tactical Interrogation Report Format and Report ................. G-0


Appendix H Approaches ..............................................................H-0

Appendix I Interrogation Guides ......................................................1-0

Appendix J 1949 Geneva Conventions .................................................J-0





Preface

This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes proce- dures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows operational procedures outlined in FM 100-5. It provides general guidance for commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interroga- tion elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on interrogation operations, and peacetime interrogation operations.
These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts; to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear, biological, or chemi- cal (NBC) weapons; to the CI operations contained in FMs 34-60 and 60A (S/NOFORN); and to the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained in FM 33-1.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements 1059 (National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 2033 (Interrogation of Prisoners of War), 2044 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War), and 2084 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents).
These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the constraints established by FM 27-10, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the Uniform Code of Mili- tary Justice (UCMJ).
Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees, resettlers, and selected US sources.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Submit changes for improving this pub- lication on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000.
CHAPTER 1
Interrogation and the Interrogator
Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining -a source to obtain the maxi- mum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- tors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accu- rate. An interrogation involves the interac- tion of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two difrers to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities, and because the circumstances of each con- tact and the physical environment vary.
PRINCIPLES OF
INTERROGATION

Intelligence interrogations are of many types, such as the interview, debriefing, and elicitation. However, the principles of objec- tive, initiative, accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security apply to all types.
OBJECTIVE
The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximun amount of usable information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a definite purpose-to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he obtains the information. The objective may be specific, establishing the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general, seeking order of battle (OB)information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses the objec- tive as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He should not concen- trate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, during an interro- gation, he learns of an unknown, highly destructive weapon. Although this informa- tion may not be in line with his specific objective, he develops this lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weap- on. It is then obvious that the objective of an interrogation can be changed as neces- sary or desired.

INITIATIVE
Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to a successful interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations. The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interroga- tion. He has certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation, such as the psychological shock the source receives when becoming a prisoner of war, which enable him to grasp the initiative and assist him in maintaining it. An interrogator may lose control during the interrogation by allowing the source to take control of the interrogation. If this occurs, he must post- pone the interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a different interrogator should conduct the interrogation. In addition, the interrogator must identify and exploit leads developed during the interrogation.

ACCURACY
The interrogator makes every effort to obtain accurate information from the source. He assesses the source correctly by repeating questions at varying intervals. The interrogator, however, is not the final analyst and should not reject or degrade information because it conflicts with pre- viously obtained information. The interro- gator's primary mission is the collection of information, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all information as the truth; he views all information obtained with a degree of doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm information received and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is of great impor- tance to report accurate information to the using elements. The interrogator checks his notes against the finished report to ensure that the report contains and identifies the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the source.

PROHIBITION AGAINST USE
OF FORCE

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohi- bited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government. Experi- ence indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused with psychological ploys, ver- bal trickery, or other nonviolent and non- coercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and princi- ples outlined should neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as brain- washing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and use normally consti- tute violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders an inter- rogator ineffective should the source chal- lenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, agree- ments, and customs render threats of force, violence, and deprivation useless as inter- rogation techniques.

SECURITY
The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a great deal of classified informa- tion. He is aware constantly that his job is to obtain information, not impart it to the source. He safeguards military information at all times as well as the source of informa- tion. This becomes very clear when one considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, there are those attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator is alert to detect any attempt made by the source to elicit information.


SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The interrogator is concerned primarily with two sources of information in his intel- ligence collection effort: human sources and material sources (mainly captured enemy documents (CEDs)). The senior interroga- tor, depending on the supported command- er's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements (IR), decides which of these sources will be more effective in the intelligence collection effort.
HUMAN SOURCES
The interrogator encounters many sources who vary greatly in personality, social class, civilian occupation, military specialty, and political and religious beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health, their intelli- gence levels may range from well below average to well above average, and their security consciousness may range from the lowest to the highest. Sources may be ci- vilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defec- tors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Because of these variations, the interrogator makes a careful study of every source to evaluate his mental, emotional, and physical state and uses it as a basis for interrogation. He deals mainly with three categories of sources: cooperative and friendly, neutral and non- partisan, and hostile and antagonistic.
Cooperative and Friendly
A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount of informa- tion from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not inquiring into those pri- vate affairs which are beyond the scope of the interrogation. At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and losing control of the interrogation.

Neutral and Nonpartisan
A neutral and non~artisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by the enemy. This often is the case in low- intensity conflict (LIC) where the people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the information required.

Hostile and Antagonistic
A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real chal- lenge to the interrogator. An interrogator must have self-control, patience, and tact when dealing with him. As a rule, at lower echelons, it is considered unprofitable to expend excessive time and effort in interro- gating hostile and antagonistic sources. When time is available and the source appears to be an excellent target for exploi- tation, he should be isolated and repeatedly interrogated to obtain his cooperation. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where more time is available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources.

CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS
CEDs include any piece of recorded information which has been in the posses- sion of a foreign nation and comes into US possession. This includes US documents which the foreign nation may have pos- sessed. There are numerous ways to acquire a document, some of the most common ways are: found in the possession of human sources, on enemy dead, or on the battle- field. There are two types of documents: (1) official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders, maps, and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters, diaries, news- papers, and books.


PERSONAL QUALITIES
An interrogator should possess an inter- est in human nature and have a personality which will enable him to gain the coopera- tion of a source. Ideally, these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator; however, in most cases, an interrogator can correct some deficiencies in these qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote time to study and practice. Some desirable personal qualities in an interrogator are motivation, alertness, patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self-control, adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor.
MOTIVATION
An interrogator may be motivated by several factors, for example, an interest in human relations, a desire to react to the challenge of personal interplay, an enthusi- asm for the collection of information, or just a profound interest in foreign languages and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is the most significant factor used by an inter- rogator to achieve success. Without motiva- tion, other qualities lose their significance. The stronger the motivation, the more suc- cessful the interrogator.

ALERTNESS
The interrogator must be constantly
aware of the shifting attitudes which nor-
mally characterize a source's reaction to

interrogation. He notes the source's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. He determines why the source is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the source's mood and actions that the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is with- holding information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for diminishing resistance, for contradictions, or other tendencies, to include susceptibility.


PATIENCE AND TACT
The interrogator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport between himself and the source, thereby, enhancing the success of the interrogati~n. Additionally, the validity of the source's statements and the motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of tact and patience. Display- ing impatience encourages the difficult source to think that if he remains unres- ponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will stop his questioning. The display of impatience may cause the source to lose respect for the interrogator, thereby, reduc- ing his effectiveness. An interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and later continue further interrogation without arousing apprehen- sion or resentment.

CREDIBILITY
The interrogator must maintain credi- bility with the source and friendly forces. Failure to produce material rewards when promised may adversely affect future inter- rogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed, since interrogation reports are often the basis for tactical decisions and operations.

OBJECTIVITY
The interrogator must maintain an objec- tive and a dispassionate attitude, regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience, or which he may simulate dur- ing the interrogation. Without this required
objectivity, he may unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary his interrogation techniques effectively.

SELF-CONTROL
The interrogator must have an excep- tional degree of self-control to avoid dis- plays of genuine anger, irritation, sym- pathy, or weariness which may cause him to lose the initiative during the interroga- tion. Self-control is especially important when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of simulated emo- tions or attitudes.

ADAPTABILITY
An interrogator must adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By being able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during interro- gations. He must also adapt himself to the operational environment. In many cases, he has to conduct interrogations under a va- -riety of unfavorable physical conditions.

PERSEVERANCE
A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an interroga- tor who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who becomes eas- ily discouraged by opposition, noncoopera- tion, or other difficulties will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a suc- cessful conclusion nor seek leads to other valuable information.

PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND DEMEANOR
The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the interrogation and the attitude of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a neat, organized, and professional appearance will favorably influence the source. A firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude may create a proper environment for a successful interrogation. If the interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the source may prove cooperative and more receptive to questioning. However, depend- ing on the approach techniques, the inter- rogator can decide to portray a different (for example, casual, sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the willing cooperation of the source.

SPECIALIZED SKILLS AND KNOWLEDGE
The interrogator must be knowledgeable and qualified to efficiently and effectively exploit human and material sources which are of potential intelligence interest. He is
'
trained in the techniques and proficiency necessary to exploit human and material sources. His initial training is in foreign language, and his entry-level training is in the exploitation of documents and human sources. The interrogator must possess, or acquire through training and experience, special skills and knowledge.
WRITING AND SPEAKING SKILLS
The most essential part of the interroga- tor's intelligence collection effort is report- ing the information obtained. Hence, he must prepare and present both written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. He must possess a good voice and speak English and a foreign language idiomatically and without objec- tionable accent or impediment.
Knowledge of a foreign language is nec- essary since interrogators work primarily with non-English speaking people. Lan- guage ability should include a knowledge of military terms, foreign idioms, abbrevia- tions, colloquial and slang usages, and local dialects. Although a trained interrogator who lacks a foreign language skill can interrogate successfully through an inter- preter, the results obtained by the linguisti- cally proficient interrogator will be more timely and comprehensive. Language labs, tapes, or instructors should be made avail- able wherever possible to provide refresher and enhancement training for interrogator linguists.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE US ARMY'S
MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND
OPERATIONS

Interrogation operations contribute to the accomplishment of the supported com- mander's mission. The interrogator must have a working knowledge of the US Army's missions, organizations, weapons and equipment, and methods of operation. This knowledge enables him to judge the relative significance of the information he extracts from the source.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE
TARGET COUNTRY

Every interrogator should be knowledge- able about his unit's target country, such as armed forces uniforms and insignia, OB information, and country familiarity.
Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia
Through his knowledge of uniforms, in- signia, decorations, and other distinctive devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service, type of unit, and military experience of a mili- tary or paramilitary source. During the planning and preparation and the approach phases, later discussed in this manual, the identification of uniforms and insignia is very helpful to the interrogator.
Order of Battle Information
OB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and disposi- tion of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. OB elements are separ- ate categories by which detailed informa- tion is maintained. They are composition, disposition, strength, training, combat effectiveness, tactics, logistics, electronic technical data, and miscellaneous data. During the questioning phase, OB elements assist the interrogator in verifying the accuracy of the information obtained and can be used as an effective tool to gain new information. Aids which may be used to identify units are names of units, names of commanders, home station identifications, code designations and numbers, uniforms, insignia, guidons, documents, military pos- tal system data, and equipment and vehicle markings.
Country Familiarity
The interrogator should be familiar with the social, political, and economic institu- tions; geography; history; and culture of the target country. Since many sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the interrogator may induce reluctant prisoners to talk by discussing the geography, eco- nomics, or politics of the target country. He may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and atti- tudes in the target country. He should keep abreast of major events as they occur in the target country. By knowing the current events affecting the target country, the interrogator will better understand the gen- eral situation in the target country, as well as the causes and repercussions.
KNOWLEDGE OF COMMON
SOLDIER SKILLS

Interrogators must be proficient in all common soldier skills. However, map read- ing and enemy material and equipment are keys to the performance of interrogator duties.
Map Reading
Interrogators must read maps well enough to map track using source informa- tion obtained about locations of enemy activities. Through the use of his map tracking skills, the interrogator can obtain information on the locations of enemy activities from sources who can read a map. Furthermore, his map reading skills are essential to translate information into map terminology from sources who cannot read a map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26.
Enemy Material and Equipment
The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and employ- ment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infan- try support weapons, artillery, aircraft, ve- hicles, communications equipment, and NBC defense. FM 100-2-3 provides informa- tion on enemy material and equipment.
Specialized Training
The interrogator requires specialized training in international regulations, secu- rity, and neurolinguistics.
International Agreements
The interrogator should know interna- tional regulations on the treatment of pris- oners of war and the general principles of the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Security
Interrogators must know how to identify, mark, handle, and control sensitive mate- rial according to AR 380-5. He should have received special training on Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA).
Neurolinguistics
Neurolinguistics is a behavioral commu- nications model and a set of procedures that improve communication skills. The interro- gator should read and react to nonverbal communications. An interrogator can best adapt himself to the source's personality and control his own reactions when he has an understanding of basic psychological factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motiva- tions, and inhibitions.
Chapter 2
capabilities and probable courses of action. This estimate must consider the terrain fea- tures in the area of operations, the number and type of enemy units in this area, and the prevailing weather conditions. Intelli- gence assets collect and analyze informa- tion to develop this estimate, then, give the estimate to commanders in sufficient time for use in their decision making. -
Commanders request the information they need. These information requests are translated into collection requirements. The collection requirements are consolidated into collection missions and assigned to specific collection assets. Collection assets cbnduct operations to obtain information
1
that satisfies their assigned collection mis- sions. As collection assets gather informa- tion, they report it. The reported informa- tion is consolidated and analyzed to determine its reliabilitv and validitv. Valid information is collated and used to produce intelligence, which is then provided to the commanders, and simultaneously to collec- tion assets to provide immediate feedback to assist in coilection operations. This pro- cess is continuous, since commanders must react to a constantly changing battlefield. The following illustration shows the overall process followed by intelligence personnel in producing this estimate.
THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
s
,q
THE COMMANDER s:::E:::kk:-
PIR/IR CREATED AND/OR
REVISED TO COVER ALL
THE IDENTIFIED NEEDS.

u

v
COLLECTION MISSIONS
FORMULATED TO COVER
ALL PIR/IR.

v
MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO
I SPECIFIC, CAPABLE
COLLECTION ASSETS.

ASSETS RESPOND TO
ASSIGNED MISSIONS BY
COLLECTING INFORMATION.

I

I

STAFF ELEMENTS PLAN
FUTURE OPERATIONS BASED
ON INTEL PREDICTIONS.

INTEL USED TO PREDICT

I
PROBABLE ENEMY FUTURE
ACTIVITY. I
INFORMATION PROCESSED
TO PRODUCE INTEL.

I I

COLLECTED INFORMATION
IS REPORTED BACK THRU
INTEL CHANNELS.

Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
Chapter 2 - cont.
CHAPTER 3
Interrogation Process
The interrogation process involves the screening and selection of sources for inter- rogation and the use of interrogation tech- niques and procedures. Both screening and interrogation involve complex interpersonal skills, and many aspects of their perfor- mance are extremely subjective. Each screening and interrogation is unique because of the interaction of the interroga- tor with the source. There are five interro- gation phases: planning and preparation, approach, questioning, termination, and reporting.
SCREENING SOURCES
Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation. It must be conducted at every echelon to determine the cooperativeness and the knowledgeability of sources and to determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and IR in a timely manner.
CONDUCT PRESCREENING
Observe the Source

Screeners should personally observe the source. During this observation, the screener should first examine the EPW cap- tive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive tag will provide the screener information regarding the source's circumstances of capture (when, where, how, by whom, and so forth). This information can assist the interrogator in the conduct of the screening and most importantly can show imme- diately if the source has the potential of possessing information which could answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. The screeners should pay particular atten- tion to rank insignia, condition of uniforms and equipment, and behavior demonstrated by the source. Screeners should look for things like attempts to talk to the guards, intentionally joining placement in the wrong segregation group, or any signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source whose appearance or behavior indicates
that he is willing to talk should be noted by the screeners. During the observation, the screener should look for signs (such as the source's branch insignia or other identifi- able features) to indicate that the source could have knowledge of information related to the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Question Guards
Screeners should question guards about the source. Since the guards are in constant contact with the source, they can provide the information on the source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how the source has responded to orders, what requests have been made by the source, what behavior has been demonstrated by the source, and so forth. In addition, the guards can help screeners with specific items of interest to identify sources who might answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Examine Documents
Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any docu- ments pertaining to the source. Documents captured with the source (identification card, letters, map sections, and so forth) can provide information that identifies the source, his organization, his mission, and other personal background (family, knowl- edge, experience, and so forth). Available documents pertaining to the source (screen- ing reports, interrogation reports, and administrative documents, such as detainee personnel record (see Appendix B)) prepared by the military police, can help the screener by providing information on the source's physical and emotional status, knowledge, experience, and other background informa- tion. This information can be used to verify information from documents captured with the source and further assess his willing- ness to cooperate. When examining docu- ments, screeners should look for items that will indicate whether the source is coopera- tive or willing to cooperate based on any
Chapter 3 - cont.
who responds hesitantly to questioning. The number "3" represents a source who does not respond to questioning. The letter "A" represents a source who is very likely to possess information pertinent to the sup- ported commander's PIR. The letter "B" represents a source who might have infor- mation pertinent to the supported com- mander's IR. The letter "C" represents a source who does not appear to have perti- nent information.
Those sources who have been assigned to the same category may be interrogated in any order deemed appropriate by the senior interrogator. Category 1A sources should normally be the first to be interrogated. Category 1B sources are next, followed by those assigned to categories 2A, lC, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 3B. Category 3C sources are nor- mally interrogated last. This order of priori- ties ensures the highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent information within the time available for interrogations. Screening codes may change with the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to con- duct an approach. The following illustra- tion depicts the order in which sources will be interrogated.
NOTE: The term "screening category" should not be confused with EPW- or source-assigned category that is assigned according to their intelligence value (see Appendix A).
INTERROGATION PRIORITIES BY SCREENING CATEGORY
AMOUNT OF PERTINENT KNOWLEDGE MOST LEAST
LEAST

Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
the approach phase. Make assessment by asking background and nonpertinent ques- tions which will indicate whether or not the approaches chosen will be effective. The questions can be mixed or they can be separate. If, for example, the interrogator had chosen a love of comrades approach, he should ask the source questions like "How did you get along with your fellow squad members?" If the source answers that they were all very close and worked well as a team, then the interrogator can go right into his love of comrades approach and be reasonably sure of its success. However, if the source answers, "They all hated my guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," then the interrogator should abandon that approach and ask some quick nonpertinent questions to give himself some time to work out a new approach.
Make Smooth Transitions. The interro- gator must guide the conversation smoothly and logically, especially if he needs to move from one approach technique to another. "Poking and hoping" in the approach may alert the prisoner of ploys and will make the job more difficult. Tie-ins to another approach can be made logically and smoothly by using transitional phrases. Logical tie-ins can be made by the inclusion of simple sentences which connect the previously used approach with the basis for the next one. Transitions can also be smoothly covered by leaving the unsuccess- ful approach and going back to nonperti- nent questions. By using nonpertinent con- versation, the interrogator can more easily move the conversation in the desired direc- tion, and as previously stated, sometimes obtain leads and hints as to source's stresses or weaknesses or other approach strategies that may be more successful.
Be Sincere and Convincing. All profes- sional interrogators must be convincing and appear sincere in working their approaches. If an interrogator is using argument and reason to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and appear sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and arguments, or other invented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe depends on his level of knowledge, experience, and training. A good assessment of the source is the basis for the approach and is vital to the success of the interrogation effort.
Recognize the Breaking Point. Every source has a breaking point, but an interro- gator never knows what it is until it has been reached. There are, however, some good indicators that the source is near his breaking point or has already reached it. For example, if during the approach, the source leans forward with his facial expres- sion indicating an interest in the proposal or is more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point. The interrogator must be alert and observant to recognize these signs in the approach phase. Once the interrogator determines that the source is breaking, he should inter- ject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If the source answers it, the interrogator can move into the question- ing phase. If the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the interrogator must realize that the source was not as close to the breaking point as was thought. In this case, the interrogator must continue with his approach or switch to an alternate approach or questioning technique and con- tinue to work until he again feels that the source is near breaking. The interrogator can tell if the source has broken only by interjecting pertinent questions. This pro- cess must be followed until the prisoner be- gins to answer pertinent questions. It is entirely possible that the prisoner may cooperate for a while and then balk at an- swering further questions. If this occurs, the interrogator can either reinforce the approaches that initially gained the source's cooperation or move into a differ- ent approach before returning to the ques- tioning phase of the interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the amount of time that is spent with a particu- lar source is dependent on several factors, that is, the battlefield situation, the expe- diency with which the supported command- er's PIR and IR requirements need to be answered, and so forth.
Approach Techniques
Interrogation approach techniques are usually performed by one interrogator
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
rapport. A response which is inconsistent with earlier responses or the interrogator's available data is not necessarily a lie. When such a response is obtained, the interroga- tor reveals the inconsistency to the source and asks for an explanation. The source's truthfulness should, then, be evaluated based on the plausibility of his explanation.
There are two types of questions that an interrogator should not use. These are com- pound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for at least two different pieces of information. They are, in effect, two or more questions combined as one. They require the source to supply a separate answer to each portion of the question. Compound questions should not be used during interrogations because they allow the source to evade a part of the question or to give an incomplete answer. They may confuse the source or cause the interrogator to misunderstand the response. Negative questions are questions which are constructed with words like "no," "none," or "not." They should be avoided because they may confuse the source and produce mis- leading or false information. They usually require additional questions to clarify the source's responses.
SALUTE Reportable Information
SALUTE reportable information is any information that is critical to the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. SALUTE reportable information is reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE report format, written or oral (see Appendix E for an example). Information may be SALUTE reportable even when an interro- gator cannot determine its immediate intel- ligence value. SALUTE reportable informa- tion is always time sensitive and answers the supported, higher, or adjacent unit's PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable informa- tion is identified by its potential value. If the information indicates a change in the enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is SALUTE reportable. If an interrogator cannot decide whether or not a piece of information is SALUTE reportable, he should act as though it is. This means that he should exploit it fully and record all per- tinent information. The interrogator should
then consult the senior interrogator for a
final determination of the information's
value.

Hot and Cold Leads
Leads are signs which tell an interrogator that the source has additional pertinent information that can be obtained through further questioning. Leads are provided by a source's response to the interrogator's questions. There are two types of leads that concern interrogators-hot and cold. A hot lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- tion that is SALUTE reportable. A cold lead, when exploited, may obtain informa- tion that is not SALUTE reportable but is still of intelligence value. The use of follow-up questions to fully exploit hot and cold leads may require an interrogator to cover topics that he did not list in his inter- rogation plan. An interrogator must exploit hot leads as soon as he identifies them. Once the interrogator is sure that he has obtained and recorded all the details known to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. The interrogator then resumes his question- ing of the source at the same point where the hot lead was obtained. An interrogator should note cold leads as they are obtained and exploit them fully during his question- ing on the topics to which the cold leads apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may indicate that the source possesses pertinent informa- tion in areas not previously selected for questioning. If the interrogator does not fully exploit all of the cold leads he obtains, he must include information on all the leads he did not exploit in his interrogation
report.
Hearsay Information
Hearsay information must include the most precise information possible of its source. This will include the name, duty position, full unit designation of the person who provided the information, and the date time group of when the source obtained the information.
Questioning Sequence
An interrogator begins his questioning phase with the first topic in the sequence he
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Chapter 3 - cont.
Throughout the briefing, the interrogator must answer all questions that the interpre- ter may have as fully and clearly as possi- ble. This helps ensure that the interpreter completely understands his role in the interrogation.
Conduct the Interrogation
During the interrogation, the interrogator corrects the interpreter if he violates any of the standards on which he was briefed. For example, if the interpreter injects his own ideas into the interrogation, he must be cor- rected. Corrections should be made in a low-key manner. At no time should the interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the source. The interrogator should never argue with the interpreter in the presence of the source. If a major correction must be made, and only when it is necessary, the interrogator and interpreter should leave the interroga- tion site temporarily.
When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude, behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogator and the source is especially important. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way that it would be if no interpreter was used.
During the termination phase, the inter- preter's ability to closely imitate the inter- rogator and the source is again very impor- tant. The approaches used are reinforced here, and the necessary sincerity and con- viction must be conveyed to the source.
The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to fill in gaps and unclear areas in the interrogator's notes. He may also assist in transliterating, translating, and explaining foreign terms.
Following the submission of all reports, the interrogator evaluates the performance of his interpreter. The evaluation must cover the same points of information that the interrogator received from the senior interrogator. The interrogator submits the results of his evaluation to the senior inter- rogator. The senior interrogator uses this evaluation to update the information he has about the interpreter. This evaluation may also be used in developing training pro- grams for interpreters.
Chapter 4
CAPTURED DOCUMENT TAG
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TAG
1.
DATEITIME CAPTURED:

2.
PLACE CAPTURED:

3.
CAPTURING UNIT:

4.
IDENTITY OF SOURCE (IF APPLICABLE):

5.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:


ACCOUNTABILITY
At each echelon, starting with the captur- ing unit, steps are taken to ensure that CED accountability is maintained during docu- ment evacuation. To establish account- ability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs. Thorough account- ability procedures at each echelon ensure that CEDs are not lost. To record each pro- cessing step as it occurs helps correct mis- takes in CED processing. Accountability is accomplished by anyone who captures, evacuates, processes, or handles CEDs. All CEDs should have captured document tags, and all captured document tags should be completely filled out. An incoming batch of documents includes a transmittal document (see the illustration on page 4-10). When a batch is received without a transmittal, the interrogation element contacts the forward- ing unit and obtains a list of document serial numbers. The interrogation element records all trace actions in its journal. Accountability includes inventorying the CEDs as they arrive, initiating any neces- sary trace actions, and maintaining the captured document log. Whenever intelli- gence derived from a CED is included in a unit or information intelligence reports, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are quoted to avoid false confirmation. All CEDs are shipped with any associated documents.
Chapter 4 - cont.
UNIT:
FILE RECEIVED DOCUMENT INCOMING FORWARDING RECEIVED BY NUMBER DTG SERIAL TRANSMIS-UNIT NUMBER SlON NUMBER
CAPTURING UNIT SCREENING DESCRIPTION OF OUTGOING
CATEGORY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL
TIME AND PLACE OF CAPTURE (DTG)
C)
B
w
-I
C
a

m
u

u

0
C)
E

m
Z
-I r
0 G)
REMARKS
-

Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
especially for lengthy or technical docu- ments. It is unlikely that many full transla- tions will be performed at corps or below. Even when dealing with category A docu- ments, it may not be necessary to translate the entire document to gain the information it contains.
Extract Translation. An extract transla- tion is one in which only a portion of the document is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may decide that a few paragraphs in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance manual merit translation and a full translation of the manual is not necessary. Therefore, he would request an extract translation of the portion of the text in which he has an interest.
Summary Translation. A translator be- gins a summary translation by reading the entire document. The translator then sum- marizes the main points of information instead of rendering a full translation or an extract translation. This type of translation requires that a translator have more analy- tical abilities. The translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the document against the time available in combat operations. A summary translation may also be used by translators working in languages in which they have not been formally trained. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to accurately deliver a full translation of a Bulgarian language document. However, he can proba- bly render a usable summary of the infor- mation it contains.
Translation Reports
Except for SALUTE reports, all informa- tion resulting from document exploitation activities will be reported in a translation report (see the following illustration for a sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports have been sub- mitted, the translator will prepare any required translation reports. CEDs that contain information of intelligence value that was not SALUTE reported are the sub- ject of translation reports. Translation reports are prepared on all category C CEDs and include portions of category A, TECHDOCs, and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported.
SAMPLE TRANSLATION REPORT
UNCLASSIFIED
DATE: 231500ZAug85 TO: G2, V Corps
FROM: Team 1, IPW Section, REPORT NUMBER: 08-0356 241st MI Bn, 23d Div (Armd), V Corps
PART I:CONTROL DATA
1.
DOCUMENT NUMBER: US-WAIBVO-03093

2.
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: Personal letter, 1 page, handwritten, mentions a tank factory disguised as a sugar processing plant, and school teachers and elderly people working in factories

3.
DOCUMENT'S ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: Russian

4.
DATE AND TIME RECEIVED: 240847ZAug85

5.
DATE AND TIME OF CAPTURE: 230923ZAug85

6.
PLACE OF CAPTURE: NB640320

7.
CAPTURING UNIT: All-50513182 ABN DIV

8.
CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE: Found in an abandoned enemy CP.

9.
TRANSLATOR: SSG Schnurbart

10.
TYPE OF TRANSLATION: Full


PART 11: TEXT OF TRANSLATION
My dear Serezhen'ka: It has been a long time since Ireceived a letter from you. How are and where are you? The last time you wrote that fighting was going on around you all the time, and this worries me alot. Take care of yourself. There have been many changes at home. Your mother, des- pite her age, had to go to work in the factory. They make tanks there, but the sign over the entrance says this is a sugar plant. Idon't know why they do this. At the school where I work, we were also told to go and work at the same plant. They are going to close the school. Everyone has either to go to the front or work in the war industry. This is necessary in order to speed up the victory over the enemy of our country. Iwould be more at ease if I knew that you are alive and well. Please write as soon as you can. Your KATHY.
UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4 - cont.
Chapter 4 - cont.
SAMPLE CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL
CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT TRANSMITTAL TO: DATEITIME: FROM: TRANSMITTAL NO:
SCREENED: YES NO CATEGORY: A B C D NIA
DOCUMENT SERIAL NUMBERS:
Chapter 4 - cont.
them away from him so that he cannot de- stroy them. In general, this is good, but there is one major exception. Under no cir- cumstances is a source's identification card to be taken from him.
When documents are taken from a source, it is necessary to ensure the source from whom they were taken can be identified. The easiest way to accomplish this is with the source's captive tag (see standardized captive tag in Appendix D). The bottom portion of the tag is designed to be used for marking equipment or documents. Three possible actions may be taken with docu- ments captured with a source. The docu- ments may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the source.
Confiscation
Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention of returning them. Official documents, except identifica- tion documents, are confiscated and appro- priately evacuated. The intelligence value of the document should be weighed against the document's support in the interrogation of the source. Category A documents require exploitation and should be copied. One copy should be translated and exploited sepa- rately, and the other copy should be evacu- ated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision should be made on whether to evacuate the document with the source or evacuate it separately. Cate- gory B CEDs should be evacuated to the TCAE for appropriate exploitation. Cate- gory C official documents can best be used in the interrogation of the source. Therefore, these CEDs and category D official docu- ments should be evacuated with the source.
Impounded
Impounded CEDs are taken away with the intention of returning them at a later time. When a document is impounded, the source must be given a receipt. The receipt must contain a list of the items impounded and the legible name, rank, and unit of the person issuing the receipt. All personal effects, including monies and other valu- ables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of personal effects that have been impounded will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appen- dix B).Also, DA Form 1132 will be com- pleted and signed by the officer in charge or authorized representative. A copy will be provided the source. Further procedures for the handling of personal effects are pro- vided in AR 190-8.
Returned
Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and information of interest, and immediately given back to the source. Personal docu- ments belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination in accor- dance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of such papers may be made and forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned to the source.
RECOGNITION AND EVACUATION OF DOCUMENTS
In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible that documents captured with, sources will not be handled expediously. Final disposition of these documents may not be made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps holding area. Some documents captured with a source will aid in the interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, should be copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited separately. This makes it particularly important for the cap- turing unit to correctly identify the docu- ments captured with the source. This is more easily done when the interrogation element rather than the military police ele- ment signs for the documents captured with sources.
EVACUATION OF SIGNIFICANT
DOCUMENTS

For more efficient exploitation of CEDs and sources, documents captured with a source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significance may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a reproduction should be made and kept with the source. If reproduction is not possible, the captured document tags should be annotated as to where the document was sent. Significant documents such as cate- gory A documents and TECHDOCs, Cate- gory B documents, maps, charts, and Air Force- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.
ACCOUNTABILITY OF DOCUMENTS
The evacuation of documents captured with a source follows the same account- ability procedures as with documents found on the battlefield. The capturing unit pre- pares a captive tag listing details pertain- ing to the source and the place and circum- stances of capture. The bottom portion is used to list documents captured with the source.
Documents captured with a source are subject to the same screening and exploita- tion procedures as those found on the bat- tlefield. These documents are categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A docu- ments have SALUTE reportable informa- tion extracted and are copied, if possible. A copy can then be used to aid in the exploita- tion of the source, and the other copy is sent forward for prompt exploitation and trans- lation. Category B documents should be treated as secret and evacuated to the TCAE. Category C documents are exploited. A category C document may also require copying and evacuation. Official documents should be evacuated through document evacuation channels. If they would aid in the interrogation of a source, personal documents may require similar copying.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 - cont.
SCREENING REPORTING

Screening determines who will be interro- gated on a priority basis and in many cases how many times a source will be interro- gated. For this reason, the successful accomplishment of the intelligence collec- tion effort depends on qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a minimum. He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.
INTERROGATION
The senior interrogator ensures that sources are assigned for interrogation according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures that the high- est probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information within the time available is chosen.
The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened sources. He does this by comparing infor- mation gained during the screening process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular source.
At times, a situation will occur in which none of the available interrogators speaks the target language well enough to conduct an interrogation. When this occurs the senior interrogator coordinates with Sl/Gl for procurement of native interpreters. The senior interrogator maintains a list of available interpreters. He compares this list with the qualifications of his subordinate interrogators and the information listed on the screening report. Based on this compari- son, the senior interrogator can then assign the best qualified interpreter and interroga- tor. Interrogators must monitor interpreters periodically to ensure their performance is according to the standards established by the senior interrogator.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports are prepared and submitted in an accurate and timely manner. SALUTE reports must be generated immediately upon identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other reports which are generated by an interro- gation mus

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